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FOREWORD
Still Soldiers and Scholars? An Analysis of Army Officer Testing traces the history of officer accessions testing and assessment in the U.S. Army from about 1900
until the present day. This book is intended to supplement the series of monographs written by the Army’s
Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA)
that were intended to provide a conceptual and theoretical framework for the development of an Army
officer corps strategy. Those monographs consider the
creation and maintenance of a highly skilled officer
corps in the context of the nation’s continuing commitment to an all-volunteer military, its far-flung international interests, and ongoing changes in its domestic
labor market. They advocate building a talent-focused strategy around a human capital model focused
on accessing, developing, retaining, and employing
talent.
The focus of Still Soldiers and Scholars? is on the
controversial, little understood, and often ignored
component of talent management known as cognitive
assessment. While the Army has embraced various
non-cognitive assessments of individuals’ skills and
abilities, which are also admittedly important parts of
talent management, it as an institution has been reluctant to place too much of an emphasis on the cognitive
testing of officer aspirants. Commissioning sources
either set no minimum cut-off score on standardized
tests or routinely waive the requirement to attain a
minimum score. Indeed, the Army’s largest commissioning source—the Reserve Officer Training Corps
(ROTC)—no longer requires all, or even the majority,
of its officer candidates to take a test measuring their
cognitive abilities.
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By recounting the long history of officer accessions
testing in the U.S. Army, the authors of Still Soldiers
and Scholars? shed light on a very neglected and misunderstood topic and offer insights into how and why
the Army has arrived at the policies and programs it
currently has for screening officers for cognitive abilities. They conclude that cognitive testing for officer
producing programs is an essential part of the talent
management process. It is critical to creating the
Army’s force of the future, because it will produce the
type of critical thinking, mentally agile, and intellectually flexible leaders the Army needs to meet the challenge of an environment that is becoming increasingly
ambiguous, volatile, and chaotic.
After devoting the bulk of the book to describing
the evolution of officer accessions testing over the
last century, the authors provide a list of recommendations and observations intended to help the Army
think through the officer testing issue. Their recommended measures were crafted to make the officer
accessions process more selective, and to ensure that
the Army has a reasonable, but definite, intellectual
baseline from which to work. The prescriptions they
provide are reasonable, achievable, and crafted to be
accepted by economy-minded defense officials.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Still Soldiers and Scholars? An Analysis of Army Officer Testing was written as a supplement to a series of
monographs authored by members of the Office of
Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) and published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in 2009
and 2010. In those monographs, the authors proposed
an officer corps strategy based on the theory of talent
management. Other observers have contributed to
the discussion, most notably, perhaps, Tim Kane, a
research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, in Bleeding
Talent (2012).
This book focuses on one critical, yet neglected,
aspect of the talent-based officer management system
that performs four functions: accessing, developing,
retaining, and employing talent. The book focuses on
the cognitive testing and evaluation of officer aspirants, a critical element in the accession function. The
book opens with an introduction in the first chapter,
explaining the contemporary significance of the cognitive capability (and hence testing) of officers. Next,
eight historical chapters are presented, which describe
how the Army conducted cognitive testing for officers over time. The final chapter offers a conclusion
in which the authors review their findings, highlight
important conclusions, and offer recommendations
for the Army to restore a system of rigorous and effective mental screening for officers.
Chapter 2 traces the history of officer testing from
the Spanish-American War through World War I. The
chapter is organized around the three principal commissioning sources during this era—the U.S. Military
Academy (USMA) at West Point, the enlisted force,
and civil life (that is, officers drawn from the civilian
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population). Except in wartime, West Point was by
far the Army’s largest commissioning source. The
rigorous mental tests used to screen applicants for a
commission are described in some detail, as are the
admissions policies and conditions at West Point. A
surprisingly large proportion of cadets during this
era, somewhere between 50 and 80 percent, attended
post-secondary educational institutions before applying to West Point.
Chapter 3 covers officer selection during World
War I. The Army had to take extraordinary measures
to produce enough officers to direct its expanded
force. The former-War Department established a
system of Officer Training Schools (OTS) that vetted,
and, to a limited extent, trained the men who eventually received line commissions. Starting with the third
series of camps, the War Department drew principally
from the enlisted ranks for its officers. The OTS model
had pronounced shortcomings, but it brought some
consistency and standardization to the commissioning process. The War Department’s officer selection
system for the technical and professional branches
was more traditional and haphazard. In many of these
branches, political influence, personal connections,
and chance regulated the commissioning process.
West Point underwent acute changes during the war;
its curriculum was severely curtailed, and it eliminated the entrance test as a prerequisite for admission,
thereby lowering standards.
Chapter 4 provides a review of officer testing
during the interwar period. Standards for entrance
into the officer corps remained quite high throughout that period, and applicants for commissions
exceeded vacancies. West Point’s entrance standards
may have eroded slightly as the institution expanded
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and admitted a majority of its students by certificate
until 1930. It also established a pathway for enlisted
candidates into the Academy in 1920 via preparatory
schools across the country. Even so, the admissions
standards at West Point remained quite high. During
the Great Depression, West Point could offer a free,
elite education and a well-paying job after graduation.
The Army tightened up admissions policies in 1930
when it adopted a validating exam to screen applicants more carefully before admitting them into the
Academy.
Accessing officers during World War II is the subject of Chapter 5. The calculus of officer production
for the Army changed fundamentally in World War
II. Officer Candidate School (OCS) accounted for the
bulk of new line officer accessions, while direct commissioning furnished the majority of officers for the
professional and technical specialties. While entrance
testing for the OCS program was more consistent
and standardized than it had been in World War I, it
was no more rigorous. With the outbreak of war, the
War Department abandoned the criterion-referenced
exams of the peacetime Army and adopted the Army
General Classification Test (AGCT) as the principal
officer testing instrument. It did so not because the
AGCT was optimal for the task, but because nothing
better was available at the time. It also set a minimum
AGCT score of 110; not for any objective reason, but
because it enabled the Army to meet its wartime officer needs.
Chapter 6 analyzes the tests used to screen officer candidates in the 2 decades after World War II,
when the mental testing of Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps (ROTC) graduates underwent a transformation. Before the war, candidates were given rigorous,
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criterion-referenced tests of academic attainment and
general intelligence in order to identify individuals
with the intellectual skills required of field grade officers. After the war, candidates were given norm-referenced tests of mental ability and academic attainment.
The emphasis was on finding lieutenants capable of
functioning effectively as junior officers and motivated toward a career in the Army. The transformation in mental testing was, in part, a result of the Cold
War strategic environment, which demanded a military that was constantly ready to fight. The Army no
longer focused on producing erudite, strategically
thinking officers capable of managing a mass mobilization effort and leading a huge citizen army in a
general war. Now it had a more immediate and intellectually less ambitious focus: well-trained and motivated junior officers capable of leading platoons.
In Chapter 7, officer testing during Vietnam, an
era of declining standards for officer accessions, is
reviewed. The rapid and massive expansion of the
Army and its officer corps led to a compromise with
quality in each of its three major commissioning programs. ROTC saw its institutional base changed drastically. Elite, private colleges were replaced with less
competitive state institutions in the South and West.
The entrance tests, ROTC Qualifying (RQ)-8 and RQ-9,
were circumvented with hundreds of waivers. OCS
admitted thousands of undereducated officer aspirants and altered the intellectual, if not moral, complexion of the officer corps.
Chapter 8 reviews the officer cognitive screening
during the first 2 decades of the All-Volunteer Force
(AVF). In terms of testing, all three of the Army’s
main commissioning sources experienced a similar evolution in the post-Vietnam era. West Point,
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ROTC, and OCS all diluted their mental standards
and increased their emphasis on non-cognitive measures of career motivation, including non-cognitive
interest inventories and biographical surveys. ROTC
adopted a less rigorous test of mental ability in 1972,
and then abandoned cognitive testing completely in
1984. OCS adopted a less rigorous test in 1979, and
then abandoned that test in the mid-1980s, leaving a
general technical (GT) aptitude area score of 110 as
its only mental screen. West Point eliminated the College Board math and English achievement tests as an
admissions requirement in 1973.
Chapter 9 covers the aspects of officer mental testing during the post-Cold War era. Officer testing in
all three of the Army principal commissioning programs has followed a similar trajectory during the
post-Cold War period: cognitive measures continued
to be eclipsed by non-cognitive measures of aptitude
and performance. The latter tended to be better predictors of retention in pre-commissioning programs in
the Army than the former, which were found to have
an inverse u-shaped correlation with career commitment. Budgetary pressures and military effectiveness
combined to push defense and congressional leaders
to demand economy and efficiency in pre-commissioning training, and to place a premium on non-cognitive measures.
The final chapter, Chapter 10, offers a conclusion
and makes recommendations for improvements. In
short, contrary to popular opinion and scholarly assertion, the rigor of the Army’s intellectual selection
instruments has deteriorated over the last century.
In all three of the Army’s principal commissioning
sources—the USMA, the ROTC, and the OCS program—the trend has been toward declining standards
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and declining (relative) scores. The size of the Army,
changing economic paradigms and the consequent
decline of the prestige of an Army career, expansion of
college aid, unbalanced college growth, competition
from the other services, increasing emphasis placed on
officer retention, and diversity considerations all help
explain this trend. To address and potentially reverse
this decline, this book makes several recommendations with respect to officer mental testing. The principal recommendations are for the Army to: 1) require
accessions testing for officer candidates in all commissioning sources; 2) establish explicit standards for
these tests, both in terms of a minimum and an average; and, 3) do more to identify and access cognitively
capable individuals from its large and diverse pool of
enlisted Soldiers.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the last century, the Army has
progressively diluted its intellectual screening instruments for the selection of officers. This dilution is not
reflective of a deliberate choice by the Army but rather
a slow, progressive adjustment to the reality of the
recruiting environment. Restoring an intellectually
rigorous screening process will require substantial
time, work, and resources from the Army; but, in our
opinion, it is a task worth undertaking.
This enfeeblement of screening standards is not
widely recognized by academics and policymakers.
In fact, many scholars would have us believe that the
story of mental testing for officers has been a “triumph of science”—a story of unremitting progress in
which the intellectual requirements for commissioning have been steadily raised over the years. In their
narratives, they depict officer testing before World
War II as being in a primitive state. In a recent book,
one social scientist, with a long involvement in the
area of officer screening, flatly states that, aside from
the limited use of intelligence quotient (IQ) tests in
World War I, “there was little systematic screening
of officer candidates prior to World War II.”1 Stephen
Ambrose, in his rather uneven history of West Point,
paints a similar picture. He wrote that the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), in response to a congressional
directive in 1812, introduced a rudimentary entrance
examination in reading, writing, and arithmetic. There
things stood until 1902, when, according to Ambrose,
high school graduation replaced the basic literacy and
numeracy test as an entrance requirement. How he
could reconcile West Point’s antebellum preeminence
1

as an institution of engineering education with such
lax screening procedures is a mystery. Like some
others who have written about the subject of officer
accessions, Ambrose did not waste a lot of time digging around in the archives to construct his narrative.
He certainly would not have had to dig very deeply to
unearth the admissions tests used to screen Academy
applicants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
If he had done so, he would have probably come up
with a different set of conclusions.2
As opposed to the primitive state of officer mental
screening before World War II, some scholars intimate,
the story after the war was one of steady advancement, with finely calibrated psychometric instruments
gradually replacing the primeval instruments used in
the earlier era. New, more holistic approaches to officer evaluation accompanied these new assessment
instruments, making for a more useful and predictive
selection process. In any case, they continue, there was
not a great need for Army-developed mental screening mechanisms after World War II. The Army and
Defense Department requirement that officers—or
at least those who were commissioned through West
Point or Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC)—
possess a baccalaureate degree “greatly reduced the
need for additional screening.”3 As anyone familiar
with trends and developments in post-secondary education over the last half century is well aware, this is a
questionable proposition at best.
We find the picture of officer screening painted
by many social scientists and historians to be, at best,
incomplete. To be sure, the Army’s psychometric
instruments for officer selection have been refined and
the Army’s resultant ability to predict career success
and retention in service has increased over the years.

2

This has not, however, been accompanied by more
rigorous tests of academic achievement or mental ability. While it is true that the Army has become in some
ways more systematic about officer screening, it has
also become, we argue, less rigorous (i.e., intellectually
demanding). Consistency and standardization do not
necessarily equate to rigor. In fact, while the Army has
been increasing its reliance on psychometric principles
for screening its officer candidates, the emphasis of
officer testing has shifted from academic and mental
ability to non-cognitive factors such as motivation and
likelihood of retention. In the age of the All-Volunteer
Force, economic considerations rule, and high retention-rates are key to achieving economic efficiency.
Only recently have voices been raised questioning
the conventional wisdom regarding the intellectual
quality of the military’s officer corps and the rigor of
the officer screening process. One such voice has been
Bruce Fleming, a professor of English at the Naval
Academy. In his book Annapolis Autumn, and other
publications, Fleming has questioned the rigor of the
Naval Academy’s screening process and the intellectual quality of students admitted to Annapolis.4 Two
political scientists, Matthew Cancian and Michael
Klein, have posed similar questions about entrance
requirements for the Marine Corps Officer Candidate
School (OCS). They conclude that the intelligence level
of newly accessed Marine officers has dipped substantially since 1980.5 Stephen Gerras and Leonard Wong,
both from the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), have
evaluated the Army’s pre-commissioning mental
screening standards and found them wanting. Their
recent article on the Army’s intellectual screening procedures highlights pre-commissioning testing gaps
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and questions the rigor of the mental screening process for officers. They contend that:
quality metrics for officer accessions are uneven and
oftentimes meaningless. Thus, despite the Army’s
focus on achieving cognitive dominance on the future
battlefield, officer accession quality standards are
inconsistent, sometimes non-existent, and not on par
with enlisted accession standards.6

This long-term trend toward relaxed mental
screening standards is troubling given the Army’s current emphasis on the development of cognitive skills
in officers, the perceived lack of strategic acumen
among the Army’s general officers, and the low level
of basic literacy and numeracy among mid-career field
grade officers. To be sure, there is a growing awareness that things might not be as auspicious as some
social scientists would have us believe relative to the
intellectual quality of the officer corps. Still, among
senior Army leaders at least, the need for more exacting intellectual entrance gates for commissioning has
not become an issue.
A NEW ERA?
Since the end of the Cold War, the intellectual
demands on the Army’s officer corps have increased
substantially. Today, the Army faces a security
environment of, in the words of the authors of the
USAWC’s Elihu Root Study, “growing complexity and
danger.”7 Technological advances as well as the new
and more multidimensional threats that have arisen in
recent years are making extraordinary demands on the
intellectual capability of the officer corps. Responding
to these new conditions, the Army has revamped its
operational doctrine to meet the new threats that have
4

arisen. AirLand Battle, the Army’s doctrine during the
Cold War, gave way to new doctrinal approaches contained in concepts such as Full Spectrum Operations,
Network Centric Warfare, and Charles C. Krulak’s
“Three Block War.”8
Over the last decade or so, the Army has reassessed the security challenges facing the nation and
has adumbrated the type of officer corps it needs to
meet these challenges. These challenges encompass
both environmental factors and threats posed by what
are seen as adaptive and increasingly powerful potential adversaries. According to the Army, the “dynamic
and complex future operational environment” that is
rapidly taking shape is distinguished by:
five fundamental characteristics: increased velocity and
momentum of human interaction, growing potential for
overmatch, increased proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, spread of advanced cyberspace and counterspace capabilities, and changing demographics that
increasingly require operations among urban populations
and in complex terrain [emphasis added].9

Moreover, Army leaders assert, while the institution
is preparing to adjust to or compensate for these characteristics, it must be prepared to “engage globally in
multiple domains.”10
The “unprecedented connectedness” that now
characterizes global interaction has aroused special
concern. This connectedness, Army leaders believe,
has resulted in a “rising velocity of human interaction” that will make it more difficult for leaders to
understand events completely or to predict the aftermath of any incident. Army leaders stand in danger
of becoming overwhelmed with information and
being presented with multiple dilemmas within very
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constricted timeframes. This difficult environment will
require future Army officers to perform at a higher
intellectual level than they presently do.11
The connectedness that allows for the rapid proliferation of ideas and technology tends to level the
technological playing field. It is helping prospective
adversaries close the technology gap with the United
States and gain near-peer status in many realms. This
trend is leading to increasing competition in the land,
air, sea, space, and cyber domains. In an earlier era,
the United States could rely on its superior industrial
base, powered by a stout research and development
capability, to maintain a significant advantage over
likely competitors and enemies. This advantage is rapidly evaporating. As the technology gap closes and
fiscal austerity erodes U.S. military superiority, the
Army must find new ways to ensure it is capable of
meeting adaptive threats and dominating throughout
the full spectrum of military operations.12
One thing that the Army must do to cope with this
new and substantially more complex security environment is to find better ways to select, develop, and
leverage its people. It must produce leaders who have
a heightened appreciation of social context, a highly
refined sense of cultural empathy, an ability to craft
apposite solutions to multifaceted human problems,
a capacity to innovate on the battlefield, a well-developed social intuition for their operational environment, and the intellectual ability to think broadly about
the nature of the conflict in which they are engaged.
This, at least, is what Army pronouncements on the
subject tell us we need. To meet these many demands,
the Army must possess leaders who are agile, adaptive, and knowledgeable warriors with critical thinking skills and broad cultural understanding.13 Talent
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management is supposed to play a part in aligning the
Army’s talent base with its requirements and capabilities. This alignment is to begin with establishing a
baseline inventory of individual strengths and weaknesses. Assessments of personal aptitude and potential, together with predictive analytics and educational
programs to optimize individual strengths, are supposed to play a key role in this effort.14
Some observers doubt that, intellectually, the
officer corps is up to the complex and wide-ranging
demands and threats currently facing it.15 They portray the officer corps as being still mired in a Cold War
mindset and unable to adjust to the conditions of a
new age.16 While Operation DESERT STORM and the
initial stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM showed
that the Army’s officer corps was a well-trained body
of military professionals, the rather spotty record of
the officer corps in unconventional conflicts in the
years thereafter took some of the luster off its reputation and cast doubt on its collective strategic acumen.
The intellectual ability of the officer corps, some have
argued or suggested, has simply not kept pace with
the demands of the new strategic environment.17
James G. Pierce of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
is one who believes that the Army’s leaders, when
considered as a group, are intellectually unprepared
for the challenges of the operational environment. He
asserted that the Army’s senior leaders “may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future
success.”18 Prominent civilian commentators such as
Thomas Ricks have expressed the same concern.
Moreover, many of the observers who do see a
problem consider the lack of mental acuity among
Army officers as a professional education issue, not an
officer screening matter. If only the curricula in Army
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schools and educational programs could be improved,
they suggest, the Army’s dearth of strategic leaders
could be alleviated. Such an educational revamping
could supposedly produce leaders who are more mentally agile and situationally aware than their predecessors who had been prepared to battle the Warsaw Pact
during the Cold War.19
In today’s security environment, the Army expects
all officers, even lieutenants and junior captains, to be
flexible, adaptive, innovative, situationally aware, and
culturally sensitive leaders capable of thinking critically and solving complex problems. For a time, the
Army said that it wanted officers who were polymaths
(or “pentathletes” as they were dubbed in official
publications), knowledgeable in multiple disciplines
and capable of drawing connections across multiple
domains. The officer had to be a diplomat, counselor,
historian, engineer, polyglot, and sociologist. An officer was, as one officer observed, expected to be a jack
of all trades and a master of them all. In the Balkans,
and later in Iraq and Afghanistan, even junior leaders
were called upon to make tactical decisions that had
operational and strategic implications. The day of
the strategic corporal and lieutenant had seemingly
arrived. More recently, the Army has backed away
from this pentathlete model, realizing that few people
fit this mold and those few that do may not want to
serve in the Army.20 Still, the Army continues to call
for leaders who think critically and creatively, possess
mental adaptability, and possess cultural awareness.21
The rhetoric has been tempered but the demands
remain daunting.
The Army faces a dilemma. The intellectual
demands being placed on the officer corps are high
but the rigor of its intellectual screening mechanisms

8

to control entry into the officer corps is low—and continues to decline. In some respects, the Army’s officer
accessions standards have never been lower, at least
during peacetime.
Unlike the business world, the military does not
have the option of importing talent and solving its
human capital deficiencies through lateral entry. It
cannot go outside the organization to hire a general, or
even a captain, at least, not in most line branches. The
services must work with what they initially take in and
try to develop their own strategic thinkers. This puts a
premium on officer selection and a premium on native
intellectual ability, since, as will be explained later in
this chapter, intelligence is the single most important
factor in predicting who does and does not think critically and strategically. For many observers, this is an
extremely uncomfortable and unpalatable fact.22
INDICATIONS OF THIS DECLINING
STANDARD
This relaxation of mental standards is indirectly
reflected in a number of ways. One sign of this relaxation of standards can be seen in selection standards
at the USMA, the commissioning source widely
regarded as the Army’s gold standard for officers.
Since World War II, West Point has fallen out of the
ranks of the nation’s elite academic institutions. To
be sure, its faculty has not been elite since the mid19th century. Its student body, however, had been
top flight until the 1950s. In the first half of the 20th
century, it outperformed the nation’s most distinguished civilian undergraduate institutions on tests
of academic achievement. As late as 1946, West Point
cadets outperformed Yale undergraduates on the
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Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). This began to change
in the 1950s. By 1960, Yale outclassed the USMA in
almost all measures of academic attainment; by 2014,
the USMA even scored below some state-supported
flagship institutions on tests of academic achievement
and aptitude. In an academic sense, West Point is no
longer elite—at least not based on standardized test
scores (see Figure 1-1).23
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Figure 1-1. SAT Scores, 1956-2015
USMA versus Harvard.
West Point’s decline in selectivity is also underscored by the decreasing percentage of entering cadets
with prior college experience and the quality of the
institutions that these cadets attended. Forty-three
percent of the class of 1901, for example, had matriculated at other colleges before attending West Point.
Among the institutions attended were: the University
of Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Stanford,
Johns Hopkins, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the U.S. Naval Academy, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale. Today, one would be hard-pressed
10

to find a student who had spent 3 years studying at an
Ivy League institution just to qualify for an appointment to West Point, as many cadets who entered West
Point before World War I did. After World War II,
the percentage of cadets with prior college experience
began an extended decline. It fell to 30 percent by the
late 1950s and to 20 percent by the 1970s. By 2014, only
11.7 percent of West Point’s graduating class had prior
college experience and, as one might expect, none of
the institutions named above were represented among
cadets.24
Recently, there has been some attention focused
on the question of officer screening, in relation to the
Army and to other services. Fleming has called attention to what he sees as screening shortcomings at the
Naval Academy. According to Fleming, the Navy’s
fixation on enlisted candidates and diversity considerations has led Annapolis to lower the intellectual
standards for admission. Cancian and Klein, in their
study of Marine Corps officer aspirants, found that
the entry level scores of Marine Corps officers on the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery’s (ASVAB’s) General Classification Test (GCT) had declined
significantly between 1980 and 2014. This decline in
GCT scores, they noted, mirrored the increase in the
college participation rate of students who became
Marine officers and who enrolled in “green-to-gold”
type programs.25
THE IMPORTANCE OF COGNITIVE TESTING
FOR OFFICER ACCESSIONS
One of the fundamental premises upon which we
built this book was that in officer accessions, tests of
cognitive ability such as the SAT, American College
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Testing (ACT), and various intelligence/aptitude
tests (including the ASVAB and the derivative Armed
Forces Qualification Test [AFQT]) matter. More than
any other single factor, intelligence, or “g,” predicts
success or achievement in learning, training, education, workplace performance, health, income, and
wealth.26 How intelligence is measured, and how
intelligence affects outcomes such as those just listed,
are discussed next.
We accept Arthur R. Jensen’s definition of intelligence—namely, the general ability to perform well
on a large and varied battery of mental tests.27 When
test takers are given a wide variety of mental tasks
to perform, it becomes possible, through a statistical
procedure called factor analysis, to identify factors
associated with performance on the test.28 For example, a verbal ability factor emerges from performance
on reading, language, syntax, synonyms, and related
questions. From doing addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, a quantitative factor emerges.
However, it is well documented that an overall general factor (g) also emerges. This general factor influences performance on questions and tasks of all sorts.
It is not a particular ability or skill per se; rather, it is
perhaps best thought of as overall cognitive fitness.
The number typically assigned to g is the familiar IQ.
The U.S. Army does not administer traditional
intelligence tests; however, it does use the AFQT.
Research conducted in 1974 by David F. McGrevy,
Stephan B. Knouse, and Ronnie A. Thompson showed
that the AFQT was significantly correlated with scores
on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.29 Correlations were .48 for black Air Force enlistees and .71 for
white Air Force enlistees. Research that is more recent
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established a corrected correlation between the AFQT
and the Multidimensional Aptitude Battery of .9241.30
The Army uses the ASVAB and the AFQT for
enlisted personnel but not for officers (with the exception of OCS candidates and a number of ROTC cadets
who, by virtue of prior enlisted service, take the
ASVAB). Instead, the Army relies on the SAT and ACT
for officers sourced from the USMA and, contrary to a
popular notion, for only a portion of each ROTC commissioning cohort. (For a large portion of each ROTC
entering cohort, the Army uses no mental screening
instrument.) Some colleges rely on these tests to assist
in the admissions process—specifically, to predict
collegiate grades. With a long history of administration (the SAT being first administered in 1926 and the
ACT in 1959), the research literature is clear on their
important, but not necessarily large, relationship to
intelligence and academic achievement. Meredith C.
Frey and Douglas K. Detterman compute the correlation between the SAT and Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices, corrected for nonlinearity, to be .483,
while the correlation between the SAT and AFQT,
again corrected for nonlinearity, to be a very strong
.86.31 Finally, although it has a shorter history and
has generally been used less frequently, the ACT was
shown by Katherine A. Koenig, Meredith C. Frey, and
Douglas K. Detterman to correlate .77 with the ASVAB
and .61 with Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices.
In short, the Army has access to (but does not always
use) fairly decent measures of cognitive ability, which
correlate strongly with each other.32
Should the Army measure cognitive ability? Jensen
makes the following extraordinary, but well documented, claim regarding general mental ability:

13

The g factor (and other highly g-loaded test scores, such
as the IQ) shows a more far-reaching and universal
practical validity than any other coherent psychological
construct yet discovered. It predicts performance to some
degree in every kind of behavior that calls for learning,
decision, and judgment. Its validity is an increasing
monotonic function of the level of cognitive complexity
in the predicted criterion. Even at moderate levels of
complexity of the criterion to be predicted, g is the sine
qua non of test validity. The removal of g (by statistical
regression) from any psychometric test or battery, leaving
only group factors and specificity, absolutely destroys
their practical validity when they are used in a population
that ranges widely in general ability. The validity of g is
most conspicuous in scholastic performance, not because
g-loaded tests measure specifically what is taught in
school, but because g is intrinsic to learning novel
material, grasping concepts, distinctions, and meanings.
. . . In the world of work, g is the main cognitive correlate
and best single predictor of success in job training and job
performance. Its validity is not nullified or replaced by
formal education (independent of g), nor is it decreased
by increasing experience on the job. . . . The g factor is
also reflected in many broad social outcomes. Many
social behavior problems, including dropping out of
school, chronic welfare status, illegitimacy, child neglect,
poverty, accident proneness, delinquency, and crime,
are negatively correlated with g or IQ independently of
social class of origin. These social pathologies have an
inverse monotonic relation to IQ level in the population,
and show, on average, nearly five times the percentage
of occurrence in the lowest quartile (IQ below 90) of the
total distribution of IQ as in the highest quartile (IQ above
110).33

Generally speaking, extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence. The reader should note that g
is the most studied topic in psychology; that is, more
studies have been done on human intelligence than on
any other topic (including sexuality and personality).
It is also one of the oldest topics studied. The research
14

literature reviewed below certainly justifies Jensen’s claims regarding the importance of g.34 We, the
authors, readily concede, however, that intelligence is
not the only thing that matters. Certainly, motivation
and opportunity affect outcomes as well.35 Particularly, motivation can influence one’s intelligence test
scores, hence compromising the predictive validity of
the intelligence tests.36 However, as will be shown, g,
as measured by IQ tests, is a remarkably powerful predictor. We will review the research literature, which
shows how intelligence is positively related to sensory
discrimination, to job selection and performance, to
health, and to state and national wealth.
The relationship between g and job performance is
strong, positive, and nearly linear. This suggests that
both entrance into a particular job or job field, and performance in that job, can be predicted fairly well from
intelligence test scores. The crux of this relationship is
complexity.37 Essentially, an IQ score is a numerical
indicator of how well the test taker can solve problems. Since these problems vary in complexity, it follows that the IQ score is also a numerical indicator
of how well one handles complexity. Some jobs are
inherently more complex than others are; for example,
neurosurgery compared to commercial painting. It follows, then, that individuals with greater intelligence
would be more likely to enter fields that are more
complex and, having entered those fields, outperform
their less intelligent counterparts. This is just what the
research literature reveals.
H. T. Himmelweit and J. W. Whitfield successfully differentiated 39 different occupations based on
mean intelligence test scores for British Army recruits.
Occupations such as schoolmaster and teacher had
mean test scores of 40.65 and 39.68, respectively, while
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occupations such as butcher and miner had mean test
scores of 17.73 and 14.90, respectively.38 Jesús F. Salgado, Neil Anderson, Silvia Moscoso, Cristina Bertua,
Filip de Fruyt, and Jean Pierre Rolland had similar
success in examining the relationship between general
mental ability and 11 occupational groups. They calculated correlational coefficients, which ranged from
lows of .24 and .45 (the former for police and the latter
for driver and typing) to highs of .66 and .67 (for sales
and manager, respectively).39
Frank L. Schmidt and John E. Hunter meta-analyzed 85 years of research in personnel psychology
and computed a correlation coefficient between general mental ability and job performance of .51; this
result confirms the earlier findings of Malcolm James
Ree and James A. Earles, which demonstrate that g
is far more important for predicting job performance
than are job-specific factors.40 The predictive validity
of g is maintained even within narrow bands, such as
those limited to holders of particular undergraduate
or graduate degrees in science and technology. Gregory Park, David Lubinski, and Camilla P. Benbow
were part of a research project in which mathematically precocious youth who took the SAT-Math by age
13 and scored very high (i.e., in the top 1 percent of
the population) were followed for more than 25 years.
They found that, when these individuals were clustered into one of three groups—bachelor’s, master’s,
or doctorate degrees—g was still able to predict their
differential creative potential (defined as the number
of patents or publications).41
This relationship is maintained in the military. Jeffrey J. McHenry, Leaetta M. Hough, Jody L. Toquam,
Mary Ann Hanson, and Steven Ashworth examined
how well cognitive ability, perceptual-motor ability,
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personality, interest, and job outcome preference measures predicted core technical proficiency and general
soldiering proficiency for enlisted Soldiers in nine
Army jobs. Intelligence was by far the best predictor
of both, with correlation coefficients of .63 and .65,
respectively. The military trains well and often, and in
this realm as well, the best predictor of training success is shown to be g.42 Ree and Earles showed how g
was a far better predictor of job-training school grades
for 78,041 Air Force enlistees in 82 jobs than were specific abilities.43 Salgado et al., who examined how well
g predicts job performance, also examined how well
it predicts job-training success. The correlation coefficients they calculated for the 11 job categories ranged
from lows of .25 and .27 (for police and skilled workers, respectively) to highs of .72 and .74 (for chemistry
and engineer, respectively).44
Finally, if the Army has an interest in reducing the
incidence of accidents (and it most assuredly does),
then again it would do well to pay attention to psychometric g. The relationship between the two, though
small, is consequential. Ross R. Vickers and Adriana
Villaseñor examined U.S. Navy enlistees and calculated a correlation coefficient between intelligence and
accidents to be .263. They concluded, “at the occupational level, the average intelligence of occupational
incumbents and the physical hazard level of an occupation predicted injury rates.”45
While job training, job performance, and even the
type of job field selected are all influenced by g, there
is also evidence that g plays an economic role as well.
For black and white American Armed Forces veterans,
Helmuth Nyborg and Arthur R. Jensen calculated correlation coefficients between g and income of .37 and
.36, respectively.46 Even when the unit of analysis is
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expanded, g remains a significant predictor of wealth.
Satoshi Kanazawa correlated IQ and the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the 50 United States.
Using two different techniques, he computed coefficients of .5034 and .5481; regardless of which of the two
is the more accurate, they are both very substantial for
the social sciences.47 Garry A. Gelade, Earl Hunt, and
Werner Wittmann were able to produce similar results
in their examinations of the relationship between IQ
and national wealth.48 Jay L. Zagorsky, in fact, demonstrated that “each point increase in IQ test scores raises
income by between $234 and $616 per year after holding a variety of factors constant.”49 In addition, Garett
Jones and W. Joel Schneider found that “a 1 point
increase in a nation’s average IQ is associated with a
persistent 0.11% annual increase in GDP per capita.”50
The relationship between IQ and wealth is not as
straightforward as it is with job performance or school
achievement; this is so simply because individuals are
not nations. For nations, the strong influence of high
IQ on wealth seems to be concentrated on the high
end.
Heiner Rindermann, Michael Sailer, and James
Thompson found that it is the presence (or relative
absence) of individuals at the 95th percentile of general mental ability (i.e., and IQ score of at least 125)
that makes the difference. When they are found in high
numbers (or, more accurately, in higher numbers than
in other countries), scientific and business activity is
greatly improved. The result of the improved activity
is an overall increase in a nation’s wealth.51 This effect
holds promise for the Army. To the degree it attracts
and retains individuals of above-average intelligence,
it can expect an improved climate for strategizing
and for tactical operations. The research of Linda S.
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Gottfredson, Richard J. Herrnstein, Charles Murray,
Richard Lynn, and Tatu Vanhanen support these findings and interpretations.52
Given these results from scientific investigations,
the judicious use of mental ability tests seems to us to
be fully warranted.53 Issues remain, of course. These
tests are not perfect, and there is always the contentious problem of “disparate impact.” To the degree
there are issues to deal with, social scientists can only
assist the resolution process. “There is . . . no psychometric solution to the problem of adverse impact. The
solution must come from policy, not science.”54
SOME COMMENTS ON ORGANIZATION AND
METHODOLOGY
In this book, we will sketch the history of officer testing or mental screening since 1900. The focus
will be on line officers—the officers who perform the
Army’s core function—as opposed to officers going
into one of the technical or professional specialties.
The next chapter will deal with officer accessions
between the Spanish-American War and World War
I and will trace the adjustment that the Army had to
make in officer testing as it expanded and transitioned
from an essentially frontier constabulary to an expeditionary force capable of, or at least aspiring to, project U.S. power across the globe. Chapter 3 will deal
with World War I and the dramatic changes in officer
screening that the Army had to make to fill the officer ranks in that conflict. The fourth chapter covers
officer screening during the interwar period. Officer
selection was conducted in and shaped by an environment characterized by fiscal austerity and, until
the late 1930s, governmental and public indifference.
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Officer testing in World War II is the subject of
Chapter 5. World War II marked the beginning of the
modern method of officer selection and was a turning
point in the way Army leaders conceptualized officer
selection. The sixth chapter deals with officer screening in the 2 decades after World War II. By necessity,
the Army had to make fundamental alterations in the
way it selected officers in peacetime due to a number
of fundamental changes in the size, mission, orientation, and social composition of the officer corps. Officer
selection during the Vietnam War is the focus of Chapter 7 of our narrative. As in previous major conflicts,
the Army was forced to trade quality for quantity in
its quest to fill the officer ranks. In Chapter 8, we take
up the story of officer selection in the first 2 decades
of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Screening standards
become more flexible in this era due to the necessity
to accommodate market forces. Officer screening in
the post-Cold War era is the focus of Chapter 9. The
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan again challenged the
Army’s ability to maintain officer quality while staffing the force at acceptable levels. Chapter 10, our final
chapter, will attempt to explain the gradual dilution of
officer screening standards, since 1900, by looking at
a number of social, political, and demographic forces
that we think have the most explanatory value. In our
final chapter, we will offer some tentative recommendations about how we believe the officer screening
process can be improved.
Within our larger chronological framework, our
chapters are organized by commissioning source.
Each one of the three principal sources of line officer
accessions has some commonalities, but also significant differences. These differences are based, among
other things, on different expectations for each source
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as well as the location of these sources within the
organization of the Army. We concentrate on the
Army’s two most prolific sources during peacetime,
the ROTC program and West Point. OCS will receive
less detailed coverage, except during wartime, when it
has become, for short periods of time, the Army’s largest source of commissioned (SOC) officers.
Our book is a multi-disciplinary effort that draws
upon the fields of history, psychology, and economics.
This work is primarily a work of history, with psychology and economics being used to reinforce and clarify
the historical narrative. Our book draws on a mix of
secondary and primary sources. We rely heavily upon
materials found in the USMA’s archives, as well as the
annual reports of the superintendent to inform our
account. We also completed some original analyses of
officer entrance exams and officer screening data (e.g.,
test scores over time by SOC). We are convinced that
one of the biggest advantages of our approach is the
extended timeline we have chosen to analyze. Trends
that are not evident over the time span of a few years,
or even a few decades, become very evident when
looked at over a timeframe of more than a century.
During the course of our research, we uncovered
no “smoking gun”—no single piece of evidence that
proves our case about the dilution of officer testing
standards over time. Neither did we conduct a standard statistical study of the type that is the stock-intrade of social scientists. Nevertheless, we paint a
compelling picture showing how testing standards
have steadily declined over the decades. We compiled a mass of evidence that is so overwhelming and
suggestive that it becomes, in our opinion, almost
incontrovertible.
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CHAPTER 2:
OFFICER SELECTION BEFORE WORLD WAR I
THE POST-BELLUM ARMY
In the decades before the Spanish-American War,
line officers were procured from three sources: the
U.S. Military Academy (USMA), the enlisted ranks
of the Army, and civil life.1 Officer selection in the
post-bellum Army was exacting. Candidates from civil
life and the enlisted force had to pass rigorous mental
examinations before they could receive a commission. Stiff examinations also regulated appointments
to West Point, although the 4-year Academy experience itself was an effective screening mechanism with
the attrition rate averaging about 50 percent for each
class. The system of officer examinations that regulated entry into the officer corps ensured what today
we might call a high baseline of officer quality, at least
in regard to mental selection standards.
The Army could afford to be selective in its
appointment of officers because of its diminutive size
relative to the overall population. Between 1871 and
the beginning of the Spanish-American War, the total
enlisted strength of the Army averaged around 25,000
men while Regular Army officer strength hovered
just below 2,000. This was a small force for a nation
that had a population of about 39,000,000 in 1870 and
about 75,000,000 in 1898. A small Army meant that
annual officer accessions totals were correspondingly
low. On only 3 occasions between 1871 and 1898 did
the Academy’s annual commissioning total top 70
cadets. West Point’s annual output during this period
averaged around 50. The other commissioning sources
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provided relatively few officers. Commissions from
the ranks averaged slightly more than seven per year,
while appointments from civil life averaged just over
nine per year.2
WEST POINT
West Point was the Army’s principal commissioning source in the last third of the 19th century. Unlike
today, the Academy in the post-bellum period was
among the most selective institutions in the country.
It had a sterling reputation. At the turn of the century,
West Point had more entries in Who’s Who in America
than any other undergraduate institution in the country. While the Academy was no longer the nation’s
premier engineering institution as it was in the antebellum period, being admitted to West Point still represented a significant accomplishment. The small size
of the institution, its strict selection standards, high
attrition rate, and relatively attractive lifestyle and
high social status afforded Army officers attracted
some of the nation’s brightest undergraduates.3
There has been confusion among historians about
admissions standards at West Point prior to World
War I. Those standards have been mistakenly portrayed as being minimal. To be sure, the legislative
requirements for admission were quite low. In 1812,
Congress merely required applicants to be “well
versed in reading, writing, and arithmetic.” It added
English grammar, U.S. history, and geography to the
requirements in 1866, but the statutory requirements
posed no serious hurdle for even the marginally qualified candidate. Moreover, the methodologies used
by congressmen to select nominees for the Academy
were generally ineffective as mental screening devices.
Many congressmen distributed nominations as a form
of patronage. Many others used the most elementary
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tests of academic achievement. However, it must be
kept in mind that even if a young man secured a nomination on the basis of flimsy screening measures, he
still had to pass the Academy’s strict entrance test to
be admitted. Roughly half of all congressional nominees could not pass this examination.4
WEST POINT NOMINATIONS
The following is excerpted from R. Eric Petersen and Sarah
J. Eckman, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies:
An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management, and although Petersen and Eckman are describing the contemporary
nomination process, their comments are generally true of the
nomination process since 1900.
Members of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to . . . service academies. . . . Although it [the
nomination] is an essential component of the appointment process, a
congressional nomination does not guarantee an individual’s admission or appointment to a service academy. In addition to securing a
nomination, a candidate must also submit an application packet and
fulfill other service academy requirements. . . . Even when a candidate meets all these requirements and is deemed to be qualified for
admission, he or she may not receive an official appointment, due
to the limited number of spaces available at each service academy.
The nomination of constituents to one of the service academies
can provide Members of Congress with the opportunity to perform
community outreach and other representational activities. In some
states and congressional districts, nominations are highly competitive. Others are less competitive, and some offices do not receive
expressions of interest from enough applicants to fill the number of
nominations allocated. Consequently, some congressional offices
may need to dedicate considerable staff resources to the selection
process to identify qualified candidates, while others can incorporate service academy nominations alongside other constituent service activities such as casework.
Historical records indicate that the congressional nomination
served to help democratize and diversify the ranks of military officers. Congressional nominations ensured that academy appointees
represented all geographic areas of the United States, came from a
diverse set of family backgrounds, and would not be subject to executive branch political patronage.5
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The Academy’s entrance examinations were thorough, as well as demanding. A modern undergraduate
seeking entry into West Point would almost certainly
blanch at their difficulty. These exams covered a multitude of subjects, to include: reading, writing, English
grammar, English composition, English literature,
arithmetic, algebra through quadratic equations, plane
geometry, descriptive geography, physical geography, U.S. history, the outlines of general history, and
the general principles of physiology and hygiene. In
his book Carved in Granite, Lance Betros describes the
test and its rigor:
Until 1870 the [entrance] exam was oral, which allowed
subjectivity in grading. Afterward, nominees took a
written test that faculty members graded anonymously
to enhance objectivity. By the late nineteenth century,
the entrance exam had turned into a mental marathon,
encompassing a series of subject tests requiring three
days to administer. The exam, as unforgiving as it was
long, posed a formidable obstacle to admission. The
Academic Board refused to make accommodations
for the lesser-prepared nominees and cadets. On the
contrary, it ruthlessly enforced standards to cull the weak
and maintain the institution’s hard-earned reputation for
excellence.6

The entrance test, in combination with the exacting
academic standards of the Academy, effectively prevented the marginally qualified from receiving a
commission.7
Students would spend considerable time preparing
for the West Point entrance exam. A cottage industry
of Academy preparatory schools grew up in various
locations across the country to prepare students for the
test. Even more telling was the large number of candidates who attended college before being admitted to
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West Point. More than 50 percent of each entering class
in the decade before the Spanish-American War had
attended a traditional 4-year college prior to arriving
at the Academy. Students who had matriculated at Ivy
League institutions, such as Harvard, Yale, and Cornell, were well represented in the ranks of incoming
cadets. Some cadets spent as many as 3 years studying at an Ivy League institution before entering the
Academy. In addition to the 50 percent who attended
a traditional college, a substantial percentage attended
a normal school. Since the Academy did not differentiate between those who attended only high school and
those who went on to a normal school, it is difficult
to establish exactly how many applicants attended the
latter type of institution.8
Selectivity at the Academy must be viewed in the
context of the times. The latter half of the 19th and
early part of the 20th century was a period in which
various professions were coalescing and establishing
standards and criteria for the qualifications of their
members. By 1900, most professions had established
an educational pattern that required a baccalaureate
degree and additional professional schooling. The
military was moving in the same direction. The Army
wanted its officers to have bachelor’s degrees and follow-on professional schooling. Secretary of War Elihu
Root’s system of professional military education, instituted after the Spanish-American War, was designed
to mirror the system of education that regulated other
professions. In addition, like other professions, the
military established standards of knowledge and performance for serving officers. In the 1880s, the Army
began to require its lieutenants and captains to pass an
examination to be promoted. The Navy did likewise.
In an era of rising professional consciousness and
standards, the Army’s determination to maintain high
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admissions standards at West Point fit in nicely with
the evolving professional paradigm.
CANDIDATES FROM CIVIL LIFE/ENLISTED
RANKS
The mental tests required of non-West Point officer
aspirants were even more arduous than those given to
their Academy counterparts. This was because these
exams screened candidates about to be accessed into
the officer corps rather than cadets who still had 4
years of education in front of them. The tests encompassed a wide variety of academic subjects that men
holding baccalaureate degrees were expected to
master. A brief and admittedly incomplete history of
these examinations will be provided below to give a
general idea of the mental requirements for admission into the officer corps in the last third of the 19th
century.
The first of these officer selection exams for candidates from civil life and the enlisted force was actually
administered before the Civil War under the provisions of General Order No. 17, dated October 4, 1854.
That general order established a procedure that was
adhered to until the First World War. It provided for
the convening of a board of officers to administer a
preliminary examination and report the results of that
exam to the Secretary of War. The candidates who
passed the preliminary exam then went before a board
composed of three West Point professors. The subjects covered in these examinations included: English
grammar, arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, geography, map reading, history, the Constitution of the
United States, the organization of the Federal Government, and the “general principles which regulate[d]
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international discourse.” These tests were suspended
during the Civil War due to time constraints and the
great demand for officers. To raise the thousands of
officers needed to lead the mass armies of the day,
vast latitude was given to state governors in granting
commissions to men seeking positions in state-organized volunteer formations. Generally, state governors
appointed men to the field grade ranks. They used a
variety of methods to accomplish this. Nepotism was
rife and the ability to raise a company or regiment
usually counted for more than military competence in
the pursuit of a field grade commission. In the junior
ranks, many officers were chosen by election. Popularity, rather than experience or expertise, often decided
who would become platoon leaders and company
commanders.9
After the Civil War, the examination system was
reinstituted. The exams were frequently revised,
albeit not fundamentally changed. Usually, these
revisions made the examination more rigorous,
reflecting advances in technology, changes in missions, and the growing professionalization of the officer corps. For example, General Order No. 62, dated
August 26, 1878, added logarithms, algebra, elements
of trigonometry, and international law to the areas
being evaluated. General Order No. 98, dated December 5, 1891, added general history, elements of surveying, and Army and drill regulations to the exam.
Finally, in 1892, General Order No. 79, dated November 26, directed an exacting test that prescribed nine
areas of evaluation for both the preliminary and final
(or competitive) examinations. The academic subjects
included on the test were: English, mathematics, geography, history, constitutional and international law,
and Army regulations.10 As can be inferred from the
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description of the exams, only those candidates who
had studied assiduously at college, or were so recently
out of school as to retain a fresh memory of advanced
mathematics, physics, etc., could pass the exam.11
As can be seen from the descriptions of these tests,
they were quite difficult. They were intended more to
exclude than to select. An average of seven enlisted
Soldiers and nine candidates from civil life might have
been selected annually, but there were stretches in
the post-bellum period when the Army went several
years without accessing a single person from either
source into the officer corps. The Army wanted to
obtain as large a percentage of its officers as it could
from West Point. The other sources, during peacetime
at least, were essentially a standard operating procedure to those observers and legislators who feared the
creation of a military caste and to those members of
the enlisted force who sought social mobility.
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
The standards and accessions patterns described
in the preceding paragraphs were established during
periods of peace. It must be kept in mind that most
candidates from the enlisted ranks and civil life were
commissioned into the Regular Army during hostilities, when the demand for officers was great and
immediate. Of the 585 enlisted men and 697 candidates from civil life commissioned between 1885
and 1903, more than 80 percent were commissioned
during the Spanish-American War and the Philippine
Insurrection.12
Regulars comprised fewer than 20 percent of the
commissioned officers who went to war in 1898. However, that 20 percent formed a group of highly capable
military professionals. One observer commented:
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in terms of officer procurement policies and methods, it
[the war] was a magnificent vindication of the doctrine
of careful selection, rigid examination, and painstakingly
thorough schooling over a long period of years.13

The problem came when the Army had to expand the
officer corps to lead the swollen force that emerged
after mobilization was declared.
Officer accessions standards were relaxed during
the Spanish-American War to produce officers quickly
and in the volume needed. As in the Civil War, governors were given great latitude in appointing officers in volunteer and militia units, opening the way
for politically powerful individuals such as Theodore
Roosevelt to obtain commissions. President McKinley,
too, engaged in nepotism in the appointment of officers. He took care of his old Ohio friends and doled
out military appointments to reward special interest
groups and appease sectional interests and sensibilities. To consolidate support for his administration, he
awarded states commissions based on their population and standing in national affairs. He was especially
solicitous of southern Democrats since he wanted to
ensure their support for the war. Election remained
a common way to select junior officers. Many militia and volunteer units elected their lieutenants and
captains. As late as 1901, the law in effect on officer
appointments provided that “captains and lieutenants
of companies [of militia] shall be elected by the written votes of the enlisted men of the respective companies”—a provision that did not disappear until World
War I. Moreover, in some militia units, the practice of
officer selection by voting was extended to the field
grade ranks, where lieutenants and captains selected
the majors who would run their units.14
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The relaxation of standards was not limited to volunteer units, it extended to the Regular Army as well.
An expanded Regular Army needed more officers.
Over the course of the war, more than 800 regular
commissions had to be awarded to fill unit vacancies.
Men who would not have qualified for a commission
in peacetime now gained access into the regular officer
corps. Many volunteer and a number of militia officers
were able to translate their commissions into Regular Army appointments. In selecting officers from the
enlisted force and from civil life, certain adjustments
had to be made. Secretary of War Root was very aware
that many of the men competing for a commission had
been away from school for some time and had forgotten a good deal of what they had learned. As a result,
he issued the following order:
in view of the long period during which volunteer
officers recently serving in the Philippines have been
without access to books with which they could prepare
for examination, and the fact that a special test of fitness is
furnished by each officer’s military record, the Secretary
of War directs that as to all such officers who are ordered
to be examined for appointment to the Regular Army, and
are physically qualified, the examining boards, instead
of recommending appointment or rejection upon the
mental examination alone, shall transmit the examination
papers in each case to the War Department, with their
marks or ratings, both specific and general, and with
an expression of the board’s estimate of the candidate’s
general intelligence and capacity. The question whether,
upon such report and the military record taken together,
the candidate’s fitness has been established will then be
determined by the appointing power.15

Regarding enlisted men who were competing for commissions, he wrote:
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In view of the fact that enlisted men who have been serving
in the Philippines have also been without opportunities to
prepare for examination, the Secretary of War directs that
as to any of them who fail to pass the mental examination
for promotion, if the examining board is of the opinion
that the candidate has sufficient intelligence and capacity
to readily fit himself for such an examination, and that
he has failed through lack of opportunity for preparation,
the board shall transmit the papers to the Department
with their certificate to that effect; and thereupon, if the
case seems to warrant such action, the candidate may
have further examination after reasonable opportunity to
prepare therefore.16

Root asserted that “it is believed that in the main we
have secured a very excellent body of officers, who
will do credit to the service” but, at the same time,
conceded that mistakes had been made in the selection
process.17
The officer corps was profoundly affected by the
war. By 1902, West Point officers were in the minority.
Secretary Root described the Army’s situation in his
annual report of 1902:
Of the 2,900 officers of the line of the Army, 1,818 have
been appointed since the beginning of the war with Spain.
Of these . . . but 276 were supplied by the West Point
Academy; the remaining 1,542 have come—414 from the
ranks, 512 from civil life, and 616 from the volunteers. .
. . The volunteers and the enlisted men have of course
acquired useful experience. . . . Yet it is generally true
[that] . . . more than one-half of all the officers of the line
. . . have had no systematic military education. . . . Unless
the theory of military education under which we have
maintained the Academy at West Point for a century is
all a mistake, it is very important to give to this class of
young officers . . . the educational advantages which the
West Point men get before they are commissioned.18
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The USMA was also affected by the war, its educational program being abbreviated during the first 2
years of hostilities. For the class of 1898, this amounted
to about 1 month. That class graduated near the end
of April rather than in the 1st week of June in 1898.
The class of 1899 lost the better part of a semester. Its
graduation date was pushed up to February 15, 1899.
It seems unlikely that the quality of the graduate was
significantly affected by this shortening of the 4-year
experience. However, the abbreviation of the 4-year
course, as relatively minor as it was, set a precedent
that was used more aggressively and more radically in
World War I.19
BETWEEN THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND
WORLD WAR I
After the Spanish-American War, the Army could
once again be discriminating in its selection of officers, albeit less so than before the war. The Army that
emerged from the war was bigger than the one that
went into it, so it needed to access more officers to
lead it. Although it was substantially larger than its
pre-1898 predecessor was, the post-Spanish-American War Army was still small relative to the overall
population. Between 1903 and 1914, the number of
enlisted men ranged between 60,000 to 92,000, while
Regular Army officer strength ranged between 3,300
and 4,000. The U.S. population grew from 80,000,000
to just under 100,000,000 during this same period.20
In Figure 2-1 we provide data on the U.S. Army
officer corps relative to the size of the U.S. population.
The size of the officer corps has varied significantly,
while the size of the U.S. population has increased
steadily over time. Notably, the fraction is consistently
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very small. However, the current fraction (roughly
0.03 percent) is much higher than in 1902 (roughly
0.01 percent). Also of note, the fraction reached significantly higher levels in the 1910s (Word War I), the
1940s (World War II) and the 1950s-1970s. These fractions have direct implications for the Army’s ability to
be selective in its officer accessions.
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This figure displays the share of the U.S. population in the officer
corps by year. The data was obtained from USMA archives and
publicly available data on the U.S. population.

Figure 2-1. U.S. Army Officer Corps as a Share of
the U.S. Population.
During the period in question, the official priority
of the commissioning sources was: first, the USMA;
second, qualified enlisted men; third, honor graduates
of “distinguished [military] institutions”; fourth, other
graduates of military schools and colleges having
Army officers detailed as professors of military science
(MS) and tactics; and, fifth, all other civilian colleges
and sources. All except West Point graduates were
required to take the Army’s competitive examination
for a commission.21
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The USMA accounted for the bulk of the annual
commissions during this period. From 1903 to 1914,
West Point’s annual commissioning totals averaged
about 100 per year; commissions from the enlisted
ranks averaged slightly over 18 per year, while commissions from civil life averaged just over 54 per year.
To give the reader an idea of what the Army looked
like in terms of the commissioning mix of the officer
corps, the following snapshot taken from the Secretary of War’s annual report for 1909 is presented.
Keep in mind that the totals reflect the many non-West
Point officers who were accessed during the SpanishAmerican War:
An examination of the records of commissioned officers
in the Regular Army shows that 43.36 percent of the
officers on the active list on October 15, 1909, were
graduates from the United States Military Academy: that
12.97 percent were appointed from the army, and that
43.67 percent were appointed from civil life. Of the 43.67
percent appointed from civil life 21.38 percent had prior
service in the army and 22.29 percent had no such prior
service.22

The high proportion of non-West Point graduates in the officer corps—almost 56 percent were not
West Point alumni—bothered Army officials. Many of
the men commissioned during the war had been fine
combat leaders but, because of their lack of formal
education, did not excel as field grade officers—ranks
where the ability to conceptualize and write clearly
was at a premium. Thus, the Army was not entirely
satisfied with the quality of the officer corps after the
Spanish-American War and resolved to do something
about it.23
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WEST POINT
To raise overall officer quality in the Army, the
War Department purposed to expand West Point and
increase the number of commissions coming from the
Corps of Cadets. In 1900, the maximum enrollment
limit at the Academy was raised by more than 25 percent—from 381 to 523. The maximum limit was raised
again in 1910, from 523 to 700. With the expansion of
1910, the Army aimed to at least double the proportion of Academy graduates in the officer corps; and if
it could reach and sustain the 700-enrollment figure,
Army leaders believed, this doubling would occur in
time. In fact, the Annual Report of the Superintendent for
1914 declared that:
With the regular Army limited in numbers as it now is and
the Corps of Cadets up to the capacity of the Academy,
more than all the vacancies for officers can be supplied
from graduates of the Academy.24

Nevertheless, the anticipated growth did not occur,
and the size of the Corps had to be raised once again in
1916, this time to 1,332 cadets. Despite these attempts
to enlarge West Point, the pre-World War I Army
never came close to filling the officer ranks primarily
with West Point graduates as it intended.25
West Point in the late 19th and early 20th centuries complained about the method of nomination used
by congressmen—the non-competitive method—to
select their candidates to West Point. This method of
nomination, many asserted, negatively affected officer
quality. According to Betros:
The non-competitive method, while popular in Congress,
undermined the search for quality. Many congressmen
used the nominations as a form of patronage and
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distributed them to the most influential candidates rather
than the most deserving. Each one had his own method
of selection, with criteria that did not necessarily accord
with Academy priorities. The unfortunate results of this
system were on display every year, as about half the
nominees failed to pass the West Point entrance exam
and returned home embarrassed and disappointed. Of
those who managed to pass the exam and become cadets,
about 50 percent subsequently flunked out.26

The expanded enrollment and increased officer
requirements induced West Point to adjust its admissions requirements in 1900. Such an adjustment was
believed necessary to make the admissions process
more flexible and allow the Academy to reach its
enrollment goals.27 Because of the need for more Academy graduates, in 1900 West Point asked Congress to
repeal the requirement for the Academy to screen its
applicants by means of “fixed mental requirements,”
by which was meant the standard entrance examination. In its place, West Point wanted Congress
to place entrance requirements under the control of
the Secretary of War, who could adjust them at will
to meet officer production goals.28 Academy authorities did not get their way in 1900, but the next year
Congress acceded to their desires. Legislation passed
in 1901 granted the Secretary of War the authority to
set admissions standards as he saw fit. The Annual
Report of the Superintendent, 1901 heralded the legislation as marking a “signal change in the history of the
Academy” and as a stepping stone to higher admissions standards.29 West Point officials developed a
new test to replace the old one in conjunction with
William T. Harris, the U.S. Commissioner of Education. The new test was allegedly designed to bring the
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admissions process in line with the latest educational
developments.30
The next year (1902), the Academy adjusted
admissions procedures again, making the admissions
process even more flexible. West Point received permission from the Secretary of War to admit candidates by “certificates of mental preparedness.” This
amounted to reviewing the candidate’s high school or
college transcripts and admitting them based on the
quality of the school attended, the grades attained,
and the subjects taken. The official reason for this new
policy was that it would:
permit those candidates who at the time of appointment
. . . have satisfactorily covered the subjects required for
admission to continue their regular course of study and
the proper gradual development of their minds instead of
putting them in [a] position where they feel compelled to
go back and review elementary work, with consequent
expense, loss of time, and, as usually occurs, attendance
at some coaching school, with resulting deadening of the
reasoning faculties.31

Concern for the deadening effect of the tests may
have influenced Academy authorities to change
admissions procedures, but the prime reason behind
the move was that too many candidates were failing
the entrance examination, which the superintendent
admitted in his 1900 report. To expand the Academy’s
output of officers, West Point needed a system that
was less rigorous than the standard entrance examination that was used since the end of the Civil War.
In short, if the Academy hoped to boost its output, it
needed to lower admissions standards.32
The first candidates admitted by mental certificate
entered the Corps of Cadets in the summer of 1902. Sixty-two cadets were admitted under this method. This
amounted to about 53 percent of the entering class (62
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out of 118). Of the 62 candidates who were accepted
by mental certificate, somewhere between 52 and 98
percent had submitted college transcripts for review.
We cannot be more precise because Academy authorities lumped high school and normal school transcripts
together into one broad classification.33 From 1903 to
1907, the number and percentage of cadets admitted
by certificate increased. In those years, the percentage
of the entering class admitted by this means ranged
between 66 and 80 percent of each entering class.34
Things changed in 1908, when screening by mental
certificate was dropped and applicants were no longer
admitted using this method. All candidates were
once again required to take the entrance examination.
Superintendent Hugh L. Scott explained the reasons
for the reintroduction of the entrance examination for
all candidates in his annual report of 1907:
The admission of candidates on certificates from local
schools and colleges (frequently secured after brief
and inadequate attendance) in lieu of the entrance
examinations, after having been given an exhaustive test
for six years, was, with the authority of the Secretary of
War, discontinued this year, the class entering in 1907
having been made the last one to enter on certificates.
The certificate system gave very unsatisfactory results
and a great number of candidates admitted by this
method were found to have been poorly grounded in the
entrance requirements, which deficiency often resulted in
a very laborious career at the Military Academy and not
infrequently in ultimate failure to master the course. It was
found that the classes would be much better grounded
if reasonable and uniform entrance examinations were
required.35

To be sure, authorities were still concerned about
lagging enrollment and the large number of vacancies in the Corps of Cadets. Even so, they felt that the
academic performance of candidates admitted under
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the certificate system was so lackluster that a standard
entrance exam had to be reinstated. Students were
flunking out at a high rate and something had to be
done to stop the bleeding. It did little good to accept
more candidates if those candidates could not pass
West Point’s academic program.36
After the reinstatement of the entrance examination for every candidate, the problem of cadet vacancies did not go away. For a time, it got worse. The 1910
version of the entrance exam was quite rigorous and
the Academy struggled to find enough candidates
who could pass it (see Appendix A). The following
table shows the scope of the vacancy problem. See
Table 2-1.
Year
(as of September 1)

Authorized
Number of
Cadets
1904
522
1905
522
1906
522
1907
522
1908
533
1909
533
1910
533
*1911
629
1912
631
1913
640
1914
748
(*The law of 1910 became effective)

Unfilled
Vacancies
42
55
51
76
117
129
122
57
74
80
87

Table 2-1. Cadet Vacancies, 1904-1914.37
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The quality of entering candidates became an issue
of serious concern to Academy authorities after their
first experience with admission by mental certificate.
The Academy took measures to correct the qualitative
deficiencies they had noted in cadets. The most radical
of those measures was to extend the 4-year curriculum
by 3 months (inserting a period of academic instruction between March and July of the fourth class year)
in order to improve the academic qualifications of new
cadets. This was done every year from 1908 through
1911.38
In 1914, the Army’s apprehension about vacancies, and the high percentage of non-graduates in
the officer corps, again stirred Academy authorities
to take extraordinary action. The authorized number
of cadets had gone up since the passage of the law
in 1910, expanding the Academy, and reducing the
number of vacancies. However, the attrition rate of
West Point officers once accessed into the Army had
shot up sharply. The superintendent believed that
Academy trained officers were leaving the service
because “more lucrative pursuits and greater fields
for promotion of private life are diverting young men
from . . . careers of small pay and slow promotion in
our country’s service.” This trend largely canceled out
any gains made by increased enrollment and a lower
vacancy rate. The Army’s anxiety took on a new level
of urgency at this time because of the outbreak of war
in Europe.39
The War Department Annual Report, 1913, clearly
reflected this new urgency. “This table [see Table 2-1
in this chapter],” the report commented:
shows very clearly the necessity of some action to increase
the number of admitted cadets so as to more nearly equal
the number authorized, the capacity of the Academy and
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the needs of the Army. It has been the subject of urgent
recommendation by my predecessors and bills have been
introduced in Congress designed to remedy the condition,
but so far nothing sufficiently effective has resulted.
In the interest of the country, the Army, and economy to
the Government, the maximum number of cadets that can
be accommodated at the academy should be kept under
instruction. The plant today can easily handle 700 cadets
with very slight increase of cost over that now required
for the 608 cadets in the corps. Only 44 percent of the
active Army officers are graduates of the academy. This
can be fully doubled in time if the academy is kept up to
its capacity of 700 cadets.40

The 1914 report went on to note that the attrition
rate at West Point had declined significantly over the
last several decades. In the period 1892—1902, the
attrition rate had been 50 percent. From 1903-1913, the
attrition rate was only 30 percent. However, according
to the report, this decline was not due to a dilution of
academic rigor. Rather, it could be attributed to “more
thorough requirements for entrance” (of which the
report gave no evidence), to the “increasing prevalence
of competitive examinations in selecting candidates
[on the part of congressmen],” and to the “assistance
now given by instructors outside of recitation hours.”
To observers familiar with the recent history of West
Point, it was not a very convincing narrative.41
Nevertheless, to raise enrollment and officer output
to the desired levels, West Point believed that it had to
take drastic action. Accordingly, the Academy reintroduced the mental certificate as a path to admission in
1914. West Point was tired of the vacancies and worried about the quality of officer in the Army. Perhaps
they reasoned that even if the Academy did lower
standards and revert to the certificate method, the end
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product would still be better than what they were getting from the other commissioning sources.
General Orders No. 3, issued by the War Department on January 23, 1914, laid out the mental certificate requirements. A candidate could be excused
from the regular admission exam if he (1) presented
a certificate from a university, college or technical
school accredited by the USMA that demonstrated
his proficiency in mathematics A1 (algebra to quadratics), A2 (algebra, quadratics and beyond), and C
(plane geometry); English A (reading and practice),
and B (study and practice), as outlined by the College
Entrance Examination Board (CEEB); (2) presented a
certificate of graduation from a preparatory school or
public high school, which was on the accredited list of
one of the institutions referred to in the general order
mentioned above, provided that he was certified to
have established proficiency in mathematics A1, A2,
and C, and English A and B, as outlined by the CEEB;
(3) presented a certificate from the CEEB that he has
passed 14 units of its examinations, including mathematics A1, A2, and C, English A and B, and history
A (ancient history) and D (American history and civil
government).42
“[G]reat difficulty” arose in screening college and
high school certificates. Many of the certificates submitted were not from schools accredited by the Academy. Many others contained incomplete or inaccurate
information. Some were illegible. West Point called
upon the National Board of Education to sort through
the mess. A new general order was issued the following year, which more precisely laid out admissions
requirements and the list of accredited schools.43
From 1914 until America’s entry into the Great
War, the Corps of Cadets continued to expand. As

52

previously alluded to, a law passed on May 4, 1916,
increased the number of cadetships to 1,332. This law
provided that the enrollment increase be spread over
4 years, thus admitting one-fourth of the increase
each year. Congress authorized the expansion of West
Point approximately a month before it passed the
National Defense Act (NDA) of 1916. This latter piece
of legislation created the Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps (ROTC), which was originally conceived as a
source of reserve officers that could be tapped in case
of mobilization. Both the dicey situation along the
Mexican border and the outbreak of the First World
War in Europe conditioned the environment in which
the bills (1916) expanding the USMA and creating the
ROTC were passed.44
Considered more broadly, however, the two bills
along with the expansions that occurred in 1900 and
1910, aimed at transforming the Army from a frontier
constabulary force to an expeditionary one. The constabulary frontier force of the latter part of the 19th
century was small, provincial, and focused on policing
and internal development. The creation of an expeditionary army—or an Army for Empire as some historians call it—was suggested by the War Department’s
recent war against Spain and the Russo-Japanese
War of 1905. It was predicated on the belief that the
nation’s rise to world power status inevitably entailed
an army capable of projecting U.S. power across the
globe. That required not only a larger force, but a more
professional and mentally astute officer corps—an
officer corps capable of understanding the elements of
national power and of efficiently and effectively using
military force to accomplish national objectives.45
The reintroduction of admission by mental certificate still did not solve the Academy’s vacancy
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problem. Vacancies totaled 79 in 1915, 103 in 1916, and
102 in 1917. The percentage of cadets admitted by certificate generally declined after 1914, however. Twothirds of the new admissions in 1915 (121 out of 182)
were by mental certificate; this fell to 54 percent in
1916 (131 out of 243), and to 48 percent (173 out of 357)
in 1917. The Academy would have preferred to have
everyone qualify by examination. Moreover, Academy superintendents from 1914 through 1917 recommended that West Point return to this former method
of admissions. However, it was feared that a move
would have reduced the number admitted too drastically and was consequently not considered a practical
option.46
Looking at the period between the Spanish-American War and the First World War in its entirety,
admissions screening procedures remained rigorous; not quite as rigorous, perhaps, as those in place
before the Spanish-American War, but rigorous nonetheless. Criterion-referenced examinations regulated
entry into the Academy every year except the periods
of 1904-1907 and 1914-1917. Over an 18-year period,
admission by certificate was allowed in only 7 years,
or about 39 percent of the time. Moreover, in 3 of those
7 years, about half the entering class took the standard entrance exam. The percentage of cadets with
prior college experience remained very high throughout this era, ranging between 35 and 50 percent of the
Corps, and those percentages did not include cadets
who attended normal schools. The percentage of
cadets who had post-secondary experience amazed
observers in the 1950s.47
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CRITERION-REFERENCED VERSUS NORM-REFERENCED
TESTS
Tests, to the degree they are valid, assist people in ascertaining what others know and in making selection decisions. While all
tests obviously have right and wrong answers, scoring procedures,
and purposes for being administered, they generally can be distinguished in terms of how they are scored: norm-referenced or criterion-referenced.48 A norm-referenced test, such as the SAT (formerly
known as the Scholastic Aptitude Test, then the Scholastic Assessment Test), compares the score of the test-taker with the scores of
other immediate test takers or with the scores of an older reference
group.49 The purpose is comparison and ranking and, as such, places
a strong emphasis on discriminating between high and low performers.50 California, for example, guarantees admission to the University
of California system (but not to a particular site such as the University of California, Los Angeles, University of California, Berkeley,
or University of California, San Diego) if a California high school
student graduates in the top 9 percent of his or her class. There is
not a minimum grade point average (GPA) requirement or a particular score on an Advanced Placement exam necessary for admission.
Class rank is dependent not only on hard work in class but also on
the “luck” associated with being part of a particularly bright or dull
graduating class. This exemplifies norm-referenced selection.
A test that utilizes this logic is the SAT. Regardless of the particular number of items answered correctly, distributions of scores at
a given administration are compared to the norming group. This is
the essence of norm-referencing: one’s score is a function not only of
performance but also of comparison with other people. At its heart,
then, norm-referenced tests are best for selection rather than for determinations of competence.51
The criterion-referenced test is more likely what one thinks
about when one thinks of tests. Though both ancient and familiar,
Robert Glaser first used the term in reference to military and industrial training.52 With criterion-referenced tests, one is interested in
determining what a test taker knows, not how he or she compares
to other people; there is still a comparison, only here the test taker’s
score is compared to standards (or, criteria) rather than to other people’s scores. To be effective, criterion-referenced tests must of course
be designed well. This is not necessarily easily done; in fact, it is
a recognized limitation as it is easier to simply to rank order people along a continuum on a subject than it is to determine just how
well someone has mastered a particular subject.53 The entrance exams and the CEEB Achievement Tests used for admission to USMA
in the early 20th century are examples of criterion-referenced tests.
Other examples would include the written portion of a state’s driver
license exam or a certification exam for medical licensure.
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Screening by certificate, albeit less rigorous than
the old admissions test, was not a sham. The certificate method had built-in safeguards that ensured the
admissions process remained very competitive. First,
the Academy would (after an initial period of confusion) only accept certificates from those institutions
that its Academic Board had accredited. This requirement narrowed the selection field considerably.
Second, the list of courses that a man had to have satisfactorily completed was rather extensive. It encompassed math, science, foreign languages, English,
history, and geography. Third, the standards that the
Academy elaborated to assess the intellectual attainment levels of applicants were rigorously applied. If
admissions officers doubted the capacity of an applicant to complete West Point’s rather rigorous academic program, he was rejected.54
Sometimes, an examination of those men who were
rejected for admission can tell us as much about the
school as an examination of those who were accepted.
A list of the schools at which unsuccessful applicants for the Class of 1921 (who, if accepted, would
have entered the Academy in the summer of 1917)
matriculated before applying to West Point includes:
Harvard, Yale, Cornell, Princeton, Vanderbilt, Clemson, Syracuse, Dartmouth, Holy Cross, Trinity (later
Duke University), Wisconsin, Michigan, Penn, Brown,
Rice, Tulane, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Georgetown, Brigham Young University Spring Hill,
Gonzaga, Amherst, Colgate, Kansas, Indiana, Georgia, George Washington, Columbia, Virginia Military Institute, Norwich, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University, Missouri, Iowa State, Texas,
Penn State, Union College, Mount Union, Mercer,
Loyola, Bucknell, Wofford, Iowa Wesleyan, Lafayette,
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Marquette, Swarthmore, Davidson, Williams, Mississippi, Stevens Institute of Technology, City College
of New York, Cincinnati, Florida, Colorado, University of California-Berkeley, Kentucky, Minnesota,
South Carolina, Arkansas, Vermont, Idaho, Tennessee,
New Mexico, Utah, Oklahoma, Washington, Oregon,
Nebraska, Miami of Ohio, Alabama, The Citadel, Pittsburg, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Vermont, St.
John’s, and Illinois. Applicants from the aforementioned institutions, some of whom had spent 3 years
as undergraduates, presented their certificates or transcripts to the Academy’s Academic Board and were
found wanting.55
Also pertinent to our study is the relatively high
socioeconomic status (SES) level of the families from
which cadets came during this era. The Corps of
Cadets before World War I had a distinctly upper middle-class flavor. Cadets whose fathers worked in one
of the professions formed the plurality of the Corps.
Those whose fathers came from the managerial class
were also well represented. Cadets from families who
fell into the lower ranges of the SES spectrum, on the
other hand, were in short supply. For example, cadets
with prior military service, cadets whose fathers came
from the enlisted ranks, and cadets whose fathers were
skilled or unskilled workers made up a very small
minority of the Corps of Cadets—indeed, less than 1
percent in all of these categories in the decade and a
half before America’s entry into the First World War.
That is unlike today’s Corps of Cadets, which has a
middle to lower middle-class hue. Since academic
achievement levels and success on tests is closely correlated with SES, our brief look at the occupations of
cadet fathers is instructive for the present study.56
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CANDIDATES FROM CIVIL LIFE AND THE
ENLISTED FORCE
Mental screening for officer candidates from civil
life and the enlisted force remained quite rigorous in
the period between the Spanish-American War and
World War I. In fact, because these exams screened
candidates about to be accessed into the officer corps
rather than cadets who still had 4 years of education in
front of them, they were more rigorous than the West
Point exams. The number of officers needed annually
from these 2 sources was small, averaging only 18
from the enlisted force and 54 from civil life. Hence,
the Army could remain quite discriminating in whom
it allowed into the officer corps from these sources.
After being suspended during the Spanish-American War, the testing of enlisted and civil officer candidates resumed in 1902 with the publication of General
Order No. 17, dated February 15. It took up essentially
where General Order No. 79 (November 26, 1892)
had left off. English grammar, mathematics, geography, history, constitutional and international law, and
Army regulations were all covered on the exam. More
subjects were added to the exam in 1906. General
Order No. 93 (May 17, 1906) augmented the commissioning exam with algebra through quadratic equations, plane and solid geometry, plane and spherical
trigonometry, and elements of surveying. Even candidates who had graduated from a good college or university undoubtedly found the test quite challenging.57
A new rigor in officer screening for candidates
from civil life and the enlisted force, inspired in part
by the Army’s heightened concern with the number of
non-West Point graduates in the officer corps, became
evident in 1910. In that year (the same year that a law
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was passed expanding enrollment at West Point), the
Army launched an effort to upgrade exams for men
seeking a commission from outside the Academy. The
effort was intended more to screen out marginal candidates than bring in a large number of new officers.58
The effort began when the Army’s General Staff
inaugurated a study of the entire range of examinations required for appointment as a second lieutenant.
During the course of the study, frequent exchanges
of correspondence occurred involving the Academic
Board of the USMA, the Carnegie Foundation, the
General Education Board of the Rockefeller Fund, and
the Department of the Interior concerning scholastic standards and ratings of civilian institutions. The
subcommittee wanted to draw its candidates from
the nation’s more selective universities. As a result,
authorities revised the examinations with the intention
of elevating commissioning standards and making the
tests more uniform for all arms and services. The subcommittee’s work was embodied in the War Department’s General Order No. 58, dated April 28, 1911.59
Another upgrade to the exam was made shortly
thereafter. The changes were outlined in War Department General Order No. 131, dated September 26,
1911. This order added the following subjects to the
final examination: French, German, or Spanish (one of
these languages), spherical trigonometry, differential
calculus, integral calculus, analytical geometry, or a
thorough knowledge of any foreign language or military field engineering.60
The difficulty of the examinations were varied by
branch. The tests for the line branches—cavalry, infantry, and field artillery—were quite stringent. In 1911,
for example, the preliminary tests for candidates from
civil life seeking commissions in the combat arms
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encompassed the following subjects: [1] English grammar and orthography; [2] mathematics, to include
algebra, plane and solid geometry, and trigonometry;
and [3] geography and history. The final examination
covered advanced subjects such as foreign languages,
calculus, and international law.61
Examinations for the technical branches, such as
the engineers, signal corps, and coast artillery were
more difficult than those for the combat arms. They
encompassed foreign languages, constitutional and
international law, general history, physics (including electricity, magnetism, heat, sound, and light),
chemistry, geology, mineralogy, surveying (geodetic,
hydrographic, and topographic), descriptive geometry, theoretical and applied mechanics, and a range of
engineering subjects. The successful candidate would
have had to have a very solid education, indeed, to
pass the test.62 Portions of the engineer exam for 1914
are provided in Appendix B.
The next version of the exam came out in the fall
of 1915. General Order No. 64, dated November 16,
1915, outlined the test. Its description read like a college catalogue. Advanced English, advanced French,
advanced German, advanced Spanish, and advanced
surveying were added to the testing requirements.
By making the test more difficult, the Army hoped
to ensure that only men from the nation’s better universities—or at least, men of that caliber—would gain
acceptance into the officer corps.63
An interesting development in officer accessions
occurred shortly after the Spanish-American War,
when the Army introduced a program to facilitate the
entry of enlisted men into the officer corps. It was not
a large program but it had some success. It allowed
men to enlist in the Regular Army for 2 years, at the
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end of which time they would take the entrance examination and compete for a commission in the Regular
Army. They could compete only for vacancies existing
after the West Point classes had been commissioned.64
General Courtney Hodges received his commission
through this program. After being dismissed from
West Point because he failed mathematics, Hodges
enlisted in the Army in 1906 and received his commission 3 years later, after doing well on the competitive
entrance examination. Hodges would go on and command the First Army in Europe in World War II.65
This experiment in opening up West Point to
enlisted men reflected a congressional push to temper
the elitist character of the USMA and its student body.
Many legislators believed that West Point should be
more representative of the society that it was charged
to defend. In the 2nd decade of the 20th century, this
entailed attracting more cadets from the middle and
lower ranges of the socioeconomic spectrum.
CONCLUSION
The need for officers in the post-bellum era was
small relative to the size of the U.S. population. This
enabled the Army to employ exacting mental tests
to screen officer candidates and be quite selective in
who it commissioned. The rigor and selectivity of
the Army’s vetting procedures declined to a certain
extent after the turn of the century as the officer corps
expanded more quickly than the nation’s population.
The Army experimented with less rigorous admissions procedures at West Point as its need for officers
grew.
Although the rigor of the mental tests and the
selectivity of the Army’s commissioning sources
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generally declined between 1900 and 1917, this rigor
and selectivity remained at fairly high levels, especially when compared to later eras. A surprising
proportion of cadets, somewhere between 50 and 80
percent, attended post-secondary educational institutions before applying to West Point. Moreover, the
SES of West Point cadets remained high, with the
majority of cadets coming from upper middle-class
families. Information about the SES of cadets is relevant to this study because SES has a strong positive
correlation with high test scores and high levels of
academic performance.66
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probationary scheme was already being tried out in the Corps
of Engineers, but had not been employed long enough to test its
effectiveness. The Chief of Staff referred this report to the Chief of
the War College Division of the General Staff who commented:
“A majority of the War College Division believe that a probationary period for candidates from the Army and from civil life (for
commissions) should be made part of the law.”
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CHAPTER 3:
OFFICER SELECTION DURING WORLD WAR I
America’s entry into World War I necessitated a
drastic change in officer selection procedures. At the
beginning of the nation’s involvement in the war, the
War Department projected it would need 80 American
divisions and almost 5 million men to fight the war in
Europe. These projections were subsequently whittled down, but the requirements remained prodigious.
Consequently, the Army expanded from 190,000 Soldiers in the spring of 1917, to almost 3,760,000 Soldiers
by late fall of 1918. Approximately 2,086,000 of the
3.76 million Soldiers reached France.1
In a force of this size, the Army could not be as
discriminating in selecting its officers as it had been
before the war. Several million Soldiers had to be
raised, trained, and shipped overseas quickly to
prevent the collapse of the Allied forces. However,
this posed huge mobilization problems for the War
Department—which administered a force that was not
too far removed from its frontier, constabulary days,
when it was more of a police agency than a bone fide
army in the European sense.
Providing officers for this force was a daunting
task. In 1915, the U.S. Army had approximately 4,200
regular officers in its ranks. By the end of 1918, this
number increased 44-fold to about 188,000 officers.2
The population of the United States during this era
was roughly 100,000,000. Thus, the officer to civilian
ratio stood at about 1:24,000 in 1915 and at 1:532 in
November 1918. Under these circumstances, the War
Department had no other realistic option but to sacrifice quality for quantity. This necessarily involved the
dilution of officer testing standards.
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OFFICER TRAINING SCHOOLS (OTS)
The declaration of war with Germany came
on April 6, 1917. Immediately thereafter, the War
Department had to come up with a system for providing officers for the National Army. The scheme it
devised represented a sharp break with tradition. In
the build-up for World War I, there would be no elections and no political appointments, as had occurred
in every previous major conflict in the nation’s history. Under the old system of appointing line officers
for volunteer units and the militia, commissions were
granted without reference to training or even physical qualification. Often, appointments were made as a
matter of nepotism, political influence, or the ability to
enlist men and form volunteer units. These practices
largely disappeared when the nation began its mobilization in 1917. Although political influence continued
to play some role in officer selection in the National
Guard, it was much less prevalent than it had been
during the Spanish-American War.3
The Army turned to Officer Training Schools
(OTS)—the forerunners of the modern Officer Candidate School (OCS)—to produce its line officers.
Every line officer received a commission only after
he had passed such a course. The training camps
were intended to eliminate personal or political influence from the officer selection process. When war
was declared by Congress, plans had already been
made to hold a series of 3-month camps of instruction, modeled after the successful “Plattsburg” camps
of the preceding 3 years. The OTS held during the
war’s first months were largely adaptations of the
Plattsburg model to wartime conditions. In fact, the
Military Training Camps Association (MTCA), the
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organization that had administered the Plattsburg
Camps, lent the War Department its personnel and
administrative apparatus for the OTS program. The
Army had no other practical choice. It lacked a training infrastructure capable of turning out the volume
of officers needed. It took a number of months after
the Declaration of War before the War Department
could place its imprimatur on these OTS and regain
control of the officer training process from the MTCA.4
Upon graduation from one of these camps, successful candidates were nominated by camp commanders
for an appointment and were given a rank dependent
on what their performance at camp merited. Most
were commissioned as second lieutenants but, in the
first and second series of camps held in the spring and
summer of 1917, appointments as majors and captains
were numerous. A few exceptionally qualified graduates were even commissioned as colonels.5
The training in these schools was not uniformly
good; even if it had been, it was clearly not possible
to produce well-trained officers in a mere 90 days.
In the main, the camps were mechanisms for observation and selection rather than for training. While
it was recognized that first-class officers could not
be turned out in such short training courses, it was
also realized that, with the country at war, this was
the maximum amount of time that could be devoted
to officer training. Altogether, camps for line officers
in the United States produced about 100,000 officers
in the 19 months that the nation was involved in the
war. A certain number of line officers chosen from the
ranks were also trained and commissioned at officers’
schools in France.6
The first series of camps, 16 in all, were opened
in various parts of the country on May 1, 1917. In the
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20 days that elapsed between the Declaration of War
and the opening of the camps (between April 18 and
May 8), the Army (with the help of the MTCA) had to
secure some 40,000 suitable officer candidates and run
them through moral, mental, and physical screening.
For these first camps, this screening process involved
making every applicant appear personally before an
Army recruiting officer for examination.7
A shortage of recruiting officers complicated the
Army’s task. Some of the larger states had only one
or two officers for the entire state. The best that could
be done in many instances was to briefly question an
applicant as to his education and previous experience,
glance hurriedly at his letters of recommendation,
and make a snap recommendation as to his fitness.
The recruiting officers’ recommendations for this
first series of camps were, however, only tentative;
the camp commander made the final selection. These
commanders were overwhelmed with the number
of candidates they had to vet, but they managed to
accomplish at least a modicum of follow-on screening.
Many mistakes were made. In the end, some 150,000
candidates passed the preliminary tests to attend this
first series of camps; 43,000 were selected to take the
course; and 27,341 graduated. Of these graduates, 2
colonels, 1 lieutenant colonel, 235 majors, 3,722 captains, 4,452 first lieutenants, and 18,929 second lieutenants were commissioned. With the experience of the
first series of camps in mind, the Army refined its rules
for the selection and appointment of candidates. It
incorporated these refinements into the second series
of Officers’ Training Camps, which were conducted
from August 27, 1917 to November 27, 1917. Out of the
72,914 men who volunteered for these camps, 21,000
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attended and 17,237 received commissions; 59 were
commissioned as majors.8
After this second series of camps, the War Department announced its intention to fill vacancies in the
commissioned grades primarily from the enlisted
ranks. In the first and second series of camps, large
numbers of college graduates were in attendance.9
Graduates from America’s most prestigious civilian universities were well represented; indeed, some
critics complained that the camps had an elitist tinge.
Moreover, there is some evidence to support this complaint.10 The Army’s abrupt shift in policy that essentially limited enrollment in officer camps to enlisted
candidates upset many observers—to include many
MTCA members. They were concerned about the
effect such a policy would have on officer quality.11
The War Department took this step—i.e., giving
preference to enlisted men in OTS—for several reasons. First, it seemed the democratic thing to do. In
a republic such as the United States, it was essential
that every inductee should have an opportunity to
become an officer, and that officers should be selected
for reasons of merit alone. Second, reserving most line
commissions for enlisted Soldiers would be a powerful incentive to the rank and file, as well as a huge
boost to their morale. Such an incentive would be a
deterrent to dysfunctional behavior, such as desertion,
absent without official leave (AWOL), misconduct,
and indiscipline. Third, limiting OTS attendance to the
enlisted ranks would help prevent nepotism and political patronage in the selection of officers—the bane
of wartime officer accessions since the Revolution.
Finally, and probably most importantly, reserving line
commissions for the enlisted ranks would help the
nation more rationally manage its manpower. Some
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of the men who earned commissions in the first series
of camps would probably have been more valuable
to the nation as managers, scientists, or engineers in
some war industry than they were as lieutenants in the
Infantry or Field Artillery. In an industrialized war of
the type then being waged in Europe, it was essential
that the nation utilize its manpower fully and distribute its human talent efficiently. Otherwise, the United
States would forfeit a considerable military advantage. Although camp attendance was again opened up
to civilians in the fall of 1918 (primarily because some
of the more technical branches were suffering from a
dearth of qualified candidates), it was done too late to
affect the fighting in France.12
The third series of Officers’ Training Camps were
in operation from January 5 to April 19, 1918. Most
attendees (approximately 90 percent) were enlisted,
which included experienced veterans from the Regular Army and new inductees from the National Army.
Exceptions to this general rule were made for a relatively small number from colleges that had a military science (MS)/ Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
(ROTC) program and for a limited number of civilians who were of draft age and had previous military
training.13 All graduates of this third series of camps
were commissioned as second lieutenants. With the
third series of camps, the War Department abandoned
the former campsites and transferred officer training
to separate schools in each division.14 Some critics
insisted that collocating officer camps with divisional
cantonments was a bad idea. Divisional camps were,
they asserted, primarily schools for the Soldier and
the officers’ camps would “necessarily become a mere
side adjunct” to their enlisted counterparts. Moreover,
officer training and selection had relatively little in
common with enlisted training and therefore needed
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to be conducted in its own dedicated area away from
the atmosphere and ethos of a division.15
In June 1918, a fourth series of OTS started in 24
National Army and National Guard divisions in the
United States as an integral part of those divisions.
Soon thereafter, Army leaders came to the conclusion
that the divisional camps were not producing officers
of the requisite quality. Consequently, these divisional
camps were abruptly abandoned. The War Department decided to consolidate the training of officers in
a few large camps—the Central OTS. The new centralized arrangements took effect in June and July 1918.16
The Central OTS were held at permanent replacement camps. The Infantry had 5 such schools: Camp
Pike, Arkansas; Camp Lee, Virginia; Camp Grant, Illinois; Camp MacArthur, Texas; and Camp Gordon,
Georgia. Each of these schools had a 4-month course
with a capacity of 5,600 students, a monthly intake of
1,400, and a monthly output of 1,000 graduates. From
these Infantry schools, 9,370 officers actually graduated before the armistice. The Engineers had a school
at Camp Humphreys, Virginia, and the Cavalry at
Leon Springs, Texas. The largest of these central
schools was the Field Artillery School at Camp Taylor,
Kentucky, which had an intake of 5,000 men monthly.
An OTS was held for African American men at Fort
Des Moines, Iowa, from June 18 to October 18, 1917.
Out of 1,250 students that passed through the Des
Moines camp, 639 earned commissions.17
The policy of drawing officers principally from the
enlisted ranks had its drawbacks. For one thing, the
draft was not supplying suitable officer material in
the necessary quantities. While conscription theoretically drew from all classes, by the time the third series
of OTS were in operation, most college men and the
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majority of those with the highest mental abilities had
already entered the service through voluntary enlistment in the first series of Officers’ Training Camps, or
had obtained commissions on the Army Staff or in the
Navy and Marine Corps. The officer material supplied
from the enlisted ranks of the Army thus left much to
be desired.18
Within the War Department, there were complaints
that the men who graduated from the Divisional OTS
and the centralized camps were, as a group, unsatisfactory. Candidates who attended these officer schools
were generally not well educated. The elimination
of civilian candidates, many were convinced, was
responsible for this dearth of quality. In its quest for
efficiency, the Army had robbed the combat branches
of intellectual talent.19
Some line branches had more problems than others
in finding suitable officer material. The spring of 1918
found the Field Artillery Corps short of the officers
necessary to meet their needs. Field Artillery work,
involving higher mathematics and technical equipment, demanded a greater degree of special training
and education than did Infantry work. Candidates
had to possess a working knowledge of arithmetic,
algebra (to include quadratic equations), and plane
geometry. A knowledge of trigonometry and the use
of logarithms were highly desirable. Those having had
an advanced scientific and technical education were
the most sought after, particularly those educated as
civil, mechanical, electrical, mining, or architectural
engineers. After the first several months of the war,
they were in very short supply.20
The Coast Artillery also encountered significant
problems in finding suitable officer material. The Big
Gun Corps, as the Coast Artillery was sometimes
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referred to, had much the same difficulty as the Field
Artillery. Its requirements for officers were even more
stringent than those for the Field Artillery, since officer candidates in that branch had to pass examinations
in logarithms and trigonometry in addition to algebra
and plane geometry. Owing to the unfortunate name
“Coast Artillery,” it was little appreciated that 90 percent of the members of this Coast Artillery Corps were
destined for active service overseas in handling the big
guns, mortars, and anti-aircraft guns on the battlefields
of France. To solve these problems, the Army took two
steps. First, it significantly enlarged the capacity of the
Coast Artillery OTS at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Second,
it made direct appeals to colleges to procure graduating seniors for the branch. By this method, it hoped to
get older recruits with the right kind of skills and education. However, things did not go as planned, and
the Coast Artillery suffered from a deficit of adequate
officer leadership throughout the war.21
Even the Infantry had problems attracting qualified officers. While the educational requirements for
an Infantry officer were not as high as for the Artillery
and Engineers, the Infantry faced intense competition
from other branches for the best officer candidates.
Generally speaking, the most qualified candidates
preferred the more refined and safer environment of
the technical branches to the more rugged and dangerous working conditions of the Infantry. The ROTC
program was supposed to be a source of officers for
the Infantry. However, the Infantry only obtained a
limited number of candidates from that source. Many
ROTC units were short-staffed and overburdened
during the war and their professors of MS and tactics,
the officers in charge of these units, could not devote
very much time to soliciting recruits for the Infantry
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branch. The end result was the pipeline from ROTC
units to OTS was severely constricted.22
Despite these difficulties in finding suitable officer
candidates, the Army continued to exclude civilian
candidates from the Officers’ Training Camps until
the summer of 1918. It took that long for the realization to sink into the collective consciousness of the
War Department that the Army’s rank and file could
not furnish the requisite number of officer candidates
with the appropriate knowledge and skills to be officers and that the continued disqualification of civilians was depriving the Army of much desirable officer
material. This first became apparent in the Field Artillery and the Coast Artillery, but all branches eventually came to feel the pinch. With the organization of
the great central Field Artillery School at Camp Taylor
early in the summer of 1918, the bars were finally let
down and civilians were once again permitted to compete for a commission. Soon afterwards, the Infantry camps were also thrown open to civilians. This
change in policy occurred too late to affect operations
in France to any appreciable degree, however. It is
doubtful that any of the civilian candidates commissioning in the summer of 1918 reached Europe in time
to take part in the last allied offensives.23
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SELECTION PROCEDURES FOR FIRST AND
SECOND SERIES OF OFFICER TRAINING
SCHOOLS
The selection of candidates for the first series of
OTS was based on four elements: a physical examination, the candidate’s application blank, letters of recommendation, and a personal interview with selection
authorities. Since candidates came into these camps
directly from civilian life and many of these men had
college degrees, the intelligence quotient (IQ) test was
not used, at least not as a screening instrument. The
Scott Rating Scale was used in eight of the first series
of Officers’ Training Camps on a test basis. The rating
scale was seen as one relative bright spot in an otherwise very unpromising situation. For overall, the
screening mechanisms employed at first were weak
and were administered in haste. This inevitably led to
mistakes.
At the Field Artillery OTS, a fairly rigorous screening system was instituted to determine which candidates would actually receive commissions. The system
did not help the Army decide who would be allowed
into the camp, only who would leave as an officer.
The candidate attempting to earn a commission was
graded on technical subjects. The grading rubric was
based on a 100-point scale, 70 being the minimum
average for graduation. The candidate was also evaluated on a monthly basis on the five essential qualities of an officer, listed on the Scott Rating Scale. This
scale that will be discussed in more detail later in this
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chapter. The minimum rating for graduation was 50.
The relative rank of each graduate was based upon the
average of his technical subjects grade and his essential qualities rating. At the close of training, the names
of the candidates recommended for commission were
arranged in an order of merit from best to poorest and
placed upon the eligible list.
SCREENING PROCEDURES IN THE THIRD
SERIES OF OFFICER TRAINING SCHOOLS
As previously noted, the third series of camps
marked a change in the general policy of OTS. In the
first two series, the candidates came from civilian life.
Now, the great majority came from the enlisted ranks.
The same procedure of selecting men on the basis of a
physical examination, an application blank, and letters
of recommendation was retained, but now the applications and letters of recommendation were submitted
by enlisted men to their company commander; upon
his recommendation, the men were considered by battalion and regimental commanders, and finally by a
special board convened for the purpose.
The third series of camps began on January 5, 1918.
To standardize the recommendations of company officers, the rating scale was introduced as an entrance
screen. Up to this time, it had been used exclusively
in selecting candidates within the Officers’ Training Camps for commissions. Now it was also used
to identify men for attendance at camp. Each platoon
commander was told to select a group of men who
could qualify as candidates for OTS. About one-fifth
of the men fell into this group. Platoon leaders were
instructed to consider general military qualifications
that were the most essential for an officer, such as
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commanding presence, strong voice, loyalty, capacity
for leadership, and high intelligence. Pocket Rating
Cards were used for gauging the potential of the candidates and special records were maintained on all
candidates. After this platoon level evaluation was
complete, company commanders would select the
most highly qualified candidates—the number was
not to exceed 10 percent of their unit. In making their
selections, company commanders would make use of
the reports of their platoon leaders, their own knowledge of the men and the educational and occupational
history of the applicants as shown by the Qualification Record Card. An Order of Merit List (OML) was
then compiled and passed through regimental and
brigade channels to the division headquarters, where
the division commander would convene a board of
three officers to consider all applications and select
the attendees. The number of attendees was not to
exceed 1.7 percent of the enlisted men in the division
cantonment.24
SCOTT RATING SCALE
Commencing with the second series of camps, the
Scott Rating Scale came into general use. This rating
scale was originally devised for a group of business
organizations in December 1916. Army officers cooperated in adapting the scale to Army needs. This originally involved the selection of exemplars, known to
the officers on the rating scale committee, who best
and most clearly represented five levels (highest, high,
middle, low, and lowest) on five different constructs
(viz., physical qualities, intelligence, leadership, personal qualities, and general value to the service). Later,
specific items were developed, along with unique
and descriptive scales, for inclusion in each of the
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construct areas (expanded to 20). Sample items shown
in Figure 3-1 illustrate what was found on the survey
instrument.25
3. Does he appear neat or slovenly in his dress?
Extremely neat and
clean. Almost a dude.

Appropriately and
neatly dressed

Inconspicuous in dress

Somewhat careless in
his dress

Very slovenly and
unkempt

Progressive tendencies

Quick to pick up new
ways and habits

Is always adapting
himself and taking up
new ideas

More than upholds his
end of the conversation

Great talker. Always
going.

13. How flexible is he?
Hidebound. Runs in a
rut.

Slow to take up new
ideas

18. Is he quiet or talkative?
Talks seldom. When
questioned answers
briefly.

Does not uphold his end Moderately talkative
of the conversation

Figure 3-1. Sample of Survey Questions.
It was then submitted to the Secretary of the Army
and the Adjutant General for review. It was eventually approved by the War Department and was tested
at the first series of Officers’ Training Camps at eight
locations—Fort Myer, Plattsburgh, Madison Barracks,
Fort Niagara, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Fort Sheridan,
Fort Snelling, and Fort Riley. These experiments were
deemed successful. An improved form of the scale
was authorized for use in the second series of OTS.26
The scale had been developed by Walter D. Scott,
an eminent psychologist. When he first tried to get his
scale accepted by the Army, he met resistance. Senior
officers and many instructors denounced it as impractical. Scott eventually induced the War Department
to test his scale with a practical experiment. His scale
was used on men who were already commissioned
and had already been identified as good officers. If
Scott’s instrument identified capacities that successful
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officers were known to possess, then it could logically be assumed that the instrument was valid and
an accurate predictor of officer performance. Scott’s
instrument proved accurate, and it was then that the
War Department authorized its use in all camps.27
The Army employed Scott’s rating system for three
different functions: determining what types of skills
and abilities that were needed in units, placing each
enlisted Soldier in an occupational specialty in which
he could make the best use of his talents, and most
relevant to this study, selecting and screening officers
on the basis of their abilities. By the end of the war,
Scott’s system had spread throughout the Army. Scott
solved the problem of selecting not only officers but
also men whose aptitudes would fit them for training
as specialists and technicians of many kinds. His committee devised means of keeping wartime industries
adequately staffed and made possible successful selection of men for unusual tasks peculiar to a wartime
army. Scott’s method was later used to gauge the promotion potential of officers and to regulate the effective use of the vast pool of talents and skills among
enlisted men.28
INTELLIGENCE TESTING
Intelligence became recognized as an important
factor in officer screening during World War I. An
intelligence or IQ test was widely, albeit not universally, employed to select officer candidates after the
second series of Officers’ Training Camps (See Appendix C and D for copies of the Alpha and Beta Tests). The
challenge of selecting officer material was to discover
who among enlisted Soldiers were equal or superior
to the average, or slightly below average, officer, and
give them the opportunity to be commissioned.29
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Under the direction of the Division of Psychology,
Medical Department, and in accordance with provisions of War Department, General Order No. 74,
mental tests were given to recruits during the 2-week
detention period—the period that elapsed between
the time a recruit was inducted into the Army and the
time before basic training. This testing began shortly
after the beginning of the war. These tests provided
a quick and reasonably accurate classification of the
men according to their level of general intelligence.
The tests were prepared by a committee comprised of
representatives of the American Psychological Association and the National Research Council. From the
beginning of the war until November 1, 1918, approximately 1,500,000 recruits were tested.30
The tests were not used in the first two series
of Officers’ Training Camps, those operated by the
MTCA. Many of the candidates who attended these
camps were college students or college graduates. It
was assumed that intelligence testing for screening
purposes was not needed in such a highly educated
population. In addition, the MTCA had operated the
Plattsburgh Camps in the years before the war, and
that organization brought its administrative apparatus
as well as its assumptions and methods (which did not
include intelligence testing) with it to OTS. Some, both
at the time and since, believed that the MTCA operated with an elitist bias; it allegedly gave candidates
who had attended prestigious, private universities
preference when it came to camp attendance and officer selection. If this was in fact true, (and there is some
evidence that it was), this practice abruptly changed
with the third series of camps when the Army intervened and gave preference to enlisted candidates.31
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In several of the third series of camps, candidates
were personally examined by a final board of officers
before being admitted to officer training. These boards
were directed to interview all candidates in person
and base their evaluation of candidates’ officer potential on soldierly appearance, bearing, etc. This procedure resulted in weighting the applicant’s physical
qualities more than mental abilities. However, it was
soon discovered that an evaluation based on appearance was not as reliable as the demonstrated performance on an intelligence test as a gauge of officer
potential. The Army found that applicants of A and
B intelligence—i.e., very superior and superior intelligence, the highest two categories—were being commissioned, while a considerably smaller portion of
C+ applicants, only half of C applicants, and very few
of C- applicants were being commissioned. So struck
were several training camp commanders by this trend
that they refused to accept anyone for the fourth series
of camps who did not score C or better on the intelligence test. Nevertheless, it is necessary to reiterate that
while intelligence testing was widely used after the
second series of camps to select officer candidates, it
was by no means a general requirement. Division and
camp commanders could determine for themselves if,
how, and when they would use the tests.32
Intelligence testing was not intended to displace
other means of selecting officers. However, the realization gradually dawned on War Department leaders
that intelligence was perhaps the most salient single
factor in officer efficiency. It was found that applicants
who scored C or lower were rarely equal to the challenge of complicated paperwork or other higher order
intellectual tasks. Intelligence testing also demonstrated that there was an intellectual hierarchy among
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the branches. The Engineers and Field Artillery had
the highest scores, while the Infantry, Quartermaster
Corps, and Dental Corps were in the lower half of the
branches from an intelligence testing perspective.33
In Field Artillery and certain other camps, the
intelligence test was not used to select candidates for
a commission (as opposed to being admitted into a
camp). At the Field Artillery’s Central OTS, for example, candidates were graded for scholarship, military
training performance, and personal qualities at both
the beginning and the end of camp. They received a
grade on technical subjects based upon a percentage
basis of 100, with 75 as a weekly passing mark, and 70
as a minimum average for the course for graduation.
They were also evaluated monthly using the Officers’
Rating [Scott] Scale and its five essential qualities of
an officer. The relative numerical rank of the graduate in the entire class was based upon the average of
his technical subject grades and his essential qualities
rating. The basis for weighting each of the 15 technical
subjects taken was worked out and applied in computing the candidate’s grade for graduation. This weighting system was based primarily upon the number of
hours devoted to the subject, with modifications dictated by consideration as to the relative importance
of the subjects as Field Artillery essentials. Based on
a score of 100, the weighting was as follows: administration—2; care and training of horses—5; communication—6; conduct of fire—12; dismounted drill—4;
driving—6; field gunnery—10; fire discipline—10; gun
squad drill—2; materiel—7; pistol drill and guard
duty—2; reconnaissance—10; re-drill—12; riding—2;
topography and artillery boards—10. At the close of
the school, the names of the candidates recommended
for commissions were arranged in order of merit from
highest to lowest and placed upon the eligible list.34
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SELECTION OF STAFF CORPS OFFICERS
During World War I, nearly one-half of all Army
officers were needed for the staff and auxiliary services. While OTS selected officers for the line units,
no such uniform method of accessing officers existed
for the professional and technical branches. Mistakes
in assigning officers to the various specialty services
were consequently unavoidable. Various methods
were used to select staff officers and various degrees
of success obtained. For that reason, it is not possible to draw any general conclusions concerning the
recruitment and training of officers outside of the line
schools because each branch of the service had a separate problem requiring separate treatment. It is possible only to sketch in general terms how the different
branches obtained their officers.35
Some contend that the training camp principle had
not been sufficiently established at the outbreak of
the war to pave the way for its extension to the Staff
Corps. There, custom and old habits remained strong.
In certain branches, commissions were doled out without a thorough screening of the candidates making
application. Some appointment-seekers were awarded
commissions due to nepotism and political influence.
Others owed their commissions to chance. They happened to appear first or showed up at the right time
and right place. Too few were given appointments on
the basis of demonstrated performance or experience.36
The scale of, and the haste with which the mobilization was carried out created problems. Some Staff
Corps such as Chemical Warfare and Military Aeronautics were created almost overnight and needed
officers not by the hundreds but by the thousands.
In such cases, branches often bid against one another
for qualified men. Under those circumstances, many
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were awarded commissions for which they were not
qualified. They went to Washington and made the
rounds of the various departments seeking through
influence or other device to get the best position available. All too often, they succeeded. In such an environment, bluster and braggadocio often trumped skill
and ability. In the process, many qualified individuals
were discouraged, rejected, or given rank well below
their abilities. As a result, the Army saw the evils of
the old volunteer system crop up once again.37
The Quartermaster and Ordnance Corps were
notorious for their lack of discrimination in screening their officer candidates. Although both of these
branches required recruits of high grade and highly
technical qualifications, they found difficulty both in
securing individuals of high caliber and in preventing the admission of those whose qualifications were
weak. These results were the consequence of ineffective screening procedures. Many thousands of Ordnance and Quartermaster officers were appointed,
especially in the early days of the war, without adequate investigation, observation, or training. The average quality of the officers in these two branches was
adjudged to be among the lowest in the Army.38
The absence of effective screening procedures
for these two branches excited much criticism, both
within and outside the War Department. In fact, a
strong public outcry arose against the commissioning
of individuals without previous training or apparent
qualifications in the Quartermaster and Ordnance
Corps. Such an anomalous method of parceling out
commissions ran against the progressive spirit of the
age. The bad reputation of these branches made them
less attractive to men of ambition and energy and further complicated the task of recruitment.39
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The loose way in which commissions had been
granted in some branches of the Staff Corps eventually led the War Department to step in. It attempted
to correct the situation by creating a Personnel Branch
within the General Staff. This branch was to have sole
charge of filling the demands for all classes of Staff
Corps officers, such as: Ordnance, Quartermaster,
Motor Transport, Military Aeronautics, Supply, Military Intelligence, Air-Craft Production, Tanks, Gas
Defense, Chemical Warfare, Judge Advocate General,
and Adjutant General. The plan aimed to consolidate
under one head a central organization that could regulate the demands of the various Staff Corps branches
throughout the country, coordinate those demands
with the supply of officer material available, and use
that supply to the best advantage.40
As previously noted, not all branches in the Staff
Corps proceeded as haphazardly as the Quartermaster and Ordnance Corps. The Corps of Engineers did
a fairly effective job in screening and securing some
20,000 officers. The OTS method was used, but with a
twist—the Engineers often sent officers to camp after
awarding those commissions. This rather irregular
policy was less harmful in the Engineers than it would
have been in most other branches because original
recruitment was accomplished almost entirely among
engineers with some professional experience whose
qualifications it was possible to ascertain with considerable accuracy.41
The Air Service, which had 20,000 officers by
the end of the war, also created a generally effective
system of officer procurement. It experienced few
problems procuring qualified aviators. The flyers were
carefully selected from a great number of volunteers
and thoroughly vetted through a system of examining boards. The service had a harder time securing
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qualified ground officers. One observer noted shortly
after the end of the war regarding the procurement of
ground officers:
Such mistakes as were made were in the appointment
of “ground” officers of whom a large number were
required. Here, as [in the Engineers], the cause was the
commissioning of candidates previous to training, on the
basis of perfunctory recommendations and inadequate
investigation.42

The Medical Department of the Army, with
its more than 25,000 new officers, recruited officers through medical associations, applicants being
appointed on recommendation and not after training.
As in the case of the Engineer Corps, the known technical qualifications of the applicants made it possible
to use this method with some success, but suggestions
of unfairness and nepotism were common, and it is
clear that things would probably have worked more
smoothly if more rigorous and elaborate screening
procedures had been adopted.43
ADMISSIONS POLICIES AT WEST POINT
During the First World War, the Academy’s admissions process experienced a metamorphosis of a very
negative kind. West Point saw its curriculum truncated and its admissions standards lowered. Upon the
declaration of war, the War Department directed the
U.S. Military Academy (USMA) to graduate the senior
class—the one that had entered in 1913—on April 20,
1917, nearly a month and a half early. Shortly thereafter, the War Department instructed West Point to
graduate the next class—the one that had entered in
1914 and had originally been scheduled to graduate in
June 1918—early as well. The graduation was to occur
in August 1917, 10 months early. The second 3-year
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class—which had entered in 1915—graduated in June
1918 and a third 3-year class—the one that entered in
1916—was scheduled to graduate in June 1919. However, that schedule was disrupted. On October 3, 1918,
the War Department ordered the superintendent to
graduate the two upper classes—the ones that had
entered in 1916 and 1917—on November 1. That left
only the plebe class—the cadets who had arrived only
5 months earlier at the Academy. In addition, West
Point was to take in a new class immediately and begin
academic instruction out of cycle. Moreover, for the
remainder of the war, classes were to graduate after
only 1 year in residence (although after the Armistice,
the Army returned the junior of the two graduating
classes back to the Academy for 6 additional months
of instruction). Army leaders had, the historian Lance
Betros commented, effectively turned the USMA into
“a glorified training camp for officers.”44
For cadets entering West Point during the war,
the customary mental screening measures were not
employed. Candidates were selected in haste and
admitted into the Academy without the usual thorough vetting. No entrance exams whatsoever were
administered to the classes that entered in 1918 and
the review of certificates submitted with applications
was cursory at best. The results were predictable.
Due to the fact that these appointees were suddenly
selected, allowed practically no time for preparation
of any sort, admitted without the usual mental tests,
and then obliged to undertake an intensive course of
academic studies and military training, many failed
to meet the Academy’s academic requirements. Many
others, perhaps sensing failure, resigned before they
had an opportunity to take their first set of examinations at the Academy.45
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Purpose of Testing
Why test? What is testing’s function? In short, we test because
we want information about a person that we cannot get without asking. However, that information is tied to a particular goal, strategy,
or system. These goals, strategies, or systems would be certification,
diagnosis, and differentiation.46
Certification tests are given to ensure that persons meet minimal
criteria or standards for knowledge and/or performance. For example, graduates of medical schools, although in possession of the Doctor of Medicine degree, nevertheless, they cannot practice medicine
until they pass their respective states’ medical boards. The Building
Owners and Managers Institute offers coursework and certification
exams so that individuals can become Real Property Administrators
or Systems Maintenance Technicians. Whether the standards are set
low or high, the goal of the test taker is simply to pass the exam.
Those who administer a test for certification purposes select items
that well represent what a practicing professional, or a graduating
student, should know or be able to do.
Diagnostic tests are administered for the purpose of detecting
the presence or absence of something.47 The field of medicine is rife
with examples of such a test. One might give a magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) test to a patient to see if a knee ligament is torn, for
example. Or, a drop of blood can be tested for blood sugar levels
using a glucometer. However, there are paper-and-pencil diagnostic
tests as well. In psychology, there are tests for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder.
Generally, the higher or lower a particular score, the more or less
likely one is to suffer from these psychological ailments.
Finally, tests are also administered for purposes of differentiation. The SAT (formerly known as the Scholastic Aptitude Test, then
the Scholastic Assessment Test) is such a test; so also are most school
quizzes and tests.48 These tests measure knowledge (or ability); to
do so well, they must differentiate individuals as much as possible.
If, for example, we wanted to know how much enlistees understood
advanced mathematics, we would not want to administer a test of
basic arithmetic. While the scores likely would be very high, and
while one could argue that basic arithmetic is the foundation for
advanced mathematics, there would be virtually no differentiation
among individuals. What we want and need would be as wide a
spread in scores as is possible and as is reasonable. Put another way,
people who know the material should score very high while people
who don’t know it should score very low.49
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Moreover, the social composition and educational
background of incoming cadets changed dramatically
during the war. The number of cadets whose fathers
were professionals plummeted by 50 percent, the
number of cadets with prior college experience sank
almost as precipitously, and the number of cadets
with previous enlisted service reached an all-time
high. Indeed, the percentage of cadets with prior military service changed permanently during World War
I. Never again would the presence of former enlisted
Soldiers drop back to the negligible levels of the prewar days.50
Academy authorities were, as one can imagine,
upset by the lowering of admissions standards. They
complained that the wartime accessions policy was
bankrupt. It was a mistake, they asserted, to allow
the need for a large number of officers to compel “a
general lowering of the Military Academy standards.”
Now that USMA graduates formed only a small fraction of the officers being inducted into the Army, it
was more important than ever that West Point maintained its traditionally high admissions standards. In
the dire circumstances of the war, however, such complaints fell on deaf ears.51
CONCLUSION
The Army had to take extraordinary measures
to produce enough officers to direct its expanded
force in World War I. To lead its line formations, the
War Department established a system of OTS. These
schools vetted and, to a limited extent, trained the
men who eventually received line commissions. Starting with the third series of camps, the War Department drew principally from the enlisted ranks for its
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officers. The OTS model represented a sharp break
with tradition. In previous wars, political influence
and the ability to raise troops figured prominently in
determining who would receive officer appointments.
Election governed the process of officer selection in
many militia companies. Although the OTS model
had pronounced shortcomings, it did bring a measure
of consistency and standardization to the commissioning process.
The War Department’s officer selection system
for the technical and professional branches was more
haphazard and very much in line with tradition. In
many of these branches, political influence, personal
connections, availability, and chance regulated the
commissioning process. In the professional branches,
where qualifications for a commission were clear
and easily verifiable, relatively few problems were
encountered. However, in branches where qualifications were less well-defined—most notably the Quartermaster and Ordnance Corps—serious difficulties
arose. Many unqualified and incompetent recruits
were commissioned.
The USMA underwent acute changes during the
war. Its curriculum was severely curtailed and the
course of instruction drastically reduced. Indeed, the
traditional 4-year course was shortened to 6 months.
Training took top priority and West Point became
essentially an intensive version of the OTS program.
At the same, admissions standards declined. The
Academy eliminated the entrance test and the careful
scrutiny of applicant transcripts. West Point authorities were despondent, but had to wait until the cessation of hostilities to reintroduce rigor into the selection
process.
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CHAPTER 4:
INTERWAR PERIOD
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the interwar period, the Army could
be selective as to whom it allowed into the officer
corps; albeit, once again not quite as selective as it had
been before the war. Its small size relative to the population was a principal reason why it could remain so
discriminating. The officer corps was maintained at a
strength of approximately 12,000 from 1923 until the
eve of World War II. This was almost triple the size
of the pre-World War I officer corps. Over the same
period, the U.S. population expanded from 106,000,000
to 132,000,000. The officer to population ratio, therefore, ranged from 1:8,833 to 1:9,429 between 1920 and
1941—ratios small by the standards of the pre-World
War I era but huge compared to the ratios that existed
during the 1st decade of the Cold War.
AFTER THE ARMISTICE
The Army emerged from World War I far larger
that it had been before the outbreak of hostilities. On
November 11, 1918, the date on which the Armistice
ending World War I was signed, the officer strength of
the Army, including Regular Army, National Army,
and National Guard, was 188,434. Approximately
100,000 were products of OTS.1 This huge body of
officers—or at least most of it—had to be demobilized
and demobilized quickly. Nevertheless, even after the
demobilization was complete, a sizable officer corps
remained.
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This enlargement (pre-war versus post-war size)
was accompanied by a noticeable downturn in the
intellectual quality of the officer corps. This downturn
occurred because—first, new accessions requirements
were greater than before 1917 and this necessarily
diluted quality to a slight extent; and second, and
much more significantly, the Regular Army had to
quickly incorporate many provisional or temporary
junior and mid-grade officers into its ranks to reach
and sustain its expanded post-war size. It simply
could not support the enlarged force with the Regular officers it had on hand—which was at nearly the
same level as it had been before the war. And it could
not rely on new officer accessions since it would take a
considerable amount of time with the commissioning
machinery then in place to build up to the necessary
strength. As a result, World War I, like all previous
major wars in U.S. history, allowed many temporary
officers brought on for the emergency to remain in the
Army after the cessation of hostilities. It was the War
Department’s only practical option.2
To get to its expanded size, the War Department,
as it had done in the aftermath of the Spanish-American and Civil Wars, incorporated many of the officers
who held provisional or reserve commissions into the
Regular Army. When provisional appointments to the
Regular Army were suspended in 1918, some 3,500
provisional commissions as second lieutenant had
already been granted. By August of 1920, all of these
officers had served their 2-year probationary periods
and were awaiting the decision whether or not they
would be incorporated into the Regular Army permanently. In addition, there were 2,000 officers on the
eligible lists and 1,000 officers holding commissions
in the Officers’ Reserve Corps (ORC), the National
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Guard, and the National Army who had indicated
their desire to make the Regular Army a career. The
large number of officers who desired incorporation in
the peacetime Regular Army came as no surprise to
the War Department. Even before the demobilization
program got in full swing, the War Department realized that thousands of men who had earned reserve
commissions wanted to continue their service. It had
consequently made arrangements for accepting the
best of them—or at least the best of them who would
agree to remain on active duty—into the Regular Officer ranks. War Department Circular No. 75, dated
November 20, 1918 provided that, in the demobilization that was about to commence, those temporary
officers who desired to be commissioned in the Regular Army should be the last to be discharged.3
On June 30, 1919, the Chief of Staff wrote that:
steps have been taken toward the procurement of material
to fill, from the reservoir of war-trained material, such
vacancies in the permanent establishment as now exist,
mainly as a result of resignations, and as may be created in
the reorganization of the Army. Early in December [1918]
instructions were published giving opportunity to all
emergency officers who so desired to submit applications
for permanent appointment. These instructions provided
that applicants be given a preliminary examination and
be rated by boards of officers and their applications be
forwarded to the War Department. . . . There have been
received, classified and filed to date about 25,000 such
applications. From the data available, at least 27,000
applications will be received, about 17,000 of which will
have approval of the preliminary examining boards . . .
no applicant should be appointed who does not pass a
thorough and satisfactory final examination [emphasis
added].4
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The Army, however, was not able to live up to the
Chief of Staff’s expectations.
The Army Reorganization Act of June 4, 1920,
effected the post-war restructuring of the Army. This
statute is important to our narrative because it modified a few long-standing War Department policies
and contained some entirely new ones relative to the
officer corps: (1) for the first time since the Civil War,
officers were to be appointed in grades up to and
including colonel; (2) a General Staff Corps eligibility list was established; (3) the Regular Army officer
corps was to be increased (to a maximum strength of
17,726) and not less than one-half of the increase was
to consist of individuals who held non-Regular commissions during the war. Although Congress set the
maximum strength of the Regular officer corps at
17,726, limited funds reduced the officer corps’ actual
strength to 12,000 by 1922. Nevertheless, because the
officer corps was much larger after the war than it was
before, authorizations were created for nearly 6,000
new officers.5
After so-called examinations were administered
to applicants for the vacancies created in August and
October of 1920, 5,593 Regular Army appointments
were tendered, of which 5,217 were accepted. Commissions in the Regular Army were granted to 4 colonels, 18 lieutenant colonels, 358 majors, 1,497 captains,
1,948 first lieutenants, and 1,391 second lieutenants.
The method of examination used in this process represented a radical departure from policies that had
regulated officer entrance examinations since the Civil
War. In his Annual Report for 1920, the Chief of Staff
outlined this new procedure. First, the candidate’s
record was examined by a board of officers in Washington, and the results were then sent to the chief of
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the branch in which the candidate sought appointment. Then, another board was convened by the chief
of that branch to consider the records, which were
subsequently submitted for final selection to the board
of general officers, set up according to the National
Defense Act (NDA) of June 4, 1920—this constituted
the first part of the exam.6
The second part of the assessment consisted of a
personal examination of the applicant. This examination included a review of physical, moral, educational,
and professional qualifications. Ostensibly because
of variations in rank, age, and condition of service of
the applicants, a strict academic educational examination of the type traditionally given to non-West Point
applicants for commission in the Regular Army was
dispensed with—that is to say, no mental test was
given. Wide latitude was accorded the examining
boards in determining the scope of the assessment
necessary in each particular case. The NDA of 1920
revoked the section of the NDA of 1916, which made
all appointments provisional for a term of 2 years,
exempted all the so-called provisional officers still on
the active list as of June 4, 1920 from any examination, and made their appointments permanent. This
procedure allowed hundreds of non-degreed officers
to receive commissions in the Regular Army. The War
Department did not like the process, but political pressure to reward veterans and fill vacancies in the officer
corps quickly left it little choice but to expand the officer corps as expeditiously as possible.7
The large integration of officers in the years following World War I created a serious promotion—
or rather, non-promotion—“hump” that plagued
the War Department throughout the entire interwar
period. There were many captains of approximately

105

the same relative rank on the promotion list, and far
too many comparatively young colonels and lieutenant colonels who could not be retired for physical
disability before they reached statutory retirement
age. By the early thirties, captains were getting grayheaded and lieutenants were approaching the border
of middle age, with no promotion in sight. The situation created a serious morale problem in the officer
corps and was the subject of many letters to service
journals and much discussion among members of
Congress. In 1926, Congress directed the Secretary of
War to study the situation and make a full report with
appropriate recommendations. Despite this study and
others like it, the problem persisted. It lingered on
until the late 1930s, when the build-up for World War
II finally brought a measure of relief.8
Nevertheless, after this large group of officers was
incorporated into the Regular Army in the aftermath
of World War I, things returned more or less to normal
as far as officer accessions were concerned. All regular
line appointments would in the future be made only in
the grade of second lieutenant and rigor was restored
to the officer selection process. In addition, West Point
once again became the Army’s most prolific commissioning source. To be sure, candidates from civil
life and from the enlisted ranks were given commissions; but, until the late 1930s, the numbers involved
were quite small. In fact, in the 10-year period from
1923-1933, only 590 officers were commissioned from
sources other than the U.S. Military Academy (USMA),
and there were none from 1933-36. Moreover, as one
might expect, rigorous entrance examinations for nonWest Point candidates were reinstituted. Once again,
only enlisted Soldiers and candidates from civil life
with very solid liberal educations could gain entrance
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into the officer corps. In this new accessions environment, the overwhelming majority of those commissioned had baccalaureate degrees.9
ADMISSIONS AT WEST POINT
West Point’s appeal hit an interwar low early in
the post-war period when prosperity, war weariness,
and a widespread desire to return to normalcy lowered the attractiveness of military service. However,
the Academy’s appeal along with its ability to be discriminating in its admissions standards recovered
quickly and remained high throughout the decade of
the 1920s. It rose even more during the Great Depression. Economic downturns are almost always good
for military recruiting and the depression that struck
in 1929 was no exception—it was one of the nation’s
worst economic downturns and shunted thousands
into the military services, as both officers and enlisted,
who might otherwise have chosen other career tracks.
Inundated with applications, the Academy could
afford to discard any candidates that failed to measure
up to its exacting standards.10
It is necessary to remind the reader that although
entrance standards remained high, they were not as
high as those in place before World War I. The growth
of the Corps of Cadets accounts for some of this. The
size of the entering plebe class doubled between 1915
and 1922, reducing the Academy’s ability to be selective to a certain extent. It essentially doubled again in
the late 1930s, when a troubling international environment prompted the government to take some preliminary steps to bolster the nation’s defense posture.
Thus, over the course of the interwar period, West
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Point’s enrollment shot up fourfold, while the nation’s
population grew by 28 percent.
The Academy during the interwar period stressed
high standards of academic achievement. The educational prerequisites for entrance included the completion of certain high school courses or their equivalent
(as demonstrated by passing examinations), or the
satisfactory completion of college courses covering
essentially the same material. A substantial number
of the annual nominations for appointment were considered competitive, which meant that within a given
appointment category (e.g., from among children
of deceased World War veterans or from among the
enlisted men of the Regular Army), the individuals
who scored highest on the written entrance examinations were appointed. Nominations made by Senators,
Representatives, and authorities in the territories, on
the other hand, were regarded as noncompetitive;
the individual named as principal was appointed if
the entrance requirements were met. If the principal
failed and the first alternate qualified, the latter was
appointed. Entrance examinations were held in March
for admission in July of the same year, but applicants
for noncompetitive appointments were not required
to take the written examinations if they could qualify
by high school or college certificate. This system had
been in place since 1914.11
Candidates seeking admission through competitive appointment had to demonstrate by examination
that they were well versed in algebra, to include: quadratic equations and progressions; plane geometry;
English grammar, composition, and literature; and
general and U.S. history. The entrance exam for these
candidates remained very challenging. The admissions process was quite different for non-competitive
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appointees. For this group of candidates, West Point’s
Academic Board considered in lieu of the regular
mental examination: (1) a properly-attested certificate
that the candidate was a regularly enrolled student
in good standing without condition in a university,
college, or technical school accredited by the USMA
and had successfully completed a certain number of
prescribed subjects with a certain grade; (2) a properly-attested certificate that the candidate had graduated from a preparatory school or public high school
accredited by the USMA, with the prescribed subjects
and appropriate grades; and (3) a properly-attested
certificate from the College Entrance Examination
Board (CEEB) that the candidate had shown proficiency in the examinations set by the board in subjects
amounting to 14 units from a prescribed list of subjects. If a scrutiny of the certificate submitted showed
low grades, the certificate would be rejected.12
In the early 1920s, approximately three-quarters of
entering cadets were admitted into the Academy by
qualification on certificate. A satisfactory certificate
was required to demonstrate proficiency in 14 units,
shown in Tables 4-1 and 4-2.
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Table 4-1. Required Certificate Proficiencies from
Mandatory Subjects.
The remaining six units had to be furnished from
among the following subjects:
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Table 4-2. Required Certificate Proficiencies from
Optional Subjects.
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The certificates of candidates were carefully scrutinized by a special committee appointed for that purpose. Any sign of weakness in one or more subjects
in the candidate’s scholastic record was sufficient
to cause rejection of the certificate.13 The Academy
boasted that its admissions standards were “equal to,
if not superior to,” those of its “civilian counterparts,”
by which West Point officials meant Ivy League institutions. While the latter institutions would:
commonly accept a man deficient in one or more subjects,
and carry him on with conditions, the Military Academy
insists upon proficiency in all subjects. . . . [and] grades
well above the passing mark [emphasis in original].14

This all might have been true but that did not mean
that the certificate system was without blemishes. In
1922, West Point found it necessary to simplify the
Fourth Class (freshman) mathematics course because
of the large numbers of newly admitted cadets with
“poor preliminary mathematical training.”15 The huge
plebe wash out rate in 1924 alerted the Academy’s
superintendent, Fred Sladen, to some of the problems
inherent in the certificate system. “The more the subject is studied,” he asserted, “the greater is the conviction that our present system of admission by certificate
is wrong and that a remedy must be found.”16 Sladen,
a member of the Class of 1890, had been admitted to
West Point when a rigorous 3-day series of examinations had been required of every applicant.
Sladen laid the blame for these problems on two
chief causes: first, the issuance by schools of certificates that did not accurately reflect a student’s abilities
and attainments; and second, a general lowering in the
quality of teaching in secondary schools.17 The Academic Board, the superintendent explained, regularly
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accepted certificates showing the required number of
units, the required subjects, and good grades. Such
certificates, based on daily contact with a student over
4 years of preparatory course work, had been presumed to be the best evidence of the student’s ability
to master the course material at West Point. The Academy should have been able to regard students with
satisfactory certificates as “good risks.” Unfortunately,
this was not the case. A review of certificates over a
4-year period showed that of those admitted by certificate, nearly 30 percent were discharged for academic
deficiency.
After the semi-annual examinations of 1922, for example,
in the single subject of Fourth Class English, forty-nine
cadets were deficient, every one of whom had been
admitted upon a certificate showing grades well above
satisfactory in that subject. The English deficiencies
which caused the discharge of these cadets were basic
and elementary, deficiencies in the first principles of
grammar, deficiencies in spelling, deficiencies in any
sense of composition form.18

The superintendent connected the general lowering of teaching standards in secondary schools to the
turbulence and upheaval occasioned by the war. In
recent years, he opined, the USMA had been receiving the products of schools whose teaching staffs had
been thinned by the unsettled wartime conditions.
Regardless of the cause, he continued, the character of
preparation had been poorer than in former years.
Out of nine hundred and sixty-eight cadets admitted
during a four-year period by certificate, two hundred and
eighty-seven, or 29.64%, were discharged for academic
deficiency; and [by way of comparison] out of four
hundred and twenty admitted by examination, sixty-four,
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or 15.23%, were discharged [in the first 6 months of their
cadetships on account of academic failure].19

In the superintendent’s opinion, such heavy attrition
signaled a major problem with the Academy’s screening procedures.20
Sladen noted how widely educational standards
differed throughout the country, a fact reflected in the
student body at the Academy. Students from states
with “good school systems,” he wrote, “succeed readily in mastering the West Point course.” States with
poor school systems, on the other hand, generally produced poor students.
Massachusetts ranks best, with only 8.7% of cadets
admitted therefrom failing in their studies. Florida is
second, with 11.1% failing; New York is third, with 12.3%
failing; and North Dakota, South Dakota, Illinois, North
Carolina, Vermont, New Jersey, Kansas, California, and
Michigan follow in the order named, all having less than
18% of failures. At the other end of the list we have the
deplorable record of one State [that he did not name]
which showed as high as 52.6% of failures of its entrants
to master the course.21

Sladen bemoaned the huge waste of resources and
personal disappointment that accompanied this high
failure ratio.
The superintendent looked back at admissions and
failure rates at the Academy from 1911 to 1923 to get
a long-term view of the effects of the certificate system
on admissions. The most recent iteration of the certificate system, he noted, was instituted in June 1914. No
dramatic change in the percentage of cadet failures
during the first 6 months at the Academy was evident
during the first few years of the certificate system. The
percentage from 1911 to 1913, inclusive—years when
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all cadets qualified for admission by examination—
was 14.9. The percentage in the years from 1914 to
1916, after the certificate system was introduced, was
only moderately greater—17.6.22 After the war, however, the situation rapidly deteriorated. Between 1919
and 1923, more than 27 percent who qualified by certificate were lost in their first 6 months at the Academy—almost a two-fold proportional increase over
the period 1911-1913. This high wash out rate was
especially disconcerting in view of the fact that more
than 73 percent of the entering classes after World
War I entered by the certificate method. As a result,
West Point was compelled to dumb down its courses
in order to accommodate the large number of inadequately prepared cadets admitted under the certificate
system.23
Sladen was concerned because the USMA was the
only one of the leading collegiate institutions in the East
that admitted candidates on the basis of a certificate
alone. Yale, Princeton, Harvard, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology all required qualification,
in part at least, by examination. The Naval Academy,
after a trial of the certificate system, had abandoned it
and reintroduced the entrance exam. Sladen was sure
that admissions standards had to be stricter, and that
meant a return to a general entrance examination or
its equivalent. He sent a detailed report to the War
Department explaining his views on that subject and
recommended that the entrance examination for all
candidates be reintroduced.24
Although the superintendent’s pleas for a return
to entrance testing did not yield immediate results,
it undoubtedly contributed to the introduction of the
“validation” test in 1930. By that year, Sladen’s successors had weighed in on the issue, reiterating his
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request for the reinstatement of some form of entrance
exam. Moreover, the attrition rate of the plebe class
continued to be extraordinarily high and a matter of
serious concern. The validation examination targeted
students who gained admission to the Academy on
the basis of their high school certificates. The first validation tests were given in March 1930 (for candidates
seeking admission beginning July 1, 1930). These first
validation tests gauged proficiency in algebra, geometry, and English. If applicants did not pass this test,
they would be rejected. It was expected that the benefits of the validating examination would be almost
immediately noticeable.25
Many candidates applying to West Point from
high school devoted considerable time and energy
studying for the validating exam. A large number of
them, ranging between 30 and 40 percent of all those
who were eventually admitted, spent from 6 months
to a year at special preparatory schools created specifically to help students pass the West Point admissions
test. One such candidate was John S. D. Eisenhower,
the son of Dwight Eisenhower. In his memoirs, he
described his experience at the school operated by
Homer B. “Beanie” Millard in Washington, DC. “West
Point in those days (i.e., 1940),” Eisenhower recalled:
had an artificially rigid entrance examination. In
geometry, for example, it had not succumbed to the
easier modern courses. In the course of the year Beanie
drove us through the geometry book, the algebra book,
an American history book, and an ancient history book,
three times each. We also memorized English authors,
works, and quotes from Beanie’s ingenious pamphlets. If
anyone missed a question in math, he was given a second
chance. If he failed the second time, he was required to
write out the problem twenty-five times for submission
the next day, in addition to his other studies. Two errors
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in history required copying the chapter, word for word.
The English teacher had a list of a thousand oftenmisspelled words. If a student missed a couple of them
on an English theme, he was directed to copy the entire
list several times.26

According to Eisenhower, attendance at an institution like Beanie’s was a virtual prerequisite for admission to West Point, at least for those students coming
from high school. “[T]hose [candidates] who had not
attended ‘cram’ school,” Eisenhower observed, “could
practically be discounted.”27 The “Personal History
Sheets” of cadets attending the Academy immediately
before World War II bear out Eisenhower’s assertion.28
While high schoolers were compelled to take a test,
candidates who presented college certificates continued to be excused from a validating exam and were
evaluated on the strength of their college transcripts
alone. This did not prove to be a particularly wise
admissions policy. Studies conducted by the Academy
showed that in every entering class between 1934 and
1940, the cadets who were admitted on the basis of
their college certificate had as a group the highest academic deficiency rate.29
It is probably more than coincidence that the
reintroduction of an entrance examination for high
school graduates coincided with the onset of the Great
Depression. The years after World War I were generally not good ones for recruiting. The economy was
strong, and the country, tired of war, longed for a
return to normalcy. In such an environment, the validating test might have seemed to some War Department officials to be infelicitous—as too restrictive and
inimical to enrollment. The Great Depression changed
the admissions equation. In an era of high unemployment and financial hardship, West Point, already an
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appealing institution, became an even more attractive
choice for many students. With students beating a
path to their door, Academy admissions officers realized that they could be more discriminating, which is
perhaps why they chose to reintroduce the validating
exam for high school graduates at that time.
The high expectations that the superintendent had
for the validating exam were realized. The test was
found to be an effective screening tool. It resulted in
the lowering of the plebe or freshman academic failure rate substantially. During the 1929-1930 academic
year, academic failure led to the discharge of 64 plebes.
The next year, only 46 freshman cadets were eliminated for academic failure. Academy authorities were
convinced that the validating examination was largely
responsible for the improvement. The exam was kept
in place for the remainder of the interwar era.30
Several other relatively minor adjustments were
made in the screening process during the 1930s. The
validating exam itself was frequently revised, although
none of the revisions were major or extensive. Those
revisions, however, did have the cumulative effect
of shortening the exam by several hours. In the late
1930s, the Academy experimented with the CEEB’s
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) as a substitute for the
validating exam. The SAT was used as an optional
method of substantiating high school certificates for
the first time in 1939. During that year, 16 candidates
took advantage of this optional test but only 3 of those
16 were admitted into the Academy. The next year, 7
took the SAT, but only 1 of these seven was admitted.
The Academic Board could not draw any conclusions
about its effectiveness since so few students opted
to take it. Nevertheless, the Board retained it as an

118

option, believing that it would become more popular
in the future.31
Another change in the admissions screening process entailed making honor graduates of honor military schools take the validating exam to qualify for
admission. Until 1939, these military school graduates
were considered as a separate admissions category and
granted entry based on their certificate alone. Many
military schools and institutes had come to regard this
as their special right. However, once admitted, cadets
from these institutions had an extraordinarily high
washout rate. Their annual freshman attrition rate
averaged about 50 percent—almost all of the attrition
being due to academic deficiencies. Requiring honor
graduates to take the validating exam had an immediate effect, bringing their attrition level down to the
Academy average.32
CONCERNS ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL
NOMINATION PROCESS
During the interwar years, the Academy’s administration continued to express concern about the debilitating effects of the congressional nomination process
on admissions. The concern was greatest in the early
1920s, when in the aftermath of the Great War, propensity for military service among youth was at a
low ebb. The nomination process had bedeviled the
Academy to a greater or lesser extent since its establishment. That process was inimical, the Academic
Board noted, to the Academy’s goal of attracting the
best students into its cadet corps. Nominations were
often made without the congressman or his staff carefully scrutinizing the candidate’s mental qualifications. One result of this irregular procedure was that
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an excessively large proportion of nominees failed to
meet the academic requirements for admission, thus
leaving many vacancies in the number of authorized
cadetships. Another untoward result was that a considerable number of cadets, after having been admitted, proved unable to handle the course load at West
Point and were discharged for academic deficiencies.
The direct loss to the government was considerable,
both in terms of vacancies in the Corps of Cadets and
in the expenditure of time, money, and effort in the
attempt to move cadets through the system who had
an inadequate secondary or collegiate education.33
To correct this problem, West Point’s Academic
Board suggested that two measures be taken; first,
that state-wide and district-wide preliminary competitive examinations be held to select candidates for Senatorial and Representative appointments; and second,
that provision be made that whenever all vacancies at
the USMA have not have been filled through the regular entrance examinations, the remaining vacancies in
each state shall be filled by admission from the whole
list of alternates of that state, selected on the basis of
their order of merit rank established at such entrance
examinations. This would raise the overall quality of
nominees, the Board was convinced, as well as save
the government money, since West Point would have
to discharge fewer cadets due to academic failure. The
Board’s recommendations to streamline and reform
the nomination process were not adopted, and the
admissions process went on as before. Few legislators, it seems, wanted to limit their prerogatives and
their power of patronage in the way suggested by the
Board.34
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ENLISTED APPOINTMENTS TO WEST POINT
After World War I, West Point systematically
began to pursue enlisted candidates for the first time.
It was not a voluntary move. Congress had passed
an act on May 4, 1916, directing West Point to admit
more Soldiers from the enlisted ranks. Shortly after
the passage of the NDA of 1920 (June 4), the Army
took action to fulfill the purpose of the law.35 It began
to establish West Point Preparatory Schools in each
Corps Area in the Continental United States and in
the Insular Departments overseas. The Academy took
this step, it seems, in response to congressional pressure. Certain senators and representatives feared that
unless special preparatory schools were established,
few enlisted men would qualify for admission. After
all, most enlistees came from families who could not
afford to give their sons a good education and needed
help meeting the Academy’s rather strict entrance
standards. Select enlisted men began attending these
schools in the summer of 1920. After a year of intensive instruction, they were permitted to take the competitive examination for entrance into the Academy.36
Three principal motives inspired the congressmen who sponsored the bill reserving slots at West
Point for enlisted men.37 One was a desire to improve
recruiting by providing an incentive for bright and
ambitious young men to join the Army or one of the
reserve components (RC). One congressman was convinced that:
no class of men will do the best work of which they are
capable unless there is some incentive to effort. A great
many young men who have an ambition along military
lines would join the Army if they could see a way to an
education and promotion.38
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His solution was to hold the door of admission to
West Point “wide open” to the capable young man of
limited means but great initiative. The congressman
continued:
I give it as my very humble opinion that you will never
build up the military spirit and military knowledge
among the masses of the people until you have made it
so that an entrance into the Army affords a reasonable
opportunity for advancement, education, and general
improvement. Will somebody tell me what reason there
is today for a young man to enter the Regular Army, at
$15 a month, on a long term of service that takes the very
best years of his life from him; that affords practically
no room for intellectual improvement; that teaches him
no trade or occupation; that turns him out at the end of
that period without money in his purse, without business
acquaintance, without any of those attributes which are
being acquired and cultivated by the ordinary young
men of the country who are not in the Army? Create a
system under those conditions and it inevitably results in
what? In the unfortunate going into the Army because he
can do nothing better; in the man of slight attainment or
slight ambition going into the Army because he cannot do
better outside. Under such conditions you cannot secure
the best material for the Army.39

Opening West Point to the enlisted ranks would
also be an instrument of social uplift. It would require
men who hoped to be admitted to the Academy to
undertake a program of personal study to prepare
for the rigorous entrance exams. In pursuing such a
course, the men would “improve their minds,” “vastly
improve their usefulness,” and prepare themselves
to be better citizens. All these benefits would accrue
to the Army and to the individual even if they never
entered West Point or took its entrance exam.40
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The ability for the private soldier to compete for
a commission would thus help gentrify the enlisted
ranks. One congressman explained:
The officer having under him an enlisted man and
knowing that the private has the opportunity under
the law to enter the list of commissioned officers and to
pass with him in any place whatsoever, to be received
in his home, to be his associate in the council tent, will
instinctively begin treating that private with a more
kindly consideration. Upon the other hand, the private
who understands that he will have an opportunity to
someday associate with the officer will be inclined to fit
himself for the higher walks of life that are usually trod by
the officer. He naturally will cultivate the amenities and
the kindlinesses which he hopes will be the foundation
for a future association.41

Finally, opening the way for more enlisted participation would “democratize” West Point and erase the
Academy’s reputation as a bastion of privilege, political patronage, and militarism. Admitting enlisted men
into West Point, even on a limited basis, would supposedly tear down caste barriers and incline officers to
view private Soldiers as their equals. The hauteur and
class consciousness of the West Point graduate would
be moderated and the Academy graduate would be
better able to lead a mass citizen army in any future
conflict. The officer would be made to realize that the
service of the Soldier is not limited to military affairs,
but carries over into the broader life of the nation as
well. “The greatest generals,” one congressman noted,
“have usually been great civilians as well as technical
soldiers.”42
Another possible reason, not broached by the legislators who debated the measure, was recruiting.
The Corps of Cadets had been expanded by the NDA

123

of 1916, and the Congress wanted to ensure that the
Academy had enough candidates to fill its ranks. The
enlisted population of the Army would provide a willing pool from which West Point could draw applicants. The question was: how many could qualify
given the high entrance requirements of the Academy?
Although the path for enlisted candidates to enter
West Point widened after World War I, it is difficult
to determine how wide that path actually was. If one
reviews the Academy’s annual editions of Personal
and School History Sheets (which is a compilation of
the data sheets filled out by individual cadets upon
entry to the Academy), one would get the impression
that the enlisted path into the Academy was a narrow
one. Annual commissioning reports indicate that
few cadets from the enlisted ranks received Regular
Army appointments. In some years, there were only
two or three. Appointments from the enlisted ranks
of the National Guard were more numerous but usually numbered fewer than 20 per year. On the other
hand, an Academy-sponsored Curriculum Study indicates that, on average, about a third of the Corps of
Cadets had prior military service during the interwar
years. The nature of that service is not defined. Some
enlisted men were able to secure congressional nominations and hence were not counted against Regular
Army or National Guard allocations. Membership in
the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program
in college and attendance at a Citizens Military Training Camp were also, it seems, counted as prior military service.43
In any case, enlisted candidates from the Regular
Army and National Guard, since they automatically
received a competitive appointment, had to qualify for
admission by examination, which was a very high and
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exacting standard for young men without the benefit
of a solid secondary or post-secondary education. In
1922, only 1 candidate from the Regular Army and 8
candidates from the National Guard were admitted
out of a pool of 120 Regular Army and 60 National
Guard enlisted Soldiers who took the entrance exam.
(In addition, this pool of candidates was itself a relatively elite group for only the most intellectually
astute enlisted men were granted permission to compete for an appointment.) The number rose in subsequent years but never surpassed 11 for the Regular
Army (1927) or 22 from the National Guard (1929).44
WEST POINT’S ADMISSIONS STANDARDS
West Point’s admissions standards eroded somewhat after World War I. The growth of the Academy’s
enrollment, the proliferation of new colleges and universities in the 1920s and 1930s, the increase in the
number of enlisted candidates, and the sinking (albeit
still relatively high) prestige of the military profession all contributed to this erosion. Nevertheless, the
USMA remained one of the most selective colleges in
the nation.
One gauge of the Academy’s continuing selectivity was the performance of its cadets on the SAT.
Although the SAT was not a requirement for admission, and was used only sparingly as a substitute for
the validating exam, it was administered to all admitted cadets beginning in the summer of 1930—about
a month after they entered the Academy and before
the academic year began. It was used as a check of the
admissions process and as a way to compare the caliber of student West Point was attracting with students
admitted to other leading universities. West Point
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during this period used leading Eastern universities as
a measuring stick and stacked up quite well against
those universities in terms of the quality of the student
body. In fact, the SAT results from 1930 showed West
Point cadets to have higher scores, on average, than
students admitted to Yale University who took the
test and scores that approximated those of students
admitted to Harvard. True, not all students at these
elite civilian institutions were required to take the test
until later, and Harvard and Yale might not have been
as intellectually elite as they are today. Still, they were
some of the most selective schools in the nation and
West Point stacked up well against them.45
Another sign of West Point’s continuing academic
prowess in the interwar period was the number of
cadets who came to West Point with prior college
experience. The percentage of entering cadets with
prior college experience ranged from a low of 25 percent in 1927, to a high of 62 percent in 1938. The average was about 45 percent. This is significant in an age
when less than 18 percent (8 percent in 1919, 12 percent in 1930, and 17 percent in 1940) of the annual high
school graduating cohort attended college. The quality
of the collegiate institutions attended is also worthy
of note. As in the pre-World War I era, the nation’s
most revered and selective institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Cornell, Dartmouth, Columbia,
Brown, Penn, Stanford, Georgetown, Northwestern,
Duke, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, California Institute of Technology, Vanderbilt, Johns
Hopkins, Rice, and the University of Chicago were relatively well represented. In 1920, one entering cadet
came to the Academy with a baccalaureate degree
from Yale. Many others showed evidence of attending
elite colleges such as Johns Hopkins and Princeton for
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2 or 3 years before being admitted to the Academy.46 In
the interwar years, the percentage of undergraduates
admitted to West Point that attended one of the institutions listed above hovered around 5 to 6 percent.
Not an overwhelming number, perhaps, but a significant one nonetheless. If one counts such renowned
state flagship institutions such as Berkeley, University
of California, Los Angeles, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Texas, Washington, Iowa, Florida, North Carolina, and Minnesota, the percentage more than triples.
Extend it again to encompass all flagship universities
and the percentage rises to between 30 to 40 percent.47
Finally, since test scores and academic achievement are correlated to socioeconomic status (SES), it is
relevant that the Corps of Cadets at West Point during
the interwar period had a distinctly upper middleclass flavor to it. Well over 60 percent of the Corps,
on average, came from what Academy authorities
classified as the professional and managerial classes.
Another 15 to 25 percent came from families headed
by military officers. A relatively small percentage of
cadets—10 percent on average—came from families
headed up by skilled or unskilled laborers. Moreover,
the number who came from the families of enlisted
men was negligible.48
Several factors help explain West Point’s continuing appeal during the interwar period. One of those
factors, as already noted, was the Great Depression
with its very slack labor market. West Point graduates
were guaranteed well-paying jobs after graduation.
An Army officer’s pay and compensation during this
period was much more generous that it would be after
the war. Although salaries were slashed during the
Great Depression, officers could still enjoy an upper
middle-class lifestyle. Pay and a generous benefits
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package allowed officers to sustain active social lives,
employ full-time maids to help out with domestic
tasks, and, in general, live a genteel existence. The
availability of financial aid was another factor. In an
era when college financial assistance was very limited,
West Point could offer a full scholarship along with
room, board, and a stipend to its students. Few other
colleges could match West Point’s aid package.49
OFFICERS FROM THE ENLISTED RANKS AND
CIVIL LIFE
The Army continued to access officers directly
from civilian life and from the enlisted ranks during
the interwar period but at a relatively low rate.
Direct enlisted accessions into the officer corps were
extremely low, even lower than from civil life. The
enlisted ranks accounted for less than 3 percent of the
annual officer accessions cohort in the early 1920s and
less than 1 percent in certain years during the 1930s.
Direct accessions from civil life were only moderately
significant. The Marine Corps, it seems, got more
officers directly from Army ROTC (whose graduates
formed a subset of officers from civil life) than did the
Army. The principal obstacle to a commission for candidates from civil life or from the enlisted ranks was
the stiff, multi-phased commissioning exam.50
That examination was quite extensive and required
a passing knowledge of the principal subjects covered in good undergraduate programs. Candidates
for a line commission, for example, had to pass oral
and written tests in U.S. history, geography, spelling,
grammar, composition, algebra, plane geometry, natural science, and “ordinary problems involving the
use of logarithms” in addition to tests required by
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the branch for which they were applying. Candidate
review boards also screened candidates based on their
ability to think clearly and express themselves in a
clear and logical manner.51
Although the inflow of officers from civil life
directly into the Army was low, there were a considerable number of officers—amounting to just under 30
percent of the officer corps—who were commissioned
in the Regular Army out of the ORC and the National
Guard. These were counted as accessions from civil life
but were not new accessions in the traditional sense.
Unlike those officers who had been accessed directly
from civil life, however, these officers had experience
in one of the RC before entering the Regular Army
and usually came into the force at an advanced rank
(first lieutenant or above). The overwhelming majority
had college degrees, and many were products of the
ROTC.52
A snapshot of the officer corps in 1935 might be
helpful to put the accessions picture into perspective.
In that year, 3,575 officers—or about 29.7 percent of
the officer corps—had been appointed from civil life.
The bulk of this group, it appears, came out of the
ORC. In 1935 alone, 107 ORC officers received regular
commissions. Warren, in his history of the Army officer corps, states that most of these officers were products of the ROTC, although he admits that the records
do not specifically list the source of their reserve commissions. About 3 percent of the officers (380) came
from the enlisted ranks. Coming in at about 20 percent
(2,390) were so-called emergency officers, World War
I veterans who had been incorporated into the Regular Army by legislation passed on June 4, 1920. There
was a smattering of volunteer officers—amounting to
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less than 1 percent of the officer corps. The remainder,
more than 45 percent, were West Point graduates.53
The year 1935 saw the beginning of a moderate
expansion and social widening of the officer corps.
A worsening international situation in Asia and in
Europe was behind this “modest build up,” as the historian Richard Steward dubbed it.54 In this expansion,
positions were opened up for ROTC graduates desiring to come on active duty with the Regular Army.
Prior to this, the Army made relatively little use of its
ROTC program as a source of regular officers. Only
a very limited number of honor graduates from the
ROTC were commissioned in the decade after 1918.
This practice was discontinued entirely with the
coming of the Depression in 1929. The failure to provide a consistent policy for the integration of the most
highly qualified ROTC graduates into the regular officer corps resulted in much outstanding talent being
lost to the Army. The Marine Corps capitalized on the
Army’s failure. Knowing the Army offered very few
commissions to ROTC graduates, the Marines offered
commissions to graduates of certain ROTC units upon
the recommendation of the Professor of Military Science (MS) and Tactics.55 Competition for these slots
was intense and the Marines ended up with a considerable number of outstanding men.56
However, in the mid-1930s, so many inquiries
had been made by Reserve officers and senior ROTC
cadets relative to appointment in the Regular Army
that Congress passed a bill enabling ROTC officers to
acquire a regular commission. Under the provisions
of an act (Public Law 408, 74th Congress) passed on
August 30, 1935, popularly known as the Thomason
Act (named after Representative Robert Thomason of
Texas), 1,000 Reserve second lieutenants were brought

130

on active duty with the Regular Army for a period of
1 year. Out of these 1,000 lieutenants, 50 were selected
each year for a commission in the Regular establishment. This legislation accomplished a dual purpose:
first, it allowed 50 young men annually to become
officers of the Regular Army; second, it provided a
year’s intensive training to the remaining 950, making
this large group of officers a mobilization asset. The
large number of applications for active duty submitted under the Thomason Act permitted the War
Department to be quite selective in awarding Regular
commissions.57
Once brought on active duty, these ROTC graduates were subjected to close supervision and given
intensive instruction in garrison schools during
their year of active duty. Each one was methodically
assessed and reported upon during their year of service. At each post to which they were assigned, a
board of officers was convened to examine and report
upon their fitness for appointment in the permanent
establishment. The records of these officers, as well
as the reports and recommendations of commanding
officers and boards, were carefully studied in the War
Department before the final selections were made.
The 50 lieutenants finally chosen for regular service
were a thoroughly vetted group of lieutenants. As a
result, between 1935 (the year in which the legislation
was passed) and 1941 (the year that the United States
entered World War II) about 300 ROTC graduates
were incorporated into the Regular Army through the
Thomason Act.58
It was on the eve of World War II that the largest
annual influx of reserve officers into the Regular Army
occurred. In 1940, 836 reserve officers were awarded
regular commissions. Most were ROTC graduates.
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Their accession into the officer corps pushed the civil
life component of the officer corps up to nearly 35 percent. The overwhelming majority of these reserve officers had baccalaureate degrees.59
CONCLUSION
Standards for entrance into the officer corps
remained quite high throughout the interwar period.
The Army had many more applicants for commissions
than it had officer vacancies. To be sure, West Point’s
entrance standards may have eroded slightly. The
institution expanded and admitted a majority of its
students by certificate until 1930. Moreover, a pathway
was opened up to enlisted candidates into the Academy in 1920, when preparatory schools were established across the country to make West Point more
accessible to the enlisted ranks. Even so, the admissions standards at West Point remained quite high.
This was especially true during the Great Depression
when money was tight and West Point could offer a
free, elite education and a well-paying job after graduation. The Army tightened up admissions policies
in 1930, when it adopted a validating exam to more
carefully screen applicants to the Academy. West
Point’s success in maintaining admissions standards is
attested to by the collective performance of cadets on
standardized tests. Cadets stood up well against students from the best universities in the East, at least in
terms of the SAT scores of entering freshmen.
The tests required to earn a commission for applicants from civil life and from the enlisted ranks also
remained quite challenging. The commissioning
tests for non-West Point graduates were extremely
rigorous and required a firm grasp of the principal
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subjects covered in good undergraduate programs.
A large majority of the officers brought on from civil
life during the interwar years possessed baccalaureate
degrees, a true sign of distinction in this era.
During this period, the ROTC did not directly produce many active duty Army officers. Its mission was
to produce officers for the ORC—a manpower pool
that could be drawn upon in case of mobilization. It
was not until 1935 that an avenue opened for ROTC
graduates to serve on active duty, and then on a very
limited basis. The Thomason Act of 1935 authorized a
year of active duty for 1,000 ROTC graduates annually,
50 of whom could be awarded Regular Army commissions upon completion of their tours. In the next
chapter, we will investigate officer accessions during
World War II, which unlike previous chapters of this
book, is not primarily about West Point but about
Officer Candidate School (OCS), the largest source of
officers during World War II.
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CHAPTER 5:
OFFICER ACCESSIONS IN WORLD WAR II
INTRODUCTION
From 1938 until mid-way through 1941, officer
selection standards changed very little despite the
fact that the officer corps expanded significantly. In
the 3 years preceding the outbreak of World War II,
Congress provided for an enlargement of the Army’s
officer corps from about 12,400 men to approximately
14,020. During that period, 3,223 appointments were
made; this total included those commissioned in the
promotion list arms and services and in specialty
branches (or non-promotion list categories).1
It is noteworthy that although the need for officers
was urgent at this time, the rigor of the examinations
required for a commission in the Regular Army was
not diluted; in fact, it was strengthened, and selections
continued to be made on the basis of the best grades
attained on entrance exams. Beginning in early 1941,
the War Department extended the opportunity to earn
a Regular Army commission to all qualified National
Guard, Reserve, and Army of the United States (AUS)
officers.2 For the purpose of preliminary screening, a
general education examination of the objective type
(basically the same one required of officer candidates
from civil life and the enlisted force during the interwar period) was given to all candidates regardless
of whether or not they had graduated from a recognized college. The examination covered a broad range
of academic disciplines and required the applicant to
qualify in two specialized subjects, which he could
select. After taking this examination, which took 5.5
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days to administer, the officer appeared before a preliminary examining board, which considered his military record. Having passed the qualifying examination
and the preliminary board, candidates were examined physically and appeared before a final selecting
board, which visited their home stations and interviewed the candidates and their commanding officers.
Lists of selected candidates were compiled by Army
commanders and forwarded to the War Department
for final selection. As a result of examinations given
during 1941, 235 officers were awarded Regular commissions on February 20, 1942 and another 124 officers
on July 1, 1942.3
The approach of war forced the Army to deviate
from its interwar commissioning model. In the armies
that fought the world wars of the 20th century, the
majority of officers had to be procured from the eligible civilian population and trained partially or completely for military duty after mobilization began. In
the United States, this task was more difficult than in
most major European countries because of America’s
relatively small professional Army and the perennial
neglect of the military establishment in times of peace.
The vast majority of the officers had to be drawn from
three sources: from those who had received some
training in peacetime military agencies—(the National
Guard, the Officers’ Reserve Corps [ORC], the Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps [ROTC], and the Citizen’s
Military Training Camps); from the limited group
of civilians whose technical or administrative skills
entitled them to direct commissions (this applied primarily to the technical and professional services); and
from the Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) created in
1941 to convert eligible enlisted men into officers.4
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OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL (OCS)
OCS was by far the largest source of new officers
during the war. The legal authority for the operation
of these schools was contained in the National Defense
Act (NDA) of 1920. This law gave military installations the authority to train warrant officers, enlisted
men, and civilians to be commissioned officers. Mobilization regulations published in March 1935 directed
that OCSs were to be established by Corps Commanders as quickly as possible after mobilization day, or
M-Day, was announced and that these schools would
be 12 weeks in duration.5
The need for expanding the Army officer mobilization base prior to World War II became an urgent
issue within the Army as early as June 1938.6 At that
time, a detailed plan for establishing OCSs was submitted to the Chief of Infantry, Brigadier General Asa
L. Singleton. Then in December 1938, the War Department issued another mobilization regulation that provided further guidance for the establishment of OCS
programs. This regulation directed that OCSs be created as 3-month courses at the Army’s service schools
(instead of by Corps Commanders as prescribed in
the 1935 regulations) and outlined how these schools
were to be operated.7
On September 19, 1940, just 3 days after the President signed the first peacetime draft act in U.S. history, General Marshall issued a directive to implement
the provisions of mobilization regulations to enable
qualified enlisted men to become officers through the
OCS program.8 The program got off to a slow start.
The schools did not begin operations until July 1941.
Neither were they prolific. By December 1941, they
had produced only a few hundred lieutenants in each

141

branch. While this pre-war test run of the OCS program was not very productive in a quantitative sense,
it did have some military value—it allowed for the
further training of National Guard and Reserve officers and the elimination of obviously unsuitable officer candidates.9
After the Declaration of War on December 8, 1941,
the OCS system was immediately expanded. It continued to expand until, by the end of 1942, 23,000 men
per month were being commissioned. By the end of
the war, OCS graduates numbered 290,000 out of the
roughly 800,000 Army officers on active duty at the
time. Many thousands of those graduates reached the
grade of major; a much smaller number became lieutenant colonels and colonels.10
In early February 1943, the Army decided to
reduce the number of officers being commissioned
through OCS. It noted that such schools had produced
240,000 officers since September 1941—including
23,000 in December 1942 alone—and that their output
was down to between 2,500 and 3,000 per month,
with further cuts in the offing. The Army had enough
officers to meet requirements. In the event more officers were needed, theater commanders were told to
appoint them from the ranks, issuing direct battlefield
commissions.11
In its selection of officer candidates, the Army, as it
had done in World War I starting with the third series
of camps, gave preference to enlisted men. In general,
OCS candidates with prior enlisted experience were
thought to make the best platoon leaders, superior
to both ROTC and West Point graduates because of
their tactical skill. The OCS commissioning option also
allowed the War Department to exercise more control
over the commissioning process and better allocate
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talent. With OCS, the department could decide who
would become an officer and where and in what
capacity officers would be assigned. Thirdly, the OCS
program provided for upward mobility for enlisted
personnel and appealed to the National Army’s sense
of egalitarianism. The philosophy behind OCS, one
historian observed, “was implicit in the American
doctrine of equal opportunity for all.”12
Not everyone believed that the Army should turn
to the enlisted ranks for its officers. At the very beginning of mobilization, Secretary of War Stimson tried
to make OCS a course for college men, but General
Marshall adamantly resisted, eventually threatening
resignation over the matter.13 In the face of this threat,
the secretary yielded and let Marshall have his way.
To proceed in the way that Marshall insisted it should,
however, the War Department had to make certain
compromises with educational standards.14
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Expertise and Deliberate Practice
K. Anders Ericsson and colleagues provide much substantial
evidence that expertise, or performing at a high level in a particular
domain such as chess, music, or a sport, is very well explained by the
amount of deliberate practice in which an individual engages.15 Deliberate practice is more than merely trying hard or repeating steps
for many hours. These are essential for the full development of skills,
but such actions are insufficient for the development of the highest
levels of performance. In short, the aforementioned actions are necessary for the automation of skills, but not for their perfection.16
Expertise is characterized by the possession of skills which execute
cleanly (i.e., relatively error free) and efficiently (i.e., without unnecessary or superfluous steps). Deliberate practice is characterized,
and distinguished from traditional practice, by the time and effort
spent and by the focus of that effort. A person engaging in deliberate practice concentrates efforts on improving those aspects of performance on which he or she is weak or deficient. Normal practice
simply serves to make the steps of the skill (whether it’s putting on
a golf green or playing the normal range of notes on a flute) meld
together so that the skill executes effortlessly. For most individuals
and in most circumstances, this is adequate. However, to reach the
highest levels of a field or domain, one needs to go to the next level.
At the highest level, everyone can perform the routine tasks well
and quickly. The advanced expert, however, just as easily handles
those aspects of performance which are rare, uncomfortable, novel,
or difficult.
Deliberate practice requires great commitment as it generally
involves practicing those relatively poorly executing skills (or elements of skills) for a few hours a day (and normally alone, although
coaches/mentors are very often part of the training process). Most
individuals, in most circumstances, and given most resources and
responsibilities, settle for a compromise; they perfect their performance enough so that they are effective and employable, but they
still have enough time for the other duties and interests in their life.
From a training and education perspective, the development
of advanced expertise in the Army has built-in limitations. Officers
rotate assignments, assume new and increasingly complex responsibilities with promotions, and generally have many domains (such
as personnel management, counseling, budgeting, planning, and
scheduling) which require mastery. The cognitive psychology the
development of advanced expertise assures us that, through deliberate practice, virtually anyone can become “really good” at whatever
domain they choose. However, it also informs us that domains are
limited or restricted, that spontaneous transfer from one domain to
another is rare, and that deliberate practice has requirements that
cannot be supplanted or ignored. To the degree the Army supports
deliberate practice for its officers, they can become very expert in
their respective domains.
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SELECTION STANDARDS
The original mobilization regulations for the OCS
program prescribed no definite educational standards
for officer candidates. In fact, over the course of the
war, no formal educational requirement was ever
specified for OCS applicants. War Department directives suggested that for certain technical schools—e.g.,
Engineer, Ordnance, and Finance—academic degrees
would be desirable, but they were not considered to
be essential. The educational standard was merely
the possession of “such education or civil or military
experience as will reasonably insure . . . satisfactory
completion of the course.”17
While regulations did not specify any educational
standard for entry into OCS before 1942, there was a
de facto requirement in effect at that time for candidates to have at least 2 years of college. That changed
in mid-January 1942, when Secretary of War Stimson instituted a new open-door policy for qualified
enlisted men who sought a commission. To effect this
policy, the War Department replaced the requirement
that candidates have at least 2 years of college with the
Army General Classification Test (AGCT).18
Whereas before the war, line commissions had
been virtually restricted to college graduates, Stimson’s open-door policy permitted tens of thousands of
non-degreed men to gain entry into the officer corps.
The educational standard prescribed in Army regulations—which was, as already mentioned, merely
the possession of “such education or civil or military
experience as will reasonably insure . . . satisfactory
completion of the course”—left a lot of room for interpretation.19 As the mobilization progressed, the Army
had to reach deeper and deeper into its pool of enlisted
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talent to get OCS candidates. As one official history of
the OCS program put it, Army Ground Forces (AGF)
staff officers had to seek out “ways of squeezing the
maximum number of graduates from the material at
hand,” despite the fact that the “supply of even poorly
qualified candidates [was] none too abundant.” As
the war progressed, observers at AGF Headquarters
noted a marked decline in the quality of new officer
accessions.20
The War Department delegated the authority to
select men who were to attend OCSs to designated
commanding generals, who received quotas for the
schools that fell under their command. These commanders in turn appointed boards of officers to interview applicants and recommend those best qualified
for officer training. All selection boards were guided
in their examination of applicants by standards laid
down in War Department regulations and circulars.
Although the details of these standards were altered
from time to time to meet changing conditions, they
always involved age, physical condition, military service, capacity for leadership, learning ability, citizenship, character, and education. Elaborating standards
of learning ability, education, and leadership posed
the greatest practical difficulties.21
Originally, applicants were to be judged primarily
on the bases of leadership and fitness as demonstrated
by their military service record. Months before the first
OCS program opened on July 1, 1941, the Chief of Staff
had announced that, “‘The basic and predominating
consideration governing selections to OCS,’ would be
‘outstanding qualities of leadership as demonstrated
by actual services in the Army’.”22 Shortly after the
mobilization began, however, the personnel research
section of the adjutant general’s (TAG) office observed
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that this was an anomalous way of selecting officers
and would inevitably result in a proliferating number
of standards. Indeed, there would be as many standards as there were selection agencies.
Although the most important requirement for
selection as an officer candidate was supposed to be
proven leadership ability, no definition of leadership
was ever provided by the War Department, and no
test of leadership was ever devised. Each selection
board was left to draw up its own specifications. Consequently, candidates chosen from different sources
and at different times displayed the greatest variation
in this respect. Other standards, such as age, physique,
citizenship, and learning ability lent themselves to
more precise measurement. When demands for candidates rose above the supply of men clearly qualified
for training, it was the leadership requirement that
was most frequently ignored. Thus, instead of getting
men who had “demonstrated high qualities of leadership,” the schools had to devote much time and effort
clearing the rolls of men almost completely lacking
in leadership ability.23 In general, the requirements
for admission to OCS were so loosely drawn that
the schools were forced to develop their own means
of eliminating men who should never have been
selected.24
As mentioned previously, the Army decided to
measure learning ability with the AGCT. Originally,
the War Department had not intended to use AGCT
scores in selecting candidates, but instead to develop
an educational test and a leadership ability test for
this purpose. The AGCT was decided upon only as a
temporary expedient pending the completion of these
other tests. Since only one of the projected tests was
developed, however—and this test was not ready for
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general use until early in 1945—the AGCT remained
the principal instrument for selection throughout virtually the entire war.25
It was the personnel research section of the TAG’s
office that recommended that the AGCT be used to
establish minimum standards with respect to the ability to learn. Pending the elaboration of some type of
officer candidate test (OCT), it was urged that an AGCT
score of 110 be set as the minimum requirement. The
War Department had experimented with several tests
for officer candidates prior to the ramp up of the OCS
system. These tests were found to be accurate predicators of OCS performance but their emphasis on speed
worked to the disadvantage of older applicants. The
AGCT did not have this disadvantage. Because it was
a fairly good predictor of OCS grades and because it
was already a part of the enlisted man’s record, it was
adopted for use in June 1941 and incorporated into
the War Department’s directive governing OCS selection.26 It remained in effect until February 1945.27
THE ARMY GENERAL CLASSIFICATION TEST
(AGCT)
The minimum score of 110 was adopted, not for
any objective reason, but because it would ensure that
anyone selected for OCS would be from the top third
of the selective service input in terms of mental ability.
Administered to all inductees, this test purportedly
measured the ability to learn. The AGCT gauged both a
Soldier’s native abilities and talents gained via schooling and social experience, which equated to “intelligence” in the popular and practical sense of the word.
Numerical scores were grouped into five classes, with
Class I representing the highest intelligence and Class
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V the lowest. To qualify for OCS, a man was supposed
to fall into Class I or II, although this standard was
sometimes circumvented through waiver or artifice
whenever the demand for more officers outpaced the
supply.28
It was found that men with high AGCT scores were
more likely to graduate from OCS than men with low
scores. In two groups of classes at the Infantry School,
AGCT scores and failures were correlated as follows.29
See Table 5-1.
AGCT Score
110 or less
111-115
116-120
121-126
126-130
131-135
136-140
141 and over

Classes 253-281
61.3
49.2
39.6
32.1
23.9
21.6
17.4
18.4

Classes 329-338
70
59
42
33
31
30
24
21

Table 5-1. Percentage of Failures from
Selected OCS Classes.
In the fall of 1942, it became standard practice at the
Infantry School to administer the AGCT to all incoming candidates, even though their records showed
that they had previously achieved a score of at least
110 on the test. The school was convinced that the test
was often improperly administered in the field and
that scores were being manipulated to get men into
OCS. Although many men scored less than 110 on the
retest, Army regulations prevented their relief before
one-third of the course had been completed. Tactical
officers and faculty boards watched such men closely,
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and they were usually relieved from the school. Other
schools administered AGCT retests only when they
suspected the authenticity of a candidate’s recorded
score.30
Several schools developed screening tests designed
to identify candidates whose educational qualifications were insufficient to enable them to complete
the course or to perform satisfactorily as officers. As
already noted, no general educational qualification
was ever set by the War Department or by the AGF.
In practice, the schools faced a difficult obstacle:
many candidates lacked the educational background
to cope with the material—especially the mathematics—of the courses. The Field Artillery School developed an Arithmetic Qualifying Examination designed
to screen out men with too little mathematical ability.
In the fall of 1942, the Infantry School adopted a basic
education test, covering reading, grammar, spelling,
geography, and arithmetic. This exam was given in the
reception unit when the candidate arrived. Although
the test was extremely simple, the number and type
of errors made by candidates cast doubt on the ability
of many men to extract meaning from field manuals,
formulate and issue orders, conduct clear instruction,
and solve the mathematical problems that a platoon
leader would encounter. Deficiencies in arithmetic
revealed by the test were so striking that a mathematical examination, called the Platoon Leader’s Computations Test, was made a regular part of the Infantry
OCS course in 1943. The Armored School encountered
similar problems and, in 1942, adopted a basic education test embracing grammar, geography, and current
events.31
By use of such tests, the schools protected themselves against extreme variability resulting primarily
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from the absence of measures to eliminate unfit candidates at the outset. The schools were not permitted
to relieve candidates merely on the basis of failure
to pass an educational screening test. However, the
adoption of such tests reflected a disposition to unload
at the earliest opportunity men who could not pass
them. Such candidates were watched more closely,
and it was usually found that their subsequent performance squared with their low screening test scores. In
effect, the same result was achieved as if candidates
had been subjected to similar screening in units. Had
this been done, the time and expense of sending educationally unqualified men to school might have been
saved and greater uniformity achieved by the use of a
single test prepared by experts.32
The progressive deterioration in the quality of officer candidates during 1942 had effects more far-reaching than the institution of the correctives discussed
above. Because of the officer shortage, the prevailing
theory of officer recruitment was modified to permit
the commissioning of volunteers from deferred classes
under Selective Service and of candidates regarded as
suitable for the performance of administrative duties
only. In this way, large demands for officers were
more nearly met.33
The War Department’s Inspector General (IG) put
forward recommendations for major changes in the
procedures used to select officer candidates in January 1943. The inspection of nine schools, of which five
were in the combat arms, had led the IG to the conclusion that “during recent months, there has been a definite decline in the quality of candidates.” He drew his
conclusion from, among other things, the increasing
percentage of failures and turn-backs. The IG noted
that “a substantial portion” of failures and turn-backs
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consisted of men whose AGCT scores were only a
few points above the minimum; that the educational
requirements were too low; and that many candidates
were given no opportunity to develop and demonstrate leadership ability before they went to school.34
In view of these conditions, the IG recommended
several methods of raising the quality of candidates
and tightening the selection process. His main recommendation was to raise the minimum AGCT score to
115; this would, he believed, eliminate many of the
most unfit candidates. In addition, he urged that (1)
“Substantiating examinations [similar to West Point’s
validating examinations for entering cadets]” be prepared at each school to measure, in borderline cases,
“the minimum adequacy of candidates’ educational
(or equivalent) background;” (2) all schools establish
preparatory courses to give basic instruction to candidates who had had no basic training in the branch;
and (3) commanders “take active steps” to ensure
that potential candidates had ample opportunity to
develop and demonstrate leadership qualities. Some
of these measures had already been adopted at certain
schools within the OCS system before the IG released
his proposals.35
AGF opposed all the IG’s recommendations. Raising the AGCT score requirement, in the collective
opinion of the AGF headquarters staff, might eliminate many candidates with good leadership qualities but little education. School tests were considered
unnecessary, not only because borderline cases could
be rejected without further examinations, but also
because such tests would place an additional administrative burden on the schools. Neither did AGF want
preparatory schools for candidates lacking proper
basic training. The number of men who would fall in
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this category was not expected to be large enough to
justify the time, expense, and overhead for such special training. Finally, putting more pressure on unit
commanders to select candidates who had demonstrated leadership ability was thought unnecessary
in view of the great reduction in the number of candidates that units were now required to furnish; the
selection standards would be self-correcting under
conditions of severe retrenchment.36
The minimum score on the AGCT was an issue
that plagued the OCS program throughout the war. At
various times (the episode with the IG described above
being one of them), observers recommended that the
minimum qualifying score for OCS be raised above
the 110 mark. Studies conducted early in the mobilization period at the Finance and Signal Corps OCS,
for example, showed that the score should be raised
to 130. Those studies revealed that the OCS attrition
rate of men who scored 130 or above was very small
but that those who scored below 130 had larger, some
considered unacceptably high, attrition rates. The recommendation was never adopted. Although there
was “some justification” for raising the score to the
higher mark, one War Department study commented,
setting the bar at 130 would simply have screened out
too many candidates, leaving the Army with gaping
shortages in its officer ranks.37
THE OFFICER CANDIDATE TEST (OCT)
Late in the war, a substantiating or validating test
of the type recommended by the War Department’s
IG was adopted. This substantiating test was, in its
final form, the OCT, which certain scholars have erroneously asserted was adopted by the Army as early
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as 1942. The test, originally dubbed the Army Officer
Training Examination, had first been proposed in 1941.
The instrument was created by the personnel research
section of the TAG’s office through a contract with
the American Council on Education. This test, requiring over 4 hours to administer, contained subtests of
comprehension, expression, reasoning, and current
affairs. From an analysis of results, it was discovered
that maximum prediction of academic course grades
could be obtained by using a combination of three of
the several subtests. Two forms of the experimental
OCT were consequently constructed from three of the
Army Officer Training Examination subtests.38
The one finally adopted was composed of three
content areas: interpretation of data, arithmetic reasoning, and reading comprehension. They were found
to be particularly useful for predicting OCS grades.39
The Army gave the OCT on an experimental basis
at the Tank Destroyer, Armored, and possibly other
schools in late 1943. In addition, although the test was
available for general use in July 1944, it did not see
universal use until February 1945.40 The OCT reportedly predicted academic performance at levels “equal
to those of the best college entrance examination” up
to 1955.41
ATTEMPTS TO MEASURE LEADERSHIP
As previously noted, the War Department realized
that mental ability and academic aptitude were not
enough to ensure a quality OCS product. A candidate’s
leadership ability was also important—more important, Army leaders believed, than mental ability. Over
the course of the war, multiple attempts were made
to develop instruments that could assess leadership
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ability. One of the earliest of those attempts was the
life history data form. To develop this form, the Army
took entries from the Soldiers Qualification Card and
correlated them with tactical officers’ evaluations
in OCS. The results were disappointing; none of the
available measures provided enough discrimination
for selection purposes. In 1942, the National Research
Council Committee on Classification of Military Personnel recommended that projective measures (the
Rorschach inkblot test and the Thematic Apperception
Test) might provide fruitful leads for leadership prediction. These techniques were tried out at the Engineer School, but scores on these tests had virtually no
relationship to leadership performance in OCS. Next,
something called the Preference Inventory was tried.
It was a paper-and-pencil test based on the idea that
potential leaders could be identified by analyzing their
activity preferences. The test contained 100 groups of
3 types of activities, each presumably preferred by the
combat leader, by the administrative leader, or by the
non-leader. It was tested at the Infantry and Engineer
Schools and yielded discouraging results. Yet another
approach to leadership prediction was the Leadership
Test. This was a 150-item pencil-and-paper test consisting of statements expressing opinions about leaders, leadership techniques, attributes of leaders, and
situations involving needs for leadership. This yielded
no better results than the other tests.42
BATTLEFIELD COMMISSIONS
OCS was supplemented by another source of officer procurement—the so-called battlefield or combat
commission. It was a form of direct commission
awarded not for the possession of some technical or
professional skill, but for performance in combat. It
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was extensively used, but just how extensively, is an
open question. Certainly, the number of combat commissions ran into the thousands but beyond that generalization, reliable numbers are lacking.
RESERVE OFFICERS’ TRAINING CORPS (ROTC)
In the 3 years before the outbreak of war, 327
officers were appointed under the Thomason Act.
Although the Thomason Act was to remain on the
books until 1945, in actuality it became a dead letter
before America’s entry into the war. The last Thomason Act class was commissioned on July 1, 1940, at
a time when the Army was looking toward OCSs to
produce the bulk of newly commissioned officers in
the event of war.43
With the outbreak of war and the rapid expansion of the Army, the need for additional officers
mounted sharply. It was found that the combat readiness of those officers already in service left much to
be desired. The question arose whether to expand
ROTC or place even more emphasis on OCS. In February 1942, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair,
shortly before assuming command of the AGF, gave
his views on the question in an address to a graduating class at the Command and General Staff School.
In that address, he reviewed the military training of
the preceding year and a half accomplished under
his supervision and observed that this training had
not yet produced first-class combat troops.44 He also
noted that officers from the ROTC and the other civilian components, instead of being immediately ready
to assist in the task of converting a mass of civilians
into Soldiers, had themselves required a long period
of further tactical training:
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The outstanding generalization of this experience [with
ROTC graduates], in my view is that we did not have in
fact the great mass of trained officers that were carried
on the books . . . we have verified the inevitable—
that inadequately trained officers cannot train troops
effectively.45

Many of the college-educated officers that McNair criticized went on to become effective field grade officers
during World War II. That fact would not have been
relevant to McNair, whose focus was on producing
competent, if intellectually limited, platoon leaders.
The AGF Command, which was responsible for
many of the OCS programs, took the position that
“the three months of intensive training undergone in
an officer candidate school under war conditions is
far superior to the full ROTC course.” Because of the
AGF’s strong preference for OCS, the contemplated
ROTC expansion was dropped and instead, beginning
in the summer of 1942, men who had not completed
the full ROTC course before leaving college were upon
induction in the Army assigned to OCS and took the
full OCS course.46 McNair opposed a college training
program on military grounds. He saw no particular
reason why a college education would improve a Soldier’s fighting ability.47
In January 1942, Secretary of War Stimson had
directed that all qualified ROTC graduates be commissioned and called up immediately. To expedite matters, he even waived the standard requirement of a
college degree for upperclassmen; ROTC cadets who
had completed the military training portion of their
studies could be accessed into the Army. By March
1942, some 93,000 ROTC graduates had been commissioned. They outnumbered Regular Army commissionees by a factor of 3 to 1. Although many general
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officers, such as McNair, believed that OCS produced
a better lieutenant than the ROTC, the latter program
was never entirely eliminated. To be sure, the ROTC
advanced course was suspended in September 1943
for the duration of the conflict, but a small basic course
was maintained at various colleges around the country to facilitate reactivation of the ROTC program
after the war. Moreover, the majority of ROTC cadets
who were enrolled in the program at the beginning
of the war either received their commissions or were
afforded the chance to enter OCS upon graduation
from college.48
Most ROTC cadets who earned baccalaureate
degrees in 1942 received commissions directly. Second-year men in the accelerated class of 1944 were
permitted to remain in ROTC until they graduated
(for the most part before September 30, 1943) and
then attend OCS. Only first-year ROTC men did not
get preferential treatment; they had to compete for an
OCS slot with the broad mass of men being inducted
into the Army.49
In the ROTC classes that were commissioned before
the program’s suspension, the primary screen used to
eliminate substandard candidates was the requirement to have at least a C average (or its equivalent)
prior to entry into the Advanced Course. Interviews
with military staff were also widely used to vet officer aspirants, although the interview process was not
standardized. Considerable variability existed in how
candidates were evaluated in these sessions, although
one research effort provided a clue as to what evaluators might have been assessing. Research that compared performance on a test of physical fitness with an
individual’s rated performance in an interview generated this conclusion: “There was a remarkable close
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relationship between the level of physical fitness and
the evaluation made by the short interview; a score
below average in physical fitness was not found in
those men rated high in officer ability.”50
SPECIALIST AND STAFF APPOINTMENTS
In the early part of the war, most noncombat officers, especially those slotted for technical posts, were
commissioned directly from civilian life. From the
beginning of hostilities, the Army needed more officers than could be procured quickly and economically through its OCS system. Men of varied training
and experience in a wide range of skills and professions were needed. As early as October 16, 1940, just
1 month after the enactment of the Selective Service
Law and the integration of the first National Guard
units into the National Army, Secretary of War Henry
L. Stimson wrote a memorandum to the Assistant
Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Adjutant
General, thereby establishing the basic policy regarding direct appointments from civilian life.51 In that correspondence, Stimson observed:
It is my recollection that during the last war, President
Wilson and Secretary Baker rigidly declined to give
combatant commissions to civilian applicants who had
not qualified for such commissions by training in the
Officers’ Training Camps or through the Training Schools
established in the Regular Army. It is also my recollection
that this policy resulted in a standard of efficiency in
our combatant officers appointed from civil life which
was unprecedentedly high and that, consequently, the
policy won general approval throughout the country. It
is my desire that a similar standard should be maintained
now, by commissioning only applicants who have
received a similar thorough training. It is also my desire
that so far as possible a similar standard should be
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maintained for appointments to commissions of a noncombatant character. It seems to me that in respect to
such commissions, these limitations should be adhered
to: First—No such commissions should be given to men
who would otherwise be liable for service under the
Draft, with the exception of those who have completed
duly constituted courses leading to Reserve commissions.
Second—All political or personal considerations
should be rigidly excluded. Third—That commissions
should only be given where the individual has special
qualifications for the service he is expected to perform.
Even in such cases there should be due consideration
given as to whether there is a commissioned officer of any
component branch of the army with suitable qualifications
who is available for assignment. I can see that in the
necessary expansion of the functions of the Army into
lines which it does not exercise in times of peace, a
number of commissions of such a special character may
have to be made but I desire that the particular fitness of
the applicant for the Service to which he is expected to be
assigned should be most carefully inquired into.52

Comparatively few appointments directly from
civilian life were made during 1940 and 1941. However, as the months went by it became obvious that
the United States would eventually become a declared
belligerent; therefore Congress, in an act approved
September 22, 1941 (Public Law 252, 77th Congress),
gave the President authority to make appointments in
the AUS from the citizenship at large, without reference to the named components, and without making
such appointments in any arm or service. Stimson
issued another directive on the matter of commissioning qualified individuals directly from civilian
life on January 12, 1942. The Secretary of War made it
quite plain that, while recognizing the need of securing civilians possessing certain qualifications, he was
determined to maintain the high standards set forth in
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his memorandum of October 22, 1940. He established
top-level procedures and appointed the Secretary
of War’s Personnel Board, headed by General Malin
Craig, a former Chief of Staff, to oversee the effort.
Craig had been called to active duty from retirement
to head the board, which was responsible only to the
Secretary himself. Stimson again ordered that political
or personal considerations should be strictly excluded
as factors influencing appointments.53
With the tremendous expansion of the Armed
Forces, it soon became clear that direct commissions
must be granted to fill other than overhead administrative positions. Men possessing a wide assortment of technical skills and experience were urgently
needed not only in the combat arms, but also in the
services. For example, the Judge Advocate General’s Department needed Admiralty lawyers, and the
Air Force needed contract negotiators, both of which
were not readily obtainable through the normal process of induction and training in the OCS. Therefore, it
became necessary to broaden the base of the procurement objectives and to set up a comprehensive list of
categories from which personnel could be recruited
for direct commissioning.54
Prior to November, 1942, both the officer procurement branch of the TAG’s office and the Army Specialist Corps were actively procuring officers from
civilian life; in addition to these two agencies, the Air
Force and, in somewhat lesser measure, various other
arms and services were carrying on active recruiting
and procurement campaigns. Such active competition
between Army agencies was confusing. Therefore,
in October 1942, the Secretary of War appointed a
board of officers to study the problem of procurement
from civilian life. This board reported its findings on
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October 14. Its report and recommendations served
as the basis for three far-reaching decisions by the
Secretary. These decisions were: (1) the abolition of
the Army Specialist Corps; (2) the organization of
a new service to be called the Officers’ Procurement
Service (OPS), which would serve all agencies of the
War Department in procuring officers from civilian
life; and (3) the re-designation of the War Department
Personnel Board as the Secretary of War’s Personnel
Board, and the placing of responsibility for approving
all civilian appointments in that board, acting as the
Secretary of War’s agent.55
The operation of the OPS throughout the war is
described in detail in a special War Department monograph dated April 30, 1945, from which the information in this paragraph was taken. Under the OPS,
the direct commissioning program was broadened
to include procurement of medical personnel, which
included not only physicians and nurses but technicians such as dieticians and physiotherapists as well.
The OPS also tapped the recruiting potential of the
Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which
allowed many medical, technical, and scientific students whose studies had been interrupted by induction into the service to continue their academic work
under Army auspices. From this source, the Army
procured a number of doctors, dentists, engineers,
and scientists who proved valuable to the war effort.
The rate of procurement from civilian life increased
rapidly throughout 1942 and 1943 until some 3,000
commissions a month (a wartime peak) were being
granted by mid-1943. In July 1943, with the Army
approaching its maximum planned strength in commissioned personnel, a directive was issued reducing
the number of appointments being made from civilian
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life. The requisitions of using agencies were to be
more closely scrutinized, and every effort was to be
made to secure persons possessing the required special skills from the several millions of men who had
already been inducted into the armed services. Shortly
after Victory in Europe Day, the OPS was abolished,
except for one branch, and its functions turned over to
the Adjutant General.56
APPOINTMENTS IN THE REGULAR ARMY
The Army modified its very rigorous procedures
for screening candidates for Regular Army appointments after America’s entry into the war. The qualifying examination described earlier in this chapter was
dropped for all Regular Army candidates who were
graduates of a recognized college, although candidates without a baccalaureate degree still had to take
the qualifying exam. A group of approximately 240
officer candidates was appointed between October
5-7, 1942, under these watered-down standards. Army
Regulation 605-8, the regulation governing Regular
Army appointments, was suspended entirely in late
1942, in view of the difficulty of conducting examinations in an active theater of operations and pending
the adoption of an officer accessions policy following
the conclusion of the war. Actually, such appointments, except for a few officers of the Judge Advocate
General’s Department, were not resumed until the
beginning of the post-World War II integration program, which was initiated early in 1946.57
From the end of the fiscal year (FY) 1941 until June
30, 1945, a total of 3,764 officers were appointed to all
arms and services of the Regular Army; of this number,
2,584 were graduates of the U.S. Military Academy
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(USMA), leaving 1,180 appointed from all other
sources. A further breakdown of this 1,180 shows that
101 second lieutenants were appointed in the promotion list arms and services under the Thomason Act as
amended; 105 were honor graduates of Senior ROTC
units, leaving 440 appointed from all other sources.
The provisions of Army Regulation 605-5 (Appointment in Regular Army Except in Medical Department and
Except Chaplains), which provided for appointments to
the Regular Army from sources other than the USMA,
was suspended by War Department Circular 95 (dated
April 7, 1943) until January 1, 1944.58
WEST POINT
West Point was able to maintain its rigorous
system of mental screening during World War II. It
was helped along by the patriotic fervor generated by
the war and by the fact that the USMA represented a
way to avoid conscription. One sign of West Point’s
continuing attractiveness was the large number of
cadets who came or transferred from the nation’s
leading civilian universities. Despite the fact that the
Corps of Cadets grew substantially during the war,
the percentage of cadets from prestigious schools
actually rose. From 1920 through the mid-1930s, the
entering class at the Academy fluctuated between 350
to 450 cadets. Approximately 5 percent of those classes
consisted of cadets who had previously matriculated
at elite institutions. The Academy expanded in the late
thirties and expanded again in 1942. By 1945, West
Point was twice the size it had been in 1935. Nevertheless, West Point was more popular among the nation’s
most competitive undergraduates than ever before. In
1943, when West Point admitted a class of over 1,100
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cadets—the largest class up until that time in the history of the Academy—7 percent of admitted cadets
had matriculated at elite schools.59
The Academy continued to offer the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) as an option to substantiate secondary school certificates. However, as in the late
1930s, only a very few candidates availed themselves
of this method of qualifying. In 1942, 18 candidates
took the test; of the 18, 13 qualified, and 7 were admitted. These numbers represented only a slight increase
over those of previous years. Nevertheless, the Academy kept it as a testing alternative, still confident that
it would become more popular in the future.60
Many changes took place at the Academy after the
outbreak of war. Military training was intensified and
broadened in scope to keep pace with the national war
effort and to keep abreast of the recent developments
in weapons and tactics. West Point began a program
to give flight training to Air Cadets and to commission
them with pilot ratings. The Academy also adopted
a 3-year curriculum, a move that was directed by an
act of Congress passed on October 1, 1942. It made the
transition from the normal 4-year course of instruction
to the 3-year course during academic year 1942-43.61
As already alluded to, the Academy experienced a
major expansion during the war. On June 3, 1942, Congress enacted a law making a considerable increase
in the authorized number of cadets at the Academy
and in the manner of choosing some of them. The bill
was entitled, “An Act to authorize an increase in the
number of cadets at the Military Academy and provided for maintaining the Corps of Cadets at authorized strength.” The act raised the authorized number
of cadets at the Academy by 37 percent, from 1,960 to
2,496. The class entering the Academy in the summer
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of 1943 was the largest in West Point’s history up to
that time. It numbered 1,117 cadets. To effect the
actual increase in size of the Corps of Cadets, the legislation authorized the appointment of one additional
cadet from each congressional district, territory, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal
Zone, and two from each State at Large. It also provided that the Secretary of War might bring the Corps
of Cadets to full strength on the date of admission of a
new class by appointing qualified alternates and candidates recommended by the Academic Board. The
increase for each district was framed as a part of the
nation’s war effort, although the provision for maintaining the Corps at its authorized strength had been
under consideration for many years. Coincident with
the enactment of this law, provision was made for the
nomination of a third alternate for each district.62
The Academy introduced a new screening requirement for the class entering in 1944—the West Point
Aptitude Test. This class was the first class in which
candidates with approved college certificates were
required to pass a validating exam. (Candidates who
submitted high school transcripts, it must be recalled,
were first subjected to such a requirement in 1930.)
Since it was the first year that the test was used, the
Academic Board set a very low passing mark, and
very few candidates were eliminated based on that
test alone. However, it was clear that the test was very
effective in identifying unqualified candidates for
whom no other mental test was prescribed. In 1945,
the Board raised the passing mark for this aptitude
test, and Academy authorities decided that the test
would become a permanent part of the admissions
process.63
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The class entering in 1944 was also the first in which
“Army competitive candidates,” which included candidates from the enlisted ranks, took advantage of
the preparatory study provided by the War Department at civilian colleges as a part of the ASTP.64 In the
first years of the war, it was found that many enlisted
men designated for the competition for appointment
to the USMA were completely unprepared for the
entrance examinations and were unable to qualify
for admission through lack of time and opportunity
for preliminary study. The West Point preparatory
schools operated by the Corps Commands had been
suspended at the outbreak of the conflict, and their
resources were used to support the Army’s training
base. The director of the ATSP proposed to send Soldier appointees to selected colleges for a course, which
would prepare them for the entrance examination. In
essence, these colleges would act as substitute training facilities. The director’s proposal was approved,
and the War Department instituted for the incoming
class of candidates a USMA preparatory branch of the
ASTP at Amherst, Cornell, and Lafayette. Appointees
who were in the military were transferred to these
units where they pursued courses of study in preparation for the entrance examinations. With this move,
the failure rate of enlisted candidates was lowered,
and the number qualifying in the Army competitive
group returned to normal.65
During the war, the USMA continued to experiment with the SAT as a way for candidates to substantiate their secondary school certificates. A ray of hope
appeared in 1943 when 80 candidates elected to substantiate their high school certificates by this means—
up from 18 in 1942. However, the number plunged
back to 33 in 1944 and to 37 in 1945, and Academy
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authorities again became discouraged about the use of
this instrument.66
Another important change in the admissions process was in the form of the regular and validating
examinations. The old form for the validating examination, consisting of Part I, made up of short-answer
questions and Part II, made up of questions of the
essay type, was adopted as the form for both the validating and the regular examinations. Candidates subject to the validating examinations were required to
take Part I only, while those designated for the regular examination had to take both parts. This new form
was deemed to have numerous advantages over the
old form—administrative convenience and simplicity,
it seems, being the major ones.67
For admission by certificate, a few changes were
made in the credits required during the war years.
In 1944, among the required subjects, one unit of U.S.
history was substituted for two units of ancient, European, or English history. Among the optional subjects,
the social sciences were extended to include problems
of American democracy. Physical geography was
replaced by geography of any nature, and the category of foreign languages was broadened to include
all foreign languages.68
A significant alteration was made in the history
requirements. History was eliminated from the regular examination for the competitive groups as well
as for congressional appointees, but a special examination in U.S. history was provided, and those candidates whose educational records did not show
successful study of that subject were required to take
it. The results were used for qualifying purposes only,
not for competitive purposes. The effect of this change
was to eliminate the now little studied ancient history

168

from the history component of the old regular examination. It left the U.S. history examination, but only
for those candidates who had not already qualified in
that subject in school or college.69
CONCLUSION
The calculus of officer production for the Army
changed fundamentally in World War II. The OCS
program accounted for the bulk of new line officer
accessions, while direct commissioning furnished
the majority of officers for the professional and technical specialties. While entrance testing for the OCS
program was more consistent and standardized than
it had been in World War I, it was no more rigorous.
With the outbreak of war, the War Department abandoned the criterion-referenced exams of the peacetime Army and adopted the AGCT as the principal
officer testing instrument. It did so not because the
AGCT was optimal for the task, but because nothing
better was available at the time. It also set a minimum
AGCT score of 110, not for any objective reason, but
because a higher score would have been too restrictive
and would have prevented the Army from meeting
its wartime officer needs. As it was, the Army had to
incorporate into its ranks thousands of officers whose
mental abilities were below the desired standard.
The ROTC was suspended during the war as a
commissioning source. A small rump program, consisting only of the ROTC basic course, was maintained
to facilitate the reactivation of the program after the
war. The Army chose OCS over ROTC as a wartime
commissioning source because the latter program was
perceived by Army leaders to produce more tactically
skilled lieutenants than the ROTC program, which
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produced educated and intelligent but tactically inept
junior leaders.
West Point was able to maintain its quality standards during the war despite the expansion of the
Corps of Cadets that had occurred between 1935 and
1945. Patriotic fervor, the promise of a free, elite education, and the fact that the USMA offered an exemption
from conscription all played a part in keeping entrance
standards high. The high percentage of cadets who
attended elite colleges before being admitted to the
USMA attested to West Point’s continuing selectivity
and attractiveness as an undergraduate institution.
Officer testing at West Point during the war did not
undergo major changes. Perhaps the most significant
tweak to the system occurred in 1944 when the Academy adopted the West Point Aptitude Test as part of
the admissions process. Cadets who submitted college
certificates in their application to the Academy had to
take this substantiating exam to prove their readiness
for the Academy’s coursework. The Academy also
tried to make greater use of the SAT for applicants
submitting high school certificates with their application, although this experiment met with very limited
success.
In the next chapter, we will take up officer testing during the post-war period—an era in which the
peacetime officer accessions process was fundamentally transformed. The new era saw the emergence
of the ROTC as the Army’s largest commissioning
source, the establishment of OCS as a permanent
peacetime commissioning source, and the beginning of the demise of the USMA as an elite academic
institution.
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CHAPTER 6:
OFFICER ACCESSIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II
INTRODUCTION
World War II transformed the Army, and nowhere
was this more evident than in the officer corps. One
of the most striking changes that took place among
Army officers was the drop off in the percentage of
college graduates. As in World War I, World War II
had opened up the officer corps to huge numbers of
non-degreed candidates, many of whom wanted to
continue their service after Victory over Japan Day. A
percentage of these men got their wish, and they were
retained in an active Army that was much larger than
it had been before hostilities commenced. The result
was an officers corps that was, in an educational sense,
very unlike the one of the interwar period. Before the
war, over 75 percent of the officer corps had baccalaureate degrees. By 1955, only 55 percent did. The dearth
of educational credentials was most prevalent in the
field grade ranks, particularly among majors and lieutenant colonels.1
The Army was able to maintain its authorized officer strength in the post-war years largely because of
the huge influx of non-degreed officers during the
war. While most officers in this category separated
soon after the war was over, thousands were retained
in a career status. The post-war officer corps was, after
all, about eight times larger than its interwar predecessor, and the Army needed to quickly flesh out its
officer ranks. The injection of these non-college graduates into the officer corps created a 5-year hump of
excessive strength and reduced the number of spaces
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available for lieutenants and captains. The number
of junior officers was further diminished by the continual cutting of new accessions to bring the Army
into alignment with rapidly declining end strengths
and by the abysmally low retention rates of Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) graduates, most of
whom served on active duty for 2 years or less. As a
result, the officer corps suffered from a severe rank
imbalance. Throughout most of the 1940s and 1950s,
it had many more senior and far fewer junior officers
than required.2
The dynamics of officer accessions changed drastically in the post-war period. After dominating the
accessions process for a century and a half, West Point
lost its quantitative preeminence as a commissioning
source. The vast size of the Cold War defense establishment, of course, was the reason why. West Point
was now too expensive to be the Army’s main supplier of officers; it also lacked the physical space in
terms of classrooms and barracks. The ROTC had to
take up the slack. By the mid-1950s, ROTC was producing more regular officers than the U.S. Military
Academy (USMA) and was responsible for more than
80 percent of total annual officer accessions. Meanwhile, Officer Candidate School (OCS), drastically cut
back after World War II and confined to one branch
immaterial site at Leavenworth, was revived in 1951
due to demand stemming from the Korean conflict.
After Korea, Army personnel managers decided to
keep the program in operation to facilitate its regeneration in case of an emergency. In the early 1950s, then,
OCS became a permanent part of the commissioning
mix, producing between 6 and 10 percent of all active
officer accessions until the Vietnam War.3
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The ability of the Army to screen candidates for
commissioning dropped markedly after World War
II as the attractiveness of an Army career plummeted.
The erosion of pay and benefits, the presence of many
low quality officers left over from the war, a booming
economy, and the declining prestige of the military
profession made military service a relatively uninviting option for the talented college graduate. This
was particularly true in the late 1940s when the Army
went through its traditional post-war slump, which, to
quote the Annual Report of the Superintendent for 1953,
was a period characterized by “a natural falling off of
interest [in a military career] as a reaction to the cessation of hostilities.”4 The calculus of officer accessions
now was very different than it had been in the interwar period. Then, the Army had a small officer corps
and a surfeit of college graduate applicants and was
able to exercise great discretion in its selection process.
Officers were obtained on a competitive, selective
basis from what one colonel described as “a higher
caliber group in our society.” After 1945, however, the
Army had a huge officer corps and fewer applicants
than desired. The competition for the available positions was consequently not keen. Those that the Army
did attract, moreover, were as a group not drawn from
the nation’s most capable undergraduates. Screening,
by necessity, had to be less rigorous than it had been
before the war.5
Even West Point, which had historically been considered the Army’s gold standard for commissioning,
struggled to fill its cadet corps with qualified applicants. Admissions standards were intermittently lowered to secure enough students. There were several
years in the decade after 1945, in fact, in which USMA
authorities had to invoke special provisions of the law
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to appoint cadets to vacancies that had gone unfilled
because of the absence of a sufficient number of qualified candidates through the normal appointment
system.6
The nature of commissioned service likewise
changed in the post-war era. During the interwar
period, readiness was not a huge priority. America’s
geographic isolation and non-interventionist foreign
policy allowed officers time to study, and reflect on,
their profession. In this environment, officers were
given challenging tasks and allowed to work semi-autonomously with minimal supervision by senior
officers. They were trained for, and expected to fill,
positions two levels up from those associated with
their existing rank. Only in this way could the Army
be expanded quickly and efficiently in the event of
mobilization. The escalation of international tensions
brought on by the Cold War, together with the consequent enlargement of the Army in the post-war era,
changed all this. The officer corps morphed from a relatively homogenous body in the interwar period into
a large, diverse, and transient collection of individuals after 1945. The new urgency and constant state
of tension that the Cold War brought to military life
also drove the Army toward centralization of command and control. Training became rigidly controlled
by detailed directives and schedules from higher
headquarters. Junior officers were held on very short
leashes and not allowed to exercise judgment or initiative in their work.7
Because units now, with the constant threat of war,
had to maintain a high state of readiness, not even
routine matters could be left to chance. Junior officers
were required to attend to many housekeeping chores
that had been left to corporals and sergeants in the
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interwar years. The deleterious effects of centralization and over-supervision were compounded by overwork—another outgrowth of the perpetual state of
urgency occasioned by the operational demands of the
Cold War. Young officers found themselves working
50, 60, or even 70 hour weeks, sacrificing their family
life for the sake of their menial and oftentimes unnecessary duties.8
Pre-commissioning education and training likewise were transformed. Before World War II, West
Point, and to a certain extent ROTC, had what might be
called, for lack of a better term, “a field grade focus.”
The Army’s pre-commissioning emphasis was not on
turning out an immediately employable lieutenant but
on producing an educated officer and a gentleman
who could one day assume the mantle of field grade
leadership in a mobilizing army. There was enough
time to train lieutenants on the technical and tactical
aspects of being a junior officer once they arrived in
their first unit of assignment.
After the war, the Army could not afford to be as
patient with the development of its officers. The Cold
War, and the new sense of urgency that infused service
in the Army, called for the production of immediately
useful lieutenants. Lieutenants were now expected to
report to their first units of assignment with the tactical and technical skills necessary to be a contributing member of the team. That did not always (or even
usually) happen but that was the hope and the goal.
Consequently, the educational aspects of the curriculum were reduced but the training aspects were
expanded. Readiness now trumped long-term officer
development in the hierarchy of Army priorities.
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THE RESERVE OFFICERS’ TRAINING CORPS
(ROTC)
The ROTC, now the Army’s largest commissioning source, found it difficult to enroll top notch students in the aftermath of World War II. One U.S.
Army War College (USAWC) student noted that the
Army’s collegiate commissioning program was filled
with lower caliber individuals despite the fact that
all were college undergraduates. Problems surfaced
soon after Victory over Japan Day. At that time, the
Army took note of the high rate of academic failures
among ROTC cadets. Too many students were being
trained in ROTC and subsequently dismissed because
they did not complete the minimum requirements for
a baccalaureate degree. Concerned about this trend,
the General Staff in May 1946 directed the adjutant
general (TAG) to devise a test that would screen out
those undergraduates who did not possess the ability
to attain a college degree.9
Responding to this directive, TAG developed the
first forms of the ROTC Qualifying (RQ) Examination,
designated RQ-l and RQ-2. This RQ exam was implemented in 1947. These forms were norm-based examinations as opposed to criterion-referenced tests of the
type used to select officers in the interwar period. The
RQ tests were patterned after the American Council
on Education Psychological Examination for College
Freshmen, an instrument widely used at that time as
a general ability screening test in colleges and universities. These tests and their successors were much less
rigorous than the tests they replaced. Nevertheless,
they addressed a need. Validation studies of these
early RQ exams indicated that the verbal and mathematics subtests were sufficiently correlated with
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academic performance in college to justify their use in
screening Military Science (MS) III students. The next
version of the RQ exam—the RQ-3 test—was shortened for administrative purposes so that it could be
completed in one class period. This test consisted of
verbal and mathematics subtests and made its appearance in 1949.10
Within months of the introduction of the RQ-3 test,
however, it was suspended because it was screening
too many candidates out of the ROTC program and
preventing the Army from achieving its officer production goals. The inception of the Air Force ROTC
and the expansion of the Naval ROTC had intensified
competition for qualified officer candidates among the
services. Faced with this competition and other problems, the Army struggled to find qualified candidates
for its collegiate commissioning program. Army leaders felt that they had no choice but to sacrifice quality for quantity and adopt less stringent screening
methods.11
The growth of ROTC during the Korean War further diluted officer quality, at least indirectly. This
growth was fueled by two main factors. First, the draft
deferment that ROTC participation conferred upon
military age youth motivated many undergraduates
to enroll in the program. If students could not evade
service, they could at least delay it. Second, the Army
embarked upon a major institutional expansion of
ROTC to meet the needs of the war. ROTC units were
eagerly sought after by college presidents, who saw
them as a way to maintain their institutions’ enrollments and financial solvency. The growth of ROTC,
the motivating effects of conscription, and the suspension of the RQ-3 qualification test worked together to
drive officer production well above the needs of the
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active Army. Hundreds of officers who entered the
service during this period were essentially unscreened
and minimally qualified. Many could not meet the
minimum mental standards required for admission
into OCS. Complaints from the field soon arose alleging that even Distinguished Military Graduates, supposedly the cream of the ROTC crop, were, as a group,
substandard officer material.12
Concerned about this perceived drop-off in officer
quality, the Army administered the RQ-3 examination
to all attendees at the 1953 ROTC summer camps. The
results were startling: 20 percent of the cadets failed
the test. From this and other indicators, senior Army
leaders concluded that during the recent expansion
units had been given to colleges whose students did
not in the main have the potential to become officers.
The schools with the highest failure rates were “in
nearly every case” open admission—they required
only a high school diploma for matriculation. It was
noted that many of these open admission colleges were
located in the South and drew their student population from small high schools with uneven standards.
The academic demands placed on students attending
these colleges had been “correspondingly low.”13
As a result, on September 18, 1953, (almost as
soon as the Armistice ending hostilities in Korea was
signed) the Department of the Army directed that all
ROTC students must attain a score of 115 on the RQ-3
test to be admitted into the ROTC Advanced Course.
The requirement for a mental screen was thus reintroduced after a 3-year suspension. There was general
agreement that this move had a desirable effect. The
requirement helped ensure a minimum mental capability in officer aspirants regardless of the standards
of the college that they attended (although, as with
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all Army mental standards, waivers were sometimes
granted for scores below 115). Still, the Army was
not satisfied with the intellectual quality of the product that ROTC was turning out. The reinstatement of
the RQ-3 had reduced the worst abuses but it did not
reverse the post-war trend that saw the top performers of America’s undergraduates generally avoid military service, particularly service in the ground forces.14
NON-COGNITIVE TESTING
Over the course of the 1950s, the Army adjusted
and refined the screening instruments used in the
ROTC program. With readiness now top priority, the
Army focused on identifying candidates with the requisite “combat leadership skills” needed at the platoon level. Whereas before World War II, officer tests
were primarily aimed at measuring a candidate’s level
of academic attainment and general intelligence, in the
post-war era the emphasis in research efforts shifted
to measures designed to identify technically and tactically competent junior leaders with the requisite
leadership skills to lead small bodies of men— junior
leaders who would perform many of the tasks and
have many of the responsibilities that non-commissioned officers (NCOs) did in the interwar era.15
Many of the instruments introduced to screen officer aspirants during this era had both cognitive and
non-cognitive components. The cognitive portions
of these instruments were a far cry from the tests of
academic achievement which dominated the screening process in the 1920s and 1930s. One instrument
introduced in the late 1950s, for example, included
the following situational tests: (1) inspect vehicles for
combat readiness; (2) correct poor supply records; (3)
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check for bugs in communications network display;
(4) reschedule work assignments of ordnance repairmen; (5) report on road damage; (6) evaluate a captured foreign weapon; (7) select new route for supply
points; (8) measure the length of an airplane runway;
and (9) report enemy activities. In the interwar Army,
such tasks were taught in the Army school system
after commissioning or in the officer’s first unit of
assignment.16
The Army introduced a number of non-cognitive assessment instruments to predict the leadership
ability and measure the career motivation of ROTC
cadets. The lack of leadership ability and career commitment were criticisms often directed at ROTC-produced officers. On many campuses, ROTC cadets did
not get the tactical training necessary to prepare them
to assume platoon leaders’ responsibilities once commissioned. Their lack of basic tactical skill was often
evident when ROTC graduates reported to their first
unit of assignment. Retention was also a huge problem among ROTC graduates. During the post-war
period, 80 to 90 percent of ROTC officers remained in
the Army for 2 years or less. Non-cognitive tests could
help the Army identify officer candidates who were
prepared for military service and likely to remain in
the Army for a career.17
The first non-cognitive instrument introduced was
named the ROTC Personal Inventory. It came into
general use shortly after Victory over Japan Day. The
inventory was a self-description instrument designed
to assess characteristics deemed important for leadership. It addressed personal history, personality, and
background.18 It remained in use until the early 1950s.
In the mid-1950s, the Officer Prediction Program
was adopted in response to continuing concerns with
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junior officer retention and a widespread perception
that ROTC selection procedures were not very effective in assessing leadership potential, particularly
combat leadership potential. The Army convened several review boards to deal with these concerns. The
boards determined that existing officer selection methods in ROTC (and in the other commissioning sources
for that matter) were relatively ineffective as identifiers of combat leaders and were in need of considerable revamping.19
The Officer Prediction Program represented a
response to the Army’s concerns about officer leadership and retention and sparked an effort, which
lasted for more than a decade. The program led to
the development of an instrument that encompassed
a range of cognitive and non-cognitive measures. It
was administered in an assessment center and consisted of integrated military assessments given over
a 3-day period.20 One of the instruments used in the
program was the Differential Officer Battery (DOB).
The DOB encompassed biographical and self-description instruments that assessed “background, interests,
and attitudes.” Factors measured in the DOB included
(but were not limited to): (1) mechanical technology
(mechanical orientation, manual crafts interest, practical skills orientation, etc.); (2) combat leadership (outdoor skill, combat interest, physical leadership, and
nature endurance); (3) general knowledge (entertainment information, practical skills information, supply
information, technical operations information); (4)
outdoor information (rural versus urban background,
outdoor interest, frontiersman orientation); (5) sports
(athletic interest, sports interest, organized sports
information); (6) strict command (strict combat discipline, “taut ship” command, command responsibility);
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(7) leadership readiness (ready decision-making, readiness to lead, resistance to mediator role); and (8)
authority and structure (concern for order, achievement need). Physical performance measures were also
incorporated into the DOB: the grenade throw, the
endurance crawl, and two-hand coordination were
thought to be good predictors of combat leadership
performance.21
The DOB and other instruments like it represented
a major discontinuity in officer testing in the U.S.
Army. While before World War II, the criterion-referenced cognitive tests used by the Army had concentrated on identifying officers who could one day
become operational planners and strategic thinkers,
in the post-war era the emphasis in officer testing was
geared toward identifying junior leaders who could
be useful immediately upon commissioning and function effectively at the platoon and company level.
It is telling that the social scientists who developed
and assessed these instruments used performance
data gathered from the first 8 years of an officer’s service—years spent leading at the platoon and company
level—for their assessments of the effectiveness of
their instruments, not on performance data from field
grade officers. In an Army focused on readiness, this
was understandable if rather shortsighted.22
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Competencies
It is often difficult to speak intelligently on the subject of competencies because the word, as a term, unfortunately does not have
a generally accepted meaning. Terrence Hoffman reviews the meaning and history of the term and identifies three qualitatively different definitions: observable performance; the standard or quality of
the outcome of a person’s performance; or the underlying attributes
of a person. He states that:
With more than one meaning being used by practitioners and writers, any discussion of competency invariably leads to some misunderstanding or disagreement because the same meaning is not
shared between participants in the discussion. The term competency must be used in a way that reflects the purpose or rationale of
its application. Equivocation in the use of the term serves no purpose. It invites misunderstanding and imprecision. Such misunderstanding undermines the introduction of any attempt at either
performance improvement or change management.23

We’ve included this lengthy quote because of the importance of the
last sentence. Army officers are heavily involved in improving individual and unit performance as well as managing change in reliably
fluid environments. To the degree they deal with competencies, they
(and everyone else) should have an agreed upon understanding of
the basic meaning of the term.
From a purely psychological perspective, the second definition
listed by Hoffman is perhaps to be preferred as the first and third
already have terms associated with them (e.g., behavior, ability,
capability, aptitude, intelligence, skill set, etc.).24 Richard Boyatzis,
although preferring to define competency as a capability or ability (indeed, it was his 1982 book The Competent Manager that led to
the popularization of the term along these lines), asserts that the
whole basis for the concept is a “theory of performance” in which
a person’s “maximum performance is believed to occur when the
person’s capability or talent is consistent with the needs of the job
demands and the organizational environment.”25 An implication
of this assertion is that the organization needs to understand and
explicate job demands and the working environment.26 Given this
review, Charles Woodruffe’s definition might be the most useful: “A
competency is the set of behavior patterns that the incumbent needs
to bring to a position in order to perform its tasks and functions with
competence.”27 This is very useful because it “marries” the individual and the organizational elements together and also makes reference to acceptable standards of performance (competence).
The Army has no officer equivalent of military occupational
specialty (MOS) for enlistees. (The area of concentration, is only very
weakly comparable.) The MOS, and the associated duty description
is very specific, exact, and detailed. For example, there are 32 11B/
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Infantryman Non-Commissioned Officer Evaluation Report (NCOER) duty descriptions (such as 11B20/Team Leader, 11BX/Senior
Drill Sergeant, and 11B Grenadier). The way they are written allows
for accurate matching of individuals and assignments. For officers,
however, there is far less specialization within a particular branch
upon first assignment; that is, there is little attempt made to match
personal characteristics, abilities, and traits (as would be shown
from surveying and testing) with job requirements. In other words,
there is little attention paid to competencies, and these have a demonstrable effect on organizational performance.28

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL (OCS)
The OCS program faced the same pressures as
the ROTC during this period, although its challenges
obviously differed in some respects. One of the most
salient challenges was OCS attrition. Throughout the
1950s, OCS had a very high average dropout rate of
44 percent. By comparison, the average rate during
World War II was 33 percent. Some observers blamed
inadequate screening and selection mechanisms for
the high attrition. Others pointed to the irregular
nature of the OCS selection process. Service on OCS
selection boards was an additional duty for most officers and was generally considered by them to be a
distraction from their principal responsibilities. There
was no real payoff for a job well done. Consequently,
screening for motivation and suitability was often
hasty and haphazard.29
Screening for mental ability was more systematic.
OCS applicants were supposed to attain a score of
115 on the Officer Candidate Test (OCT) for admission to the program, although waivers were granted
in some cases for candidates who scored below that
mark.30 Thus, the OCS intellectual screening process
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from 1950-53 was, in some respects, more rigorous
than for ROTC, which did not use a test of mental ability during these years. Observers found a close correlation between OCT scores and OCS attrition rates,
as individuals scoring below 115 failed the course in
disproportionately high numbers. The best candidates
scored between 126 and 155. Authorities were reluctant to raise the minimum score, however, because
(once again) they recognized that it would result in
an unacceptable reduction in the number of eligible
candidates.31
The educational requirements for acceptance into
OCS were minimal. To be admitted, applicants needed
only a high school diploma or a general educational
development (GED) certificate. Many Army leaders
believed such a low educational standard resulted in
a number of untoward effects. First, it lowered graduation rates at OCS; researchers found that there was a
high correlation between success in the program and
level of education. Second, it was a significant handicap to those marginally educated officers when they
entered the field grade ranks. They found it difficult to
deal with subordinates with better educations. Third,
it had a deleterious effect on the quality of the officer
corps as a whole. The example set by these minimally
educated officers supposedly discouraged the most
capable lieutenants and junior captains from staying
in the service.32
There was some pushback among researchers
on the basic premise that more education generally
resulted in a higher quality officer. On the eve of the
Korean War, the Army, as it had at the beginning of
World War II, was giving extra credit in the selection
process to OCS applicants who had 2 or more years
of college. This gave the college-educated applicant a
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distinct advantage over his less educated competitors.
Since colleges varied considerably in their standards,
and college students varied even more with regard to
intellectual abilities considered desirable for officers,
this policy allegedly resulted in the rejection of many
potentially good officers and the acceptance of many
relatively poor risks. The recommended solution was
to eliminate extra credit for college experience in the
selection process and so weight the OCT scores that
applicants with the highest marks, regardless of educational background, would be given a substantial
advantage.33 This recommendation was not accepted,
however.
One of the persistent problems faced by the Army
in the 1940s and 1950s was its inability to convince
large numbers of men to apply for officer candidate
training. While OCS was expanding in World War II,
the demands of troop units being activated outran the
supply of inductees. Serious shortages of enlisted personnel ensued. Procurement of officer candidates in
the requisite numbers was, therefore, difficult in the
extreme. The Army Ground Forces (AGF) felt that the
trouble lay in the reluctance of unit commanders to
send key men to OCS. That headquarters, therefore,
imposed OCS quotas on all units, practically eliminating the voluntary nature of the program. The requisite
quantity of officers was produced but only with difficulty and the use of rather severe methods.34
During the Korean War, the lack of qualified
applicants for the OCS program again became a huge
problem. In 1952, OCS even failed to meet its officer
production quota. The next year, the Army, seeking
ways to alleviate OCS problems, conducted a study
that found that less than a third of the men eligible for
the program actually applied. After the war in Korea
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ended, things deteriorated further. Throughout the
remainder of the 1950s, in fact, only 10 percent of eligible Soldiers applied for OCS. Many draftees were not
career motivated and looked upon OCS as a waste of
their time. This was a major concern for Army leaders
since they were convinced that the quality of officers
produced depended primarily on the degree of selectivity that could be exercised in the choice of applicants. There was, in other words, a certain quality in
quantity in their opinion.35
The three biggest deterrents to OCS participation,
the Army found, were (1) the longer period of duty
required of officers (as compared to enlisted men), (2)
a belief that OCS entailed a greater likelihood of recall
after separation from active duty, and (3) a reluctance to assume responsibilities (since most had no
intention of staying in the service to retirement). The
first deterrent listed—the longer period of obligated
service—was perhaps the most important one. The
more ambitious and educated enlisted men, the Army
found, generally had attractive employment opportunities in the civilian world awaiting them and consequently wanted to sever their connection with the
Army as soon as they could.36
With enlisted accessions into the officer corps, the
differences between the interwar and post-war periods were stark. As had occurred with accessions from
civil life/ROTC, the rigorous criterion-referenced
screening tests of the 1920s and 1930s gave way to the
much less difficult norm-based exams of the late 1940s
and 1950s. Again, the selection measures developed
in the post-war era may have been more broad-based,
consistent, and standardized than the pre-war ones,
but they were also much less intellectually and academically rigorous.
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NON-COGNITIVE TESTING
Non-cognitive instruments came into widespread
use in the OCS program after World War II for many
of the same reasons they had in ROTC. Through these
instruments, the Army wanted to screen for junior
level leadership ability, motivation to complete OCS,
and career intent. Four major avenues of development
were pursued; the interview, supervisor ratings, recommendations from civilian acquaintances, and the
biographical self-report.37
The first version of the biographical self-report was
introduced in 1946. Named the Biographical Information Blank (BIB), it was in use until 1956, when it
was replaced with a new instrument, the Officer Leadership Qualification Inventory (OLI). After reviewing the results of studies that showed that the BIB’s
effectiveness as a predictor of leadership ability had
eroded, items were added from other instruments that
had been determined to be better predictors of leadership. Instruments in use at West Point and in the
ROTC program furnished some of these new items.38
The Army combined the new items with the ones
considered to be the most effective from the BIB to
create the OLI. Like its predecessor, the OLI was
a self-description questionnaire that encompassed
interests, self-evaluations, and an annoyance scale,
meant to evaluate the extent to which the candidate
was annoyed by others and by certain situations. This
battery was determined to be quite effective in identifying traits associated with leadership at the platoon
level and retention in OCS.39
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WEST POINT
Even West Point began to struggle to fill its cadet
corps with qualified applicants in the post-war era.
The number of cadet vacancies increased significantly
after the war. In the decade and a half following World
War II, USMA authorities had repeatedly attempted
to invoke special provisions of the law to appoint
cadets to vacancies that had gone unfilled because of
the absence of a sufficient number of qualified candidates through the normal appointment system. This
happened, for example, in 1947, a year in which less
than half of the number of candidates who might have
taken the entrance examinations actually reported to
the examination centers. The large number of unfilled
vacancies was attributed to the failure of the appointing authorities either to designate a full quota of candidates or to select bona fide candidates of serious
intent. There was, it was noted, a rather close parallel
between what happened in 1947 and what occurred
after World War I. In both instances, the dramatic
drop-off in enrollment was largely a result of “a natural falling off of interest in the Military Academy as a
reaction to the cessation of hostilities.”40
There was some improvement in 1948, but it was
limited. In 1947, the vacancy fill rate was 60 percent;
in 1948, it was still only 73 percent. Moreover, again,
special provisions of the law had to be invoked to get
to that mark.41 Academy authorities thought they had
turned the corner in 1949, when 80 percent of all vacancies were filled. The superintendent crowed about
“the return to the normal peace-time attractiveness
of cadetships, to be expected after the usual post-war
decline.”42 His celebration proved to be premature.
By 1954, the vacancy fill rate had dropped back to 67
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percent and, again, the Academy had to invoke the
special “Section 4” legislation to get to this number.43
The early 1960s found the Academy still struggling to
make its commissioning goals.44
The struggles described above coincided with a
period of great change at the Academy. The tendency
has been for historians to link the Academy’s struggles
to the Vietnam era, when various external forces were
in play that diminished the attractiveness of an Army
career and a West Point degree. In many respects,
however, the real period of change came well before
the advent of the Vietnam War. For it was in the late
1940s and 1950s that West Point began to lose its claim
on being a premier undergraduate institution (in terms
of the quality of its student body; its faculty had not
been particularly notable since the first half of the 19th
century). It was also during this era that West Point
began to change socioeconomically and religiously.
West Point lost its upper middle-class flavor as more
and more young men from the working classes gained
admission, and followers of mainline Protestant religions were increasingly displaced by Evangelicals and
Catholics.45
This socioeconomic and religious transformation
of West Point attracted the attention of scholars. Both
the noted military sociologist Morris Janowitz and
the noted historian Peter Karsten wrote about how
Catholics had been slow to incorporate into the officer
corps in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the growing
Catholic footprint at the Academy after World War II.
The “lag [of Catholics into West Point and the officer
corps] had been considerable,” wrote Janowitz, and
its reasons a matter of “deep complexity.”46 Karsten
opined that this “lag” was due in part to the fact that
entrance into the Academy “was very much a function
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of a family’s economic status, and well into the twentieth century high socioeconomic status [SES] was not a
characteristic of many Catholics.”47 Prior to World War
II, he noted, most Catholic immigrant groups trailed
behind Protestant America in educational attainment
and on the scale of occupational prestige. A relatively
low percentage of Catholic youth could qualify for
admission into a selective institution of higher learning, such as the USMA. After 1945, the level of educational attainment and the average family income in
the Roman Catholic community began to rise while
the prestige of the military profession and admissions
standards at West Point began to fall. Catholics consequently entered the Academy in unprecedented
numbers.48 As we shall see, these socioeconomic and
religious trends would continue to affect the officer
corps and the Academy in future years.
ADMISSIONS TESTING
Immediately after the war, West Point continued
to operate under the admissions guidelines that it had
before the war as far as mental testing was concerned.
The recently introduced West Point Aptitude Test for
validating college certificates had proved its validity
and continued to be used to screen out unfit candidates.49 However, in 1946, the Academy approached
the College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) and
asked if the Board could undertake the entire work of
preparing, scoring, and reporting upon all entrance
examinations. The superintendent had previously
directed the Admissions Committee to study and
report upon the project. It was found to be very desirable and entirely feasible. The superintendent relayed
the committee’s report to the War Department with
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a recommendation for its adoption. The plan would
not result in any change in the nature or method of
conducting entrance tests, but would merely have
the questions on the exam made up and graded by
the CEEB instead of by officers at the USMA.50 West
Point, in other words, was taking its first tentative
steps toward adopting the norm-based tests that many
of colleges in the country had already gone to by this
time.51
The actual practice of using CEEB tests in the
admissions process began in 1947. The first iteration
of this new procedure was deemed to be “satisfactory in every way.” It was then decided to continue
with the CEEB designed test in the future. The rigor
of entrance testing might have been reduced but the
administrative simplicity of the CEEB exam was a
huge selling point.52 In 1948, the Educational Testing
Service (which had taken over the functions of the
CEEB) recommended two changes to the Academy’s
admissions program, both of which were approved by
the Academic Board. One change eliminated the essay
portion of the American history examination, thereby
reducing the time required for this test from 3 hours to
1.5 hours, and putting it on a par with the other examinations, all of which were of the objective type. The
second change increased the time allotted for the West
Point Aptitude Test from 1 hour to 2.5 hours. Since
this test was the only mental examination required of
all candidates and the only measure common to the
entire group, the Educational Testing Service believed
the hour and a half gained from shortening the American history examination should be used for testing
additional areas of candidates’ mental powers, thus
providing data that could eventually contribute to the
construction of better entrance tests.53
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The next significant change to admissions testing
occurred in 1950.54 After several years of study and
research by the Admissions Committee of the Academic Board and the Educational Testing Service, a
recommendation was submitted to the Department
of the Army urging that certain changes in the Academy’s entrance examination procedures be made. This
recommendation was approved by the Department of
the Army on May 12, 1950. The changes supposedly
“simplified appreciably” the admission requirements
“without materially altering . . . standards of selection
[emphasis added].” The following were the changes
effected: (a) substitution of a single set of examinations (to be called the Math and English Achievement
Tests) for the present regular and validating exams;
(b) extension to all candidates of the requirement that
they must pass the West Point Aptitude Test to qualify
mentally; (c) arrangement of each competitive group
in order of merit by the sum of the scores on the West
Point Aptitude Test, the Math Achievement Test, and
the English Achievement Test; and (d) elimination
of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) method of validation and qualification. Under the new procedure,
the mental examination of most candidates was completed in 1 day. This compressed schedule enabled
most candidates to return home or to school at least
a day earlier than had been possible under former
examination procedures.55
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Achievement, Aptitude, Intelligence
Tests, unlike instruments such as surveys and inventories, actually have correct and incorrect answers. Regardless of the particular type of test, each one is influenced by the capabilities (whether
innate or not) of the test taker as well as the opportunities afforded
the test taker (e.g., whether the elementary school had a music program; if parents could afford computer summer camp; or if family
obligations allow for commitment to mastering material). However,
the tests themselves can differ in terms of their purpose and design.
Generally speaking, tests are classified along a continuum as being
tests of either achievement, aptitude, or intelligence.
Thomas Coyle and David Pillow give succinct and accurate
definitions of the three types of test. They define an achievement test
as those tests “which are used to assess prior learning and knowledge;” aptitude tests as those tests “which are used to assess learning potential in a specific domain;” and intelligence tests as those
tests “which assess general mental ability on all mental tasks.”56 As
an example, the familiar “Chapter 5 Quiz in Math 101” is an achievement test. Its purpose is to indicate the test taker’s understanding of
that limited range of material found in Chapter 5. The items would
essentially be restatements of examples and problems found in the
chapter. One could administer a broad based achievement test covering a wide range of topics at many difficulty levels, but such a test
would likely be considered invalid as it would be almost impossible
to come up with a reasonable number of items that test takers could
negotiate in a reasonable time frame.
At the other end of the testing spectrum is the intelligence test.
The purpose here is to give a reasonable indication of the test taker’s intellectual prowess; thus, items consist of questions or problems to solve where the test taker essentially lacks prior knowledge.
Examples include the Raven’s Progressive Matrices and Vocabulary
Scales, the Cattell Culture Fair test, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scales-Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV), and the Army’s own Alpha and
Beta tests. Not all intelligence tests accomplish this equally well. The
Raven’s and the Cattell Culture Fair tests consist basically of pictures
where test takers are to infer patterns and then implications of those
patterns. The WAIS-IV and the Army Alpha contain much factual
knowledge about which questions are drawn.57 Still, the purpose of
all these tests remains the same: Determine the state of the test taker’s intellectual prowess and assign that prowess a number (i.e., the
familiar intelligence quotient [IQ]).
Aptitude tests, conceptually, fall in between the two aforementioned types of test. They contain elements of factual knowledge and
elements of inference and processing. The SAT and the American
College Testing (ACT) are the two best-known examples of aptitude
tests. Indeed, although the SAT is now known only as the SAT, it
was originally the Scholastic Aptitude Test (until 1993 when it was
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changed to Scholastic Assessment Test-I, in order to distinguish it
from the College Board’s Achievement tests that were renamed the
Scholastic Assessment Tests-II). In 1997 the College Board stated that
the term “SAT” no longer stands for anything.58
A final essential difference among the three types of test is how
they are scored. Of the three, achievement tests can most easily rely
simply on the raw score or on a simple conversion to a percentage.
The reason is related to its fundamental purpose: demonstration
of mastery of a particular topic. The other two types of test almost
always utilize norms for scoring, as the purpose is not so much to
demonstrate mastery as it is to distinguish test takers from each other (in terms of the aptitude or intelligence which the tests presumably measure).

The biggest change in the Academy’s testing procedures—arguably the biggest change in the history
of those procedures—came in 1954 when, on June 29
of that year, the Department of the Army approved
the superintendent’s recommendation that West Point
adopt the SAT as the means for determining the mental
qualification of candidates for admission. This was to
be effective with the Class of 1960, who would enter
West Point in July 1956. The superintendent’s decision
was predicated on “exhaustive study” conducted by
the Admissions Committee and reviewed by the Academic Board.59 At the time, the College Board’s SATs
were used by almost 200 civilian colleges in the United
States for their admissions decisions. The tests adopted
by West Point consisted of the SAT and achievement
tests in intermediate mathematics, English composition, and social studies.60
The new admissions test was more important as a
symbol and a milestone than it was as an actual refinement or alteration of testing procedures. As we have
seen, the Academy was already using tests prepared
by the Educational Testing Service before it adopted
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the SAT and the achievement tests. The SAT did not
represent anything too different from what the Academy had been using for a number of years. Still, the
move was significant because it commemorated the
symbolic end of the rigorous, criterion-referenced
testing regimen that had been employed by West
Point at what was arguably the height of its influence,
prestige, and prominence. Significantly, West Point’s
adoption of the norm-based SAT came at a time when
Ivy League institutions began to pull away from
the USMA in the quality of undergraduates, when
the socioeconomic and religious composition of the
Corps of Cadets was undergoing profound change,
and when the prestige of the military profession was
beginning to erode, at least among the affluent, influential, and prominent.
In Figure 6-1, we depict the growing academic
achievement gap referenced above and provide
the average SAT scores for students at Harvard and
West Point for each decade dating back to the 1930s.
Assembling such data was complicated and required
a combination of data from a number of sources (e.g.,
school archives, published reports, and modern publicly available data). The graph shows that as of the
1950s, the SAT scores for cadets at West Point were on
par with those of students at Harvard. Since then, the
USMA’s relative standing has declined, with most of
the decline occurring between the 1950s and the 1970s.
Since the 1970s, West Point’s average SAT score has
remained below Harvard’s (by approximately 200
points), but the difference has not increased. (This
is likely due to the ceiling effect, wherein Harvard’s
mean is capped by being so close to the maximum
possible on the test.)
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Note: The figure above displays the average total SAT score for
the USMA and Harvard by select years (i.e., 1931, 1941, 1951,
1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011). All data through 2001
was obtained from archive reports. Harvard data for 1931 and
1941 is estimated using data for those in the class that took the
test. USMA data for 1961 is from 1962. Data for both schools for
1951 is from 1956. Harvard data for 2001 and 2011 is estimated
as the midpoint of the 25th and 75th percentiles using Integrated
Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS) data. USMA data for
2001 and 2011 was obtained from an internal USMA database and
displays median SAT scores (or estimated scores using students’
ACT scores).

Figure 6-1. Average Total SAT Scores by School.
Many contemporaries saw the adoption of the SAT
for what it was—a lowering of mental standards. In
his memoirs, John Eisenhower described the relaxation of West Point’s mental standards and the consequent demise of the “cram” schools that had once
thrived in a number of cities across the country. Before
World War II, these schools always maintained an
ample enrollment, relying as they did on anxious

203

applicants hoping to get past the Academy’s rigorous
3-day exam. To Eisenhower and others of his generation, West Point’s adoption of “standard college
boards” was a decided step down.61
In 1961, West Point adjusted the way it computed
its academic order of merit for the admissions process.
Whereas the old method emphasized the candidate’s
performance on a standardized exam, the new method
combined high school class rank with College Board
examination results. This change in selection criteria,
the Academy hoped, would be reflected in a reduction
in the attrition rate. It supposedly weeded out those
candidates whose record indicated little potential for
success at West Point but who had achieved high SAT
scores through a program of intensive cramming. The
Academy apparently wanted to increase the importance of grade point average (GPA) and class rank
because these measures represented commitment and
what psychologists would term persistence, qualities
that were better indicators of retention than intellectual ability alone.62
Also in 1961, the Academy diluted its admissions
testing requirement. For those cadets entering in July
1960, the required tests were the SAT and the CEEB
Achievement Tests in mathematics and English composition; the achievement test in social studies was
dropped. In the new, more competitive admissions
environment of the early 1960s, West Point could not
afford to be overly selective.63
ACADEMIC STANDARDS AND CADET
QUALITY
The USMA had to lower its academic standards
to secure enough students. It was having a recruiting problem and was desperately looking for ways
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to attract candidates who could complete the 4-year
course. Moreover, this last task was not as easy to do
as it had been before the war.64
After World War II, it did not take long for West
Point officials to recognize that things had changed as
far as the quality of incoming cadets was concerned.
In 1943, about 7 percent of the USMA’s largest class
in history had matriculated at an elite civilian school
before attending West Point. In 1947, the last year
that such records were maintained, only a little more
than 2 percent of the entering class had attended such
schools. The difference between 1947 and 1943 is
even greater, perhaps, than the percentages indicate,
since the entering class of 1947 included cadets who
attended Cornell under the Army specialized training
program (ASTP), a special wartime program in which
Army candidates did not have to compete for admission with the regular undergraduate population of the
university.65
In the late 1940s and 1950s, West Point, as several
superintendents admitted, had to constantly analyze
and review its admissions requirements to remain
competitive with leading civilian institutions of higher
learning in the search for talented undergraduates.
That competition had heated up after World War II
when more financial aid and scholarships became
available to students. In 1960, General William Westmoreland, the superintendent at the time, alluded to
the fact that the USMA was losing “some fine prospective cadets” as a result of the increased competition
from leading civilian institutions. He wrote of West
Point being “under constant pressure from industry
and from other educational institutions,” which could
now offer “highly attractive scholarships” and of the
need to “act aggressively” and “improve the caliber”
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of the students who came to the Academy. West Point
was no longer the best deal when it came to student
aid as its admissions struggles clearly showed.66
Westmoreland was not the first superintendent to
notice the new admissions environment, nor was he
the last. Improving methods of selection for the purpose of raising or improving the quality of cadets
was a constant theme among Academy leaders in the
mid-1950s through the early 1960s—just at the time
when it was becoming apparent that the nation’s elite
institutions were pulling away from the USMA in
the quality of undergraduates category.67 The USMA
approached what one superintendent called “the candidate problem” in two principal ways. First, it supposedly attempted to “raise admissions standards to
eliminate the marginal risks who might previously
have been admitted,” but whose chance for success
as a cadet was small. Second, it improved, or tried to
improve, the effectiveness of the admissions program,
which was designed to locate and assist outstanding
potential candidates throughout the country.68
Despite these efforts, the military continued to lose
ground to leading civilian schools. In 1963, the superintendent wrote:
To be truly objective, however, our entering classes must
be compared with those at comparable level academic
institutions. Such a comparison reveals that, although
there is full reason to be proud of the type young men
who today are seeking the challenges of a West Point
education, the Academy is merely abreast of the national
trend . . . we are seriously obliged to become more
selective so that we obtain our ‘fair share’ of the top talent
among the young men of the nation.69

206

The implication of this last sentence, of course, was
that the Academy was not getting its “fair share” of
the top talent.
GRADUATE RECORD EXAMINATION (GRE)
West Point became very concerned with intellectual standards after 1945. Realizing that it was slipping
behind some of the civilian institutions with which it
liked to compare itself, the USMA resorted to a fairly
extensive standardized testing regimen to measure its
relative standing. In June 1948, the Graduate Record
Examination (GRE) was administered to the graduating Class of 1948. All but 6 of the 301 members of the
class took the examination. The performance of the
Class of 1948 on the GRE was gratifying to Academy
officials. The average cadet general educational index
was 589, as compared with an average of 523 for all
“liberal arts” senior men who took the exam. Based
on the table of norms furnished by the Educational
Testing Service, the general index of the average cadet
exceeded that of 72 percent of the male college seniors
in the country. In none of the eight individual tests of
the general educational battery did the cadet average
fall significantly below the national average of senior
men, and in many of the tests, the cadet average was
significantly superior. Thus, the average cadet score
was higher than the scores of 93 percent of the male
seniors in general mathematics, of 78 percent of male
seniors in the physical sciences, of 65 percent of male
seniors in social studies, of 67 percent of male seniors
in literature, and of 77 percent of male seniors in effectiveness of expression. In general, the percentage of
cadets making very high scores compared favorably
with the percentage of college students generally
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who made high scores, while the percentage of cadets
making very low scores was far lower than the percentage of college students generally who made low
scores.70 From the GRE results, Academy officials concluded that: (1) the average cadet was getting a considerably better general education than the average
male liberal arts student; (2) the USMA was graduating a much smaller percentage of really poor students
than the average liberal arts college; and, (3) the better
cadets compare very favorably in general educational
achievement with the better college graduates.71
The GRE was taken by graduating USMA seniors
for the next 7 years. In 1950, the superintendent
included a table in his annual report showing the
results of the GRE for the years 1948-50 (see Table 6-1).
The Academy’s top officer thought the results were
quite good. Whether it placed the USMA at or near
the top of the academic pyramid—a position it clearly
held before World War II—is difficult to say.
Test

USMA
1948

USMA
1949

USMA
1950

Senior
Men 1948

General Mathematics

696

696

692

569

Physical Sciences

645

651

654

560

Biological Sciences

515

514

522

513

Social Studies

568

568

567

517

Literature

531

522

525

471

Fine Arts

455

453

488

444

Effectiveness of Expression

562

546

548

473

Vocabulary

522

530

533

487

General Educational Index

589

585

587

506

Table 6-1. GRE Results of USMA versus Senior
Men, 1948-50.
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ADVERTISING AND MARKETING
In the late 1940s, the USMA began to do what it
had never done before, at least not to any significant
extent—namely advertise, publish a catalogue (the
first edition of which came out in 1947), and engage
in other marketing efforts to widen its applicant base.
Before World War II, it never had to resort to such
measures to attract its fair share of student talent.
The Academy accelerated its marketing efforts in the
early 1950s when West Point representatives (many of
whom were cadets) began attending College Program
meetings in high schools across the country. These
College Program meetings were held in communities
in which a desire was expressed by students, parents,
or high school authorities to have firsthand information about specific institutions of higher learning. The
assistance of military installations, West Point Societies, and the Academy’s alumni group (the Association
of Graduates) were enlisted in support of this initiative. Through these efforts, Academy officials hoped
to spark a “renewed stimulation of interest” in West
Point.72
Sensing a deteriorating admissions situation and
concerned about stagnating test scores among applicants, West Point kept up the advertising blitz in the
mid- and late 1950s. In the mid-1950s, an Information
Committee was formed to place:
greater emphasis . . . upon efforts to inform the
American public in general—and high school students
in particular—regarding the mission of the U.S. Military
Academy, its stature as an educational institution, and
the opportunities for admission.73
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The emphasis on bringing West Point to the attention of the country was also evident in several new
facets of the Academy’s Public Information Program
to include a renewed emphasis on using alumni as
recruiting agents; a renewed commitment to College
Nights at secondary schools; the creation of a new
recruiting poster; the establishment of a Cadet Public
Relations Council to recruit high school students; and
the making of a 30-minute documentary film entitled,
“West Point,” for use in high school assemblies.74
In 1957, a Candidate Information Section was created in the Office of the Registrar to provide “‘accurate information concerning the United States Military
Academy with the aim of encouraging outstanding
young men to seek admission.’” “Experience has
shown” the annual superintendent’s report observed,
“that many young men fail to consider West Point and
the Army as a career because of misinformation concerning the requirements and procedures necessary
to gain admittance.”75 The next year, an Admissions
Information Branch was set up in the Office of the
Registrar “to intensify [West Point’s efforts] to interest
young men to seek admission to the Military Academy
and pursue a military career.” Colleges, businesses,
and industry were engaged in vigorous competition
for potential leaders from among the students of secondary schools, the superintendent explained, and
West Point had to get its share of these leaders.76
The steps that the Academy took to bolster public
awareness of the USMA and to facilitate the admissions process were steps that West Point did not feel
the need to take before the war. Then, advertising was
considered unnecessary; the Academy was able to
attract a significant number of candidates from America’s most elite civilian institutions into its ranks. In the

210

post-war era, West Point found itself in the uncomfortable and unaccustomed position of battling with the
nation’s civilian colleges for the nation’s top undergraduates, a battle in which, over course of the 1950s,
it did not fare too well.77
NON-COGNITIVE FACTORS
As in the ROTC and OCS, West Point began to
accord more weight to non-cognitive factors and considerations in its admissions decisions than had been
the case during the interwar period. The USMA, the
superintendent reported in 1946, started to give:
special consideration to candidates whose previous
histories showed desirable personal qualities such as
capacity for leadership and stalwart character. This
consideration of non-scholastic qualities in cases of
close failure was extended, in fact, to the other tests as
well and became general practice in judging entrance
qualifications.78

The emphasis at West Point was trending away from
rigorous academic and intelligence testing and toward
non-cognitive assessment. The Army and the USMA
wanted to improve selection procedures not necessarily to attract brighter people but to identify candidates
with leadership potential—especially potential for
“combat leadership”—and the motivation to pursue
an Army career.79
Many social scientists would have us believe that
the USMA took this tack because they were searching
for a more broad-based and scientific way to assess
candidate talent. Moreover, this, to a certain extent,
was true. Non-cognitive assessments were, indeed,
more likely to satisfy the Army’s operational imperatives in the 1950s—namely, to identify cadets who
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would remain in the service longer and be more adept
at low-level leadership skills than were their predecessors in the interwar era. Combat leadership of the type
the social scientists were trying to measure, after all,
took place at the platoon and company level, involved
captains and lieutenants, and required relatively low
level and non-complex intellectual skills. At the same
time, West Point was struggling to attract the same sort
of quality applicant it had before the war—quality in
the interwar context being primarily related to mental
ability. Academy authorities (and the social scientists
they engaged) did not seem to realize fully that the
non-cognitive assessment instruments developed to
identify the combat leader and the person most likely
to remain in the Army for a career were generally not
very effective in identifying top academic performers.
Only later did Army authorities come to realize that,
in the post-war era, the characteristics and motivations of a career-motivated combat leader were very
different from the characteristics and motivations of a
top scholar.
The first non-cognitive instrument introduced at
West Point after the war was designed to gauge leadership. This instrument, the West Point Biographical Inventory, was first used in 1947. It contained
measures of personal history, personality, and background. However, it was found to be only marginally effective in predicting success at the Academy, a
result that was deemed to be related to the tendency of
cadets to respond to the inventory items in ways that
would maximize their scores rather than reflect their
true characteristics.80
The biggest change in selection procedures (and
one of the more important milestones marking West
Point’s turning away from academic measures of
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excellence toward measures that emphasized retention in service and small unit leadership ability)
occurred in 1958 when West Point implemented the
so-called whole man type of evaluation. From this
date forward, all competitive candidates for the Academy were evaluated not on an Order of Merit List
(OML) established primarily on the basis of a test of
cognitive ability, but on an OML based on an assessment of a candidate’s entire record—his scholastic
record; his character and other personal attributes as
shown by confidential statements furnished by principals, teachers, and other school officials; evidence of
exceptional capabilities; his leadership potential; and
his physical fitness.81 The formula used to compute the
whole man score was academic potential (60 percent);
leadership potential (30 percent); and physical proficiency (10 percent).82 Congress apparently was enamored with the new whole man approach to selection.
More congressmen began to let the Academy make
the final selection decision rather than using the traditional principal-alternate method. The superintendent
was enthusiastic about the new formula, too. He confidently asserted in his annual report for 1958 that the
whole man method would improve the overall caliber
of entering classes.83
After the introduction of the whole man method
of assessment and other so-called refined admissions
procedures, West Point still bragged about the quality
of its undergraduates, but not in the same way that it
had done in decades past. It was no longer as focused
on attracting the nation’s brightest into its ranks—
although Academy leaders did from time to time pine
for the old days when West Point had the pick of the
nation’s undergraduate population. Now it redefined
excellence and quality as encompassing leadership
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and athletic ability in addition to scholarship—applicants to West Point were expected to display excellence in only one of the three areas. The Academy
focused on recruiting outstanding young men who
could be counted on to stay the course at the Academy, perform effectively in low-level leadership roles,
and remain in the Army for a career; it was, in short,
searching for young men who displayed “the best
potential for military service” and could be expected
to “fulfill the requirements of service.”84
CONCLUSION
The mental testing of officer aspirants underwent
a transformation after World War II. Before the war,
candidates were given rigorous, criterion-referenced
tests of academic attainment and general intelligence.
The intent was to identify individuals with intellectual
skills that would enable them to one day effectively
serve as field grade officers in the Army. After the
war, candidates were given norm-referenced tests of
mental ability and academic attainment. The emphasis was on finding lieutenants capable of functioning
effectively as junior officers and motivated to pursue a
career in the Army.
The transformation in mental testing was, in part, a
result of the new, post-war strategic environment. The
Cold War demanded a military that was constantly
ready to fight. Readiness became the watchword and
animated almost everything the Army did. The Army
no longer focused on producing erudite, strategic
thinking officers capable of managing a national mobilization effort and leading a huge citizen army in a
general war. Nor was its principal concern turning out
officers who were prepared to function in positions
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two levels up from their current grade. Now it had
a more immediate and intellectually less ambitious
focus. What it needed was well trained and motivated
junior officers capable of leading platoons and companies in an Army that was continually on alert and
ready to deploy. Training now trumped long-term
officer development, and intelligence gave way to
career commitment as the touchstone of officer quality
(this was somewhat paradoxical given the prevailing
historical narrative about how the more technologically sophisticated services needed brighter people
after World War II).
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CHAPTER 7:
VIETNAM
INTRODUCTION
The Vietnam War created the need for a vastly
expanded officer corps and ushered in a new accessions environment. All three of the Army’s principal officer accessions sources saw their output
substantially increased. From the onset of the Vietnam build-up, the Army wanted the Reserve Officers’
Training Corps (ROTC) to provide the bulk of its officers. However, because of the lag time associated with
the ROTC commissioning process (it took the Army
4 years to ramp up ROTC production to the desired
volume), the Army had by necessity to rely on the
Officer Candidate School (OCS) for the bulk of its line
officer accessions for the first 3 years of the conflict.
In August 1965, the Department of the Army
announced that a major build-up of the OCS program
would occur over the course of the next several years.
By 1967, OCS had become the Army’s largest producer
of line officers. The 19,226 active duty officers it produced that year represented the summit of OCS production in the post-World War II period. For a time,
the output of OCS was almost twice that of the ROTC
and 34 times that of West Point.1 In 1968, however, the
Army began to phase down its OCS program. Officer
production from that source fell off sharply.2 By 1973,
OCS was turning out slightly more than 1,000 lieutenants on an annual basis (or about 9 percent of new line
officer accessions).3 Many Army leaders, and General
William Westmoreland in particular, were not appreciative of the quality of the OCS product and believed
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that too much reliance had been placed on OCS during
the war.4
The ROTC was by a wide margin the Army’s largest commissioning source going into the war. In fiscal
year (FY) 1965, 11,400 ROTC graduates received commissions as compared with 2,300 OCS graduates and
522 West Point graduates. Approximately 10 percent
of ROTC graduates applied for a commission in the
Regular Army; the remaining 90 percent received
commissions in the Army Reserve.
However, the beginning of the Army’s ROTC
expansion in the early 1960s actually preceded the
Vietnam build-up. Upon its assumption of office, the
Kennedy administration had adopted a new “flexible response” strategy that entailed a significant
growth in Army end strength. This only aggravated
the Army’s officer procurement problems, which
already were quite serious. In 1963, the Department
of Defense reported that the Army missed its annual
officer accessions mission by over 2,000 lieutenants.
Army officer accessions were beset by qualitative as
well as quantitative problems. To be sure, due primarily to the Army’s heavy reliance on the college-based
ROTC program, the percentage of college graduates in the officer corps had increased since the early
1950s—rising from under 50 percent to over 70 percent between 1953 and 1965. Still, congressional and
Army leaders were not satisfied with the caliber of
officer they were getting and publicly complained that
the ground forces were not getting a fair share of the
nation’s talented undergraduates.5
Congress took action to address these problems.
One of the ways it did this was through the ROTC
Vitalization Act of 1964. This legislation was designed
to bolster the ROTC’s position as the Army’s principal

224

source of officers by instituting an Army ROTC scholarship program, increasing the ROTC stipend, creating
a 2-year ROTC commissioning program (aimed originally at community and junior college students), and
enlarging the Junior ROTC. Supplementary legislation
expanded the Army ROTC from 243 units to 285 units
between 1964 and 1971.6 Aided by these measures, the
ROTC resumed its place as the Army’s largest commissioning source by the late 1960s. In 1970, the ROTC
produced over 16,000 officers, the largest annual total
that the ROTC has ever produced.7
West Point also experienced growth in the 1960s.
Legislation passed in 1964 raised the enrollment ceiling at the Academy from 2,500 to 4,400 cadets. As a
result of this increase, the institution’s annual officer
output rose by nearly 90 percent between 1964 and
1972. As was the case with the ROTC, the legislation providing for the expansion of the U.S. Military
Academy (USMA) pre-dated the Vietnam War. It was
inspired by the same forces and concerns about officer
production that had informed the ROTC Vitalization
Act.8
As had occurred in previous conflicts, however,
much of the increase in quantity was realized at the
expense of quality. Moreover, this was true in all three
of the Army commissioning programs. The pressure of numbers severely restricted the Army’s ability to screen. All of the major accessions sources were
eventually forced to lower their commissioning standards to meet their larger, wartime officer production
quotas.
In the case of OCS, attempts were made, initially
at least, to hold the line on quality and avoid the turmoil that followed the expansion of the OCS program
in World War II and Korea. Before Vietnam, OCS had
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primarily been an avenue for non-degreed enlisted
people to gain a commission. Only 28 percent of the
1,688 OCS graduates commissioned in 1964 had a college degree. The next year, the Army began to aggressively target college graduates for its OCS program.
However, this push rendered few returns. To be sure,
by the early 1970s, about 70 percent of the annual OCS
graduating cohort held a baccalaureate degree. By
that time, however, that cohort had been drastically
reduced from its peak in 1967. A higher percentage
of college graduates came out of OCS but the overall
officer outflow from that source had been reduced to
a relative trickle. Thus, despite the Army’s push to
recruit more college graduates into the program, the
efforts to fill the OCS with college prospects were only
marginally successful. This is evidenced by the fact
that by 1970, approximately half of all Army captains
did not have a baccalaureate degree. This dearth of
college educated junior officers was due in large part
to the heavy reliance the Army had placed on its OCS
program during the first 3 years of the Vietnam War.9
Many blamed undereducated OCS graduates such as
Captain Earnest Medina and junior college dropout
Lieutenant William Calley, Jr. for incidents such as
the My Lai Massacre and for many of the Army’s disciplinary and morale problems in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Right or wrong, some Army leaders made
a direct connection between a low level of general
education and illicit and immoral behavior.
There were other troubling aspects of the OCS program in addition to the low level of civilian education.
One was the program’s rapidly plunging attrition
rates. Some insisted that greatly diminished washout rates were evidence of a dilution of OCS commissioning standards. From an attrition rate of about
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44 percent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the rate
sank to 30 percent by 1966 and to 20 percent by 1967.
Pressed for officers to meet the leadership demands
of the Vietnam War, the Army had little choice but to
relax its vetting procedures.10
West Point was by no means immune from the noxious effects of officer production pressures. Its ability
to be selective in admissions also deteriorated as the
Vietnam War dragged on and as the Corps of Cadets
grew. For several years in the early 1970s, in fact, the
Academy had to admit virtually all minimally qualified candidates to make its numbers. The ability of the
ROTC program to cull the marginally capable from its
ranks also declined, especially during the latter stages
of the Vietnam War. Many factors in addition to the
vastly expanded demands of the war contributed to
this development. Campus unrest, social turmoil, the
progressive elimination of compulsory ROTC, and
the gradual lessening of draft pressures after 1969,
all reduced ROTC enrollment, and consequently, the
Army’s ability to screen officer aspirants.11
RESERVE OFFICERS’ TRAINING CORPS (ROTC)
As already noted, the demands of the Vietnam
War compelled the Army into lowering commissioning standards. One method by which this was effected
in the ROTC was to lower educational requirements
for students enrolled in military junior colleges (MJC)
such as the New Mexico Military Institute, Marion
Military Institute, and Valley Forge Military Academy. In 1966, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
(DCSPER), the Army’s chief personnel officer, introduced the Early Commissioning Program (ECP). The
ECP permitted MJC graduates, who heretofore had to
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wait until they completed their baccalaureate degree
to be commissioned, to enter the officer corps immediately upon completion of their junior college studies.
Thus, instead of getting 21-year-old candidates with
with baccalaureate degrees, the Army commissioned
19-year-olds with associate degrees.12
Drastic change in the ROTC host university and
college base was another factor that affected officer
production. In an attempt to counter the elimination
of compulsory programs and to ensure that production capacity kept pace with the officer requirements,
the Army expanded ROTC’s institutional base by
over 17 percent (from 243 to 285 colleges and universities) between 1964 and 1971. During this period, a
number of universities, including such prestigious
ones as Yale, Harvard, Dartmouth, and Stanford, severed their connections with the Army ROTC. Thus, in
addition to the 42 schools required to meet the Army’s
expansion goals, the schools leaving the program also
had to be replaced. Most of the institutional newcomers into the ROTC were not top tier schools but were
small or medium-sized state institutions located in
the South, the Midwest or the West—schools such as
Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical (A&M), University of Tampa, Alcorn A&M (now Alcorn State),
and Jackson State.13 Students in these new additions
to the ROTC institutional base were more eager than
their Ivy League counterparts had been to enroll in
commissioning programs and officials at these new
schools were generally more supportive of the ROTC
than were their Ivy League counterparts. The Army
wanted to be where it was welcome, and these new
schools definitely welcomed the Army presence. On
the other hand, this shift away from the Ivies toward
less selective schools raised concerns about product
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quality. Some worried that this institutional changeover would lower the intellectual level of the officer
corps. As General Donn Starry later observed, “There
is no way to replace a Harvard . . . or Yale except with
Harvard or Yale.”14
The Army used the ROTC institutional expansion
to achieve greater ethnic diversity in its new officers. It
was pushed in this direction by both the Johnson and
Nixon administrations, both of which exerted considerable pressure on the Army and the other services to
increase the percentages of minority officers in their
ranks. Unlike today, diversity in the late 1960s and
early 1970s had a very restricted meaning; it referred
primarily to African Americans.15
Before World War II, most black reserve officers
received their commissions through ROTC programs
at Wilberforce University and Howard University.
In the immediate post-war period, an additional 12
ROTC units were established at other historically
black colleges and universities (HBCU).16 Despite
these additions, African American officer production
lagged. By the 1960s, African American representation in the junior officer ranks was in decline—it fell
from roughly 3 percent in 1962 to about 1.5 percent in
1969. The Army attempted to redress this shortfall by
adding still more units at HBCUs, as a high proportion
of serving black Army officers had graduated from
these institutions. By the end of the Vietnam War, the
number of historically black schools hosting ROTC
units had risen to 19 (or slightly less than 7 percent
of the ROTC institutional base—that stood at 285 colleges in 1972—and slightly more than 18 percent of all
HBCUs in the nation—that numbered 104 in 1972).17
The addition of these black colleges to its institutional portfolio brought quick enrollment and
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production dividends to the ROTC, in relative if not
absolute terms. The percentage of black graduates in
the ROTC commissioning class rose from 2.6 percent
in 1969 to 3.6 percent in 1973. Over the same period,
the African American share of total ROTC enrollment
grew from 6.6 percent to 10.8 percent.18 These numbers seemed to bode well for the Army’s diversity
efforts.19 Yet the reliance upon HBCUs had its troubling aspects. While ROTC enrollment rates at black
colleges were above average, black student participation in ROTC at predominantly white institutions was
well below average. This was a source of concern to
defense leaders because, in the late 1960s and early
1970s, black students in increasing numbers and percentages were attending predominantly white colleges. Additionally, ROTC units at HBCUs were much
more inefficient officer producers, on average, than
were units on other campuses, their ratios of cadets
enrolled to cadets commissioned being very low.20
One reason for the inefficiency of many HBCU-affiliated units was the difficulty they had in qualifying their cadets for the ROTC advanced course.
Many observers attributed this inefficiency to years of
unequal educational opportunity in the United States.
In 1969, almost 49 percent of the students taking the
ROTC qualification test at 7 black institutions failed
it, while the national failure rate was about 15 percent. To correct this imbalance, the Army sponsored
special remedial academic programs at HBCUs to
lower the failure rate. It soon became evident, however, that much more had to be done in this area if
the Army hoped to realize its minority procurement
goals.21 Thus, to increase officer accessions, the Army
adopted a policy of liberal waivers for scores on the
ROTC Qualifying (RQ)-8 and RQ-9 exams—the exams

230

used to screen entry into the ROTC advanced course.
In 1969, the minimum raw score on these RQ exams
was 50. Local commanders had the authority to grant
waivers for RQ scores between 44 and 49. Continental
Army Command (CONARC) headquarters could (and
did) approve waivers for scores below 44.22
Waivers for the RQ test, along with waivers for
medical, behavioral, and physical issues, were liberally dispensed. This helped to increase the number
of minority officers attaining commissions as well as
helped the Army maintain required levels of overall
officer production. Waivers were particularly useful
in the early 1970s as draft calls decreased and as the
Army began weaning itself away from conscription.
On the other hand, the liberal granting of waivers
resulted in a general lowering of the level of intellectual attainment among junior officers.23
NEW VERSIONS OF THE ROTC QUALIFYING
(RQ) EXAMINATION
Two revised versions of the ROTC Qualifying (RQ)
Examination (named RQ-8 and RQ-9) were introduced in the spring of 1966 to screen students for
admittance into the senior ROTC program. The expansion of officer procurement programs and changes in
officer training necessitated these modifications to the
Army’s officer selection instruments.24 Given to cadets
at the end of their sophomore year, the RQ test measured verbal and mathematical aptitudes that were
closely associated with success in both academic and
military science (MS) courses. A minimum score was
established each year to eliminate the bottom 16 percent of the sophomore or MS II class. About 2.5 times
as many cadets as were needed were enrolled into
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the ROTC Advanced Course using this method. This
allowed for attrition as a result of academic and leadership failures, physical shortcomings, and voluntary
resignations.25
The original versions of the RQ test (RQ-l and
RQ-2) were introduced in 1947. Through substantiation studies, their developers found that the verbal and
math subtests were aligned with collegiate academic
grades closely enough to justify their employment as
vetting instruments for MS III cadets. Later versions
of the test were shortened for administrative purposes
so that the exam could be offered in one class period.
RQ-3 was introduced in 1949, the RQ-4 and RQ-5 in
1956, and the RQ-6 and PQ-7 in 1961. The RQ-8 and
RQ-9 versions of the exam were constructed by the
Educational Testing Service under contract with the
Department of the Army and first employed as selection tools in 1966.26
The Army created the new versions of the test to
obtain “more reliable part scores (verbal and mathematics),” the thought being that more reliable part
scores could be employed for branching purposes (i.e.,
assigning ROTC graduates to the most appropriate
occupational specialty). To achieve greater reliability,
researchers made three alterations to the test: (1) they
inserted an additional verbal and an additional math
section to the test; (2) they replaced five-choice questions with four-choice questions; and (3) they used a
larger assortment of math questions.27
As in World War I and II, the assignment of officers to certain branches posed problems during the
Vietnam War. The field artillery was one such branch.
At the start of the war, ROTC graduates had to have
completed a course in trigonometry to be assigned
to the field artillery. This requirement resulted in an
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overemphasis on mathematical ability since many
ROTC graduates with good mathematical backgrounds (e.g., individuals who majored in a math,
science, or engineering discipline) were automatically
placed in the field artillery. The Army did a study to
see if the math score on the RQ exam could substitute
for the artillery’s trigonometry requirement. ROTC
graduates enrolled in the Artillery Basic Course took
the RQ exam during the first week of classes. Their
math scores were subsequently compared to their final
course grade. The outcome confirmed the appropriateness of the RQ math test for assignment purposes.28
There was some thought given in the mid-1960s
to developing a “Basic ROTC Examination” as a
screening device for entering freshmen (or the MS I
class). Out of the 80,000 to 90,000 students enrolling
in the ROTC Basic Course every year, about one-half
dropped out during their first and second year in
the program. Many observers considered this to be
extremely wasteful. To lower the dropout rate, the initial vetting of candidates for academic ability seemed
“virtually a necessity.” As it was, entry into the Basic
Course was being screened principally on local admission standards, which varied greatly from one college
to another.29 The idea was determined to be too restrictive, given the great demand for officers during the
Vietnam War, and was never adopted.
OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL (OCS)
The OCS selection system during Vietnam was a
successive hurdles system; that is, candidates had to
pass initial mental screening exams before they could
apply to OCS. Applicants who passed the initial
screen were then evaluated using a leadership selection battery, which consisted of an evaluation report,
personal inventory, and board interview. These three
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instruments provided “a standardized basis for determining the relative leadership potential of OCS applicants.” Certain branches had additional requirements.
Admission to the Artillery and Missile OCS program,
for example, entailed an additional mathematical
requirement.30
The Army used several initial intellectual vetting
tests for OCS applicants. The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) was one of them. The AFQT was
the general ability test to determine mental fitness for
military service. A minimum score of 65 was needed
to qualify for OCS under the enlistment option. The
Army also used the general technical (GT) aptitude
area of the AFQT as an initial screening device. The
GT score included the results of the verbal and arithmetic reasoning tests. The qualifying score on the GT
was 110; this meant that about 35.5 percent of inductees were qualified for further testing. The Army gave
the Officer Candidate Test (OCT) to all enlisted people
who scored 110 or above on the GT. The OCT contained an assortment of questions gauging arithmetic
reasoning, reading comprehension, chart reading, and
general information. The minimum score on the OCT
was 115; this meant that about one quarter of inductees was qualified to apply for OCS.31
The Army also used several instruments for leadership selection in the OCS program. One was the
Officer Leadership Qualification Report (OLR-1). In
the leadership arena, past performance was considered to be a reliable indicator of future performance.
Accordingly, the OLR-1 emphasized performance and
was filled out by applicant’s non-commissioned officer (NCO) supervisor and endorsed by his superior
officer. The Officer Leadership Qualification Inventory
(OLI-l) was another form used for leadership selection.
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It was administered by an OCS board during the final
stages of applicant processing. Included in this inventory were items relating to an assortment of personal
factors such as “personal history as well as interests,
skills, and attitudes concerning athletic activities and
leadership activities.”32
The Officer Leadership Board Interview (OLB-1)
was conducted by an examining board composed of
three to five officers. It had two parts. In the first part,
the applicant’s people skills were gauged in a series
of interpersonal scenarios. The candidate was presented with a series of problem situations, to which he
was supposed to respond. Judging from the manner
in which he discussed each scenario, board members
evaluated him on factors such as composure, voice
quality, and language organization as well as “his ability to deal with enlisted men and officers.” In part two
of the interview, the board reviewed the applicant’s
“entire record” and made a final determination as to
his suitability for a commission. A favorable determination was “essential to selection.”33
Composite scores computed from both parts of the
interview were then pooled with scores achieved on
the qualification report and the qualification inventory
to give a composite gauge of the applicant’s suitability for a commission. Regular Army applicants could
receive additional credit for length of service (1 bonus
point for each 2 months of service up to a maximum
of 30). These extra points were given as incentives to
stimulate Regular Army applications. The cutoff score
was adjusted from time to time to meet officer production demands. Of course, this meant that the greater
the demand, the lower the qualifying score; flexibility
was the watchword when it came to selection procedures. The final determination on OCS candidates fell
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to Army commanders, who would make their decisions after an examination of all records.34
The Army spent considerable effort after World
War II refining its OCS selection battery. Most of the
work leading to the creation of these vetting instruments was accomplished between 1941 and 1956. The
first versions of the OCT were introduced in 1945 and
instruments of the leadership selection battery in 1946.
Validity information obtained on these forms and on
later revisions indicated that they were good predictors of performance, particularly of academic grades.35
In the revision of OCS selection instruments that
occurred in 1956, the board interview and the evaluation report were updated and retitled the OLB and
the OLR respectively. The third instrument in the
leadership selection battery, a biographical information form, was revised and retitled the OLI. Revisions
of the board interview and the OCT were cosmetic in
nature. After 1956, the Army felt compelled to improve
its screening instruments and to adjust them to changing requirements and operational realities. This need
became more acute with the gradual expansion of the
Infantry and Artillery OCS programs from FY 1960
to FY 1965 and the activation of the Engineer, Armor,
Signal, Quartermaster, Transportation, And Ordnance
OCS programs in FY 1966.36
Army researchers suspected that the selection
instruments had not been adapted to the changing
characteristics of American youth and to the unique
demands of Army schools, particularly schools that
provided specialized training in the Artillery, Missile, Signal, Transportation, and Ordnance specialties.
For example, the OLR did not allow for valid assessments of the new inductees who applied for OCS;
raters, it was discovered, often had scant contact with
applicants. The OLB posed singular difficulties. To
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be sure, it was effective when used as directed. However, comments received from people administering
the instrument indicated that there was considerable
disparity in the conduct of the interview and on the
emphasis given to each part of the two-step interview.
Adjustments were made to refine the instruments but
not before the OCS program was phased down after
1968.37

SAT & g
Although we have already distinguished among achievement,
aptitude, and intelligence tests, we must nevertheless discuss the relationship between the SAT (and American College Testing [ACT])
and intelligence quotient (IQ). Both types of test are norm-referenced; scores are not reported in either raw form or as a simple percentage of answers correct. However, while they share this scoring
trait, they differ in terms of what they assess. However, this has not
stopped researchers over many years from using the SAT as a proxy
for intelligence. The main reason is simple convenience: A great
many more individuals have taken the SAT as have taken a standard
intelligence test (such as the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrix
[APM] or the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children). However,
convenience does not necessarily make for good science.
Meredith C. Frey and Douglas K. Detterman sought to examine the relationship between the SAT and psychometric g, using
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) in a first
study and the Raven’s in a second. Correcting for attenuation and
restriction of range, they obtained correlations of .86 and .72, respectively.38 These are very high correlations for a social science such as
psychology and would seem to indicate that they almost entirely
measure the same construct. However, by squaring the correlations
(and multiplying by 100), one can see how much variance they share.
In this case, the squared correlations (multiplied by 100) are 74 percent and 52 percent, respectively. These percentages indicate large
amounts of overlap (for social science phenomena), but there is still
26 percent and 48 percent of the variance unique to the individual
tests. Thus, it would seem that they do measure different things, and
this should give researchers pause for concern when studies use the
SAT as a measure of general cognitive ability
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Bridgeman critiqued Frey and Detterman’s formulas on methodological and empirical grounds, but A. Alexander Beaujean, Michael W. Firmin, Andrew J. Knoop, Jared D. Michonski, Theodore
P. Berry, and Ruth E. Lowrie, were able to validate Frey and Detterman’s formulas when they used the Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales in lieu of the SAT and the Raven’s APM.39 It is likely,
however, that use of the SAT for research purposes will continue
for reasons of the aforementioned convenience. The ACT exams
are administered about as frequently as the SATs are; they too are
actually an aptitude rather than an intelligence test. Katherine A.
Koenig, Frey, and Detterman correlated ACT scores with those of
the ASVAB and with the Raven’s APM and obtained correlations of
.77 and .61, respectively.40 Given such results, it is even more likely
that aptitude tests will continue to be used as measures of cognitive
ability as both the SAT and the ACT correlate strongly with standard
intelligence tests.
Finally, Thomas Coyle was able to demonstrate that the SAT
and the ACT are not intelligence tests, but that they do remain valid
predictors of undergraduate academic success. In 2008, he and David Pillow statistically removed g from the SAT and ACT scores of
students and showed that the tests sill remained predictively valid.
Earlier, in 2006, he demonstrated how test-retest score changes in
the SAT were unrelated to test-retest score changes for college grade
point average (GPA), the Wonderlic Personnel Test, and word recall
tasks.41

WEST POINT
West Point’s experience provides unique insights
into officer accessions during the Vietnam War. This
is because its experience was more fully documented
than that of the other commissioning sources. Information regarding Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores,
acceptance rates, screening tests, and other matters
relating to the admissions process were more readily
available. More information, of course, allows more
fidelity and specificity when detailing the changes in
officer accessions during a very tumultuous period.
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The USMA continued its academic and intellectual
decline relative to the nation’s elite civilian institutions
during the Vietnam War. The average SAT scores of
cadets diverged more and more from their contemporaries at distinguished civilian institutions. In a
socioeconomic sense, West Point was now was a very
different institution than it had been prior to World
War II. Before that conflict, its cadets were, socioeconomically and intellectually speaking, generally on a
par with students at Ivy League institutions. By the
end of the Vietnam War, it was abundantly clear that
West Point was no longer an Ivy League equivalent.
There was now a distinct social gap between the cadet
population at the Academy and the student bodies at
elite civilian institutions. The USMA also drew more
heavily from rural areas and small towns and from
lower status religious denominations than it once did.
The percentage of Catholics in the Corps, which had
risen from 15 percent in 1943 to approximately 31 percent by 1958, grew to almost 36 percent by 1973. Evangelicals, too, had also recorded substantial gains.42
Laurence I. Radway, professor of Government at
Dartmouth College and noted authority on military
education, provided a socioeconomic comparison
of West Point cadets with their counterparts in elite
civilian institutions in the late 1960s. According to
Radway, civilian elites were more likely to come from
urban or suburban upper middle-class families, more
likely to attend one of the elite preparatory schools in
the East, more likely to have high verbal scores on the
SAT, twice as likely to belong to a high status Protestant denomination, twice as likely to be Jewish, and
less likely to be Catholic than were West Point cadets.43
Academy officials realized that their institution
was experiencing a decline relative to elite civilian
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institutions. They complained about the increased
competition from civilian schools for the cream of
the nation’s entering freshmen and the decreasing
pool of qualified candidates who sought admission
to West Point. The Academy’s superintendent noted
in his 1968 annual report that the number of “fully
qualified” students had “declined significantly” since
1965. He was, he stated, “deeply concerned about the
decreasing size of the pool of interested, nominated,
and qualified young men from which we can select
new cadets.”44 The nadir of West Point’s Vietnam era
woes occurred in the early seventies when it had to
accept virtually every qualified candidate in order to
make its enrollment quota.
West Point’s relative decline was reflected in a
widening gap in SAT scores between cadets and their
counterparts at the nation’s elite colleges. The gap was
particularly noticeable in SAT verbal scores. What was
a relatively narrow breach in the late 1950s become a
significant divide by 1970. West Point’s decline was
also reflected in the decreasing percentage of cadets
who came to West Point with prior college experience.
In the interwar period, between 40 and 50 percent
of the entering freshman class had matriculated at a
4-year college before entering West Point. In the 1960s,
less than 20 percent did.45
West Point officials attributed their institution’s
admissions problems to, inter alia, the increasing
availability of scholarships and financial aid at civilian institutions. “The advantage of offering a free
collegiate education,” one superintendent noted, “is
no longer unique to the Military Academy.”46 West
Point officials also noted how pressure to select cadets
who demonstrated commitment to the “military profession” and who exhibited a high degree of “career
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motivation” complicated their search for quality students. The Academy wanted outstanding students
who were highly motivated toward a military career
before they became cadets.47 Attracting outstanding
scholars who, at the same time, demonstrated a high
degree of enthusiasm for a military career was a difficult task indeed. Students with the greatest proclivity for a military career were generally not those with
the highest SAT scores or with the highest grades. The
social and political turmoil that wracked the nation
was another factor cited as contributing to the Academy’s decline in selectivity. “The balance between
quality and quantity can be a tenuous one,” the superintendent noted in his 1971 annual report. It could be
especially tenuous when the military institution was
under critical public and congressional scrutiny, as
it was in the waning stages of the Vietnam War. The
prestige of the military was at or near an all-time low
and West Point felt the consequences. Finally, USMA
officials pointed to the expansion of the Corps of
Cadets that had occurred between 1964 and 1971 as a
factor in its admissions woes. Essentially doubling the
size of the Corps over a 7-year period almost inevitably, it was realized, entailed a certain drop-off in candidate quality.48
To be accepted into West Point, students had to
meet the Academy’s citizenship, character, medical,
and educational standards. They also had to perform
adequately on a selection battery that included gauges
of intellect and academic attainment, physical fitness,
and leadership potential.49 Throughout the Vietnam
period, the USMA continued to employ the so-called
whole man score to evaluate applicants. This composite measure (introduced in 1958) was calculated by
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combining the various scores achieved on the selection battery, employing the following weights:
Academic measures 60%
Evaluations of leadership potential 30%
Measures of physical proficiency 10%50

Academic qualification for admission into West
Point was established by “a weighted composite of
high school rank and scores on the CEEB [College
Entrance Examination Board] Verbal and Mathematics subtests of the Scholastic Aptitude Test, English
Composition Achievement Test, and Mathematics Achievement Test.” Measures of physical fitness
were integrated into the Physical Aptitude Examination, which gauged strength, coordination, muscular
power, endurance, speed, and agility. Qualification
was based on overall performance on physical ability
tests such as the broad jump, hurdle run, pull-ups, vertical jump, and rope climb. The School and Personal
History form was the principal basis for assessments
of Leadership Potential, although admissions officers
also took into account school and community activities of an athletic or social nature.51
Throughout the Vietnam War, there was understandable concern at the USMA that only the best
qualified applicants be selected. Various tests were
run to evaluate whether the assessment instruments
in use would lead to the more consistent selection of
the “better qualified individuals,” that is to say “individuals with leadership potential, who were best
motivated for attendance at the Academy and for a
subsequent Army career [emphasis added].” Officials
at West Point were concerned, as they had been since
the mid-1950s, about what they considered to be the
inordinately high resignation rates at the Academy
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and the high attrition rates of Academy graduates in
the Army. They strove to tweak their tests and selection procedures to keep these rates as low as possible.
The problem was that gearing selection procedures
to emphasize retention tended to screen out the very
high academic achievers among applicants. There
was, and still is, a negative correlation between very
high scores on the SAT and the likelihood of an officer
remaining in the Army for a career.52
One of the products developed to identify applicants with the propensity to remain in the service
was the Inventory of Cadet Aptitude. This instrument
contained:
two empirical measures: 1. A measure of cadet motivation
consisting of items which had been found to be predictive
of voluntary resignation in several USMA classes. 2. A
measure of leadership potential consisting of items
found to be associated with the Aptitude for the Service
Rating (a weighted composite rating on military aptitude
obtained from cadets and tactical officers).53

The inventory encompassed such personal factors as
self-confidence in leadership situations, motivation
for officer training and service, athletic experience and
skill, acceptance of authority and discipline, and facility in interpersonal relations. While the Inventory of
Cadet Aptitude was being created, work conducted by
the USMA’s research staff led to the articulation of a
high school personality rating, or, as it was called, the
Aptitude for Service Personality Rating. This rating
also proved to be a good gauge of cadet motivation
and leadership ability. It was based on remarks and
ratings provided by high school teachers and administrators on two scales: physical coordination and personal magnetism (ability to get along with others and
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to influence others). It was found that the high school
personality rating was the best gauge of leadership
and cadet retention.54
CONCLUSION
The Vietnam era was one of declining standards
for officer accessions. The rapid and massive expansion of the Army and its officer corps necessitated,
as it had in past wars, a compromise with quality. In
each of its three major commissioning programs, the
Army had to strike that tenuous balance between
quality and quantity that West Point’s superintendent
had alluded to. In many cases, this meant, in practical
terms, buying quantity with quality.
The ROTC program saw its institutional base
changed drastically. Elite, private colleges were
replaced with less competitive state institutions in
the South and the West. The ROTC entrance tests, the
RQ-8 and RQ-9, were circumvented with hundreds
of waivers. The OCS program admitted thousands of
undereducated officer aspirants and, in the process,
altered the intellectual and some would argue moral
complexion of the officer corps. The Army also lowered the rigor of the OCS course itself, cutting the
attrition rate in half to get the production volume it
needed. West Point continued its relative decline as
an elite academic institution. The changing socioeconomic complexion of its student body, its diminishing appeal among the nation’s top students, and the
declining prestige of the military profession (particularly evident during the Vietnam War) announced
in unmistakable terms that West Point was no longer
the institution it had been before World War II. In
the next chapter, we will see how the Army’s three
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commissioning sources reacted to the Vietnam experience and adjusted to the conditions and challenges of
an All-Volunteer Force (AVF).
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CHAPTER 8:
OFFICER TESTING IN THE ERA OF THE
ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE (AVF)
After the Vietnam War, the Reserve Officers’
Training Corps (ROTC) reclaimed its position as the
Army’s largest commissioning source. It accounted
for about 75 percent of active Army officer accessions
in the 1970s. The U.S. Military Academy (USMA) also
assumed an enhanced role relative to the one it had
in the decade before Vietnam. After 1973, it produced
about 17 percent of the active Army’s annual cohort of
new officers.1 As had occurred after other major wars
in the 20th century, Officer Candidate School (OCS)
was reduced to a caretaker status, just large enough to
ensure that it could be reactivated quickly in the event
of an emergency. Its post-Vietnam share of the annual
commissioning cohort averaged a modest 8 percent.2
With the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF),
women and minorities assumed a much larger role in
the Army’s officer accessions plans. Women began to
enter commissioning programs in large numbers in the
early 1970s. After admitting them on an experimental
basis in the fall of 1972, the ROTC was thrown open to
women in 1973. By the end of the 1970s, women comprised over 15 percent of the annual ROTC commissioning cohort. West Point admitted its first group of
119 women in 1976, the same year that OCS adopted
a gender-integrated approach to officer training.3 The
volume of minority officer accessions also grew substantially during this era. By 1979, African Americans
comprised over 10 percent of ROTC officer output and
about 7 percent of the USMA’s production. Minority
production in OCS was even greater, in a relative
sense at least.4
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The early and mid-1970s were years of ambiguity
in officer accessions. Due to declining and frequently
changing end-strengths, a new and enhanced role for
the reserve components (RC), and an indeterminate
international situation (the 1st half of the 1970s were
years of détente with the Soviet Union), there was a
great deal of uncertainty about what officer production levels should be. The Army’s Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) noted in his annual
historical summary for 1973 “the balancing of qualitative new procurement against the reductions in the
force presented major problems.” In fact, the ROTC
operated without a definite mission through the
mid-1970s. ROTC administrators were told simply to
produce as many lieutenants as they could. This methodology presented no immediate problems. The Army
merely took what it needed for active Army requirements and gave the remainder to the RC, which in the
immediate aftermath of Vietnam were still brimming
with officers. Only in 1976, after U.S.-Soviet relations
began to worsen and RC officer strength approached
dangerously low levels, did the Army assign a definite
production objective to the ROTC.5
Concerns about the quality of newly minted lieutenants plagued the Army throughout the 1st decade
of the AVF. With the phasing out of conscription after
1970, the Army found that it could not meet minimum
active duty commissioning targets without lowering accessions standards. Finding the ROTC Qualifying (RQ) test too restrictive, it began experimenting
with other tests that promised easier access into the
officer corps. The Cadet Evaluation Battery (CEB)
was selected to replace the RQ examination. It came
into general use in 1972. The CEB, being an attitude
and interest inventory as well as a test of cognitive
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ability, was much less rigorous than the RQ test that it
replaced.6
The new screening tool soon revealed a disturbing
trend. Average scores on the CEB steadily declined
after 1971. In that year, the average CEB score was 22.
By 1975, it had dropped to 17. From a cognitive assessment standpoint, the drop was actually worse than
the scores indicated since more than half of the test—
about 60 percent—measured non-cognitive characteristics. Moreover, some ROTC instructors claimed
that were widespread irregularities in the administration of the new test. Since ROTC cadre members had
total control over testing, they could provide close
and detailed coaching to their charges. They could
also allow candidates to take the test multiple times,
until they passed it, in fact. Pressed to make numbers,
many cadre members found that they had no choice
but to circumvent the test by resorting to unethical
expedients. The ROTC’s testing record was similar to
that of the Recruiting Command, which suffered from
a number of recruiting scandals and cases of recruiting malpractice in the 1970s. Some of those scandals
involved lying on the administration of the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).7
Several studies conducted during this period
added to the Army’s concerns about the quality of
its officer aspirants. J. J. Card and W. M. Shanner of
the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social
Sciences (ARI) authored a 1976 study indicating that
ROTC cadets had lower high school and college
grade point averages (GPA), lower verbal aptitudes,
and lower academic abilities than their non-ROTC
classmates. They also found that career commitment
and retention among ROTC cadets was positively
related to low academic ability and observed that
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“high academic aptitude may not be the most salient
determinant of good performance in ROTC or in the
Army.”8 In a separate but related report, Card and
Shanner, along with two of their colleagues, urged the
Army to make a greater effort to recruit and select students of higher academic ability into the ROTC, with
the goal of having ROTC students at least on par with
the average college student.9
The epochal Review of Education and Training for
Officers (RETO) study (1978), commissioned by the
Chief of Staff of the Army, also expressed strong reservations about ROTC’s selection methods and the
intellectual quality of ROTC cadets. It noted that accessions screening for all ROTC cadets was not being
conducted, that the ROTC program’s intelligence standards were “inadequate,” and that there was no initial measurement of medical status, physical fitness,
leadership potential, or even motivation for military
service for the vast majority of cadets. In fact, it suggested, little screening and culling was being done at
all in the ROTC officer selection process.10
Another criticism of the Army’s officer vetting
system advanced by the RETO study involved the
disparate mental aptitude screening methods used by
the three pre-commissioning training programs. There
were minimal mental aptitude scores required for
entry into OCS, in the opinion of the RETO committee. Not only were the qualifying scores inordinately
low, they were different for male and female applicants (males had to score 110 on the general technical [GT] test to qualify for OCS, women had to score
115). On the other hand, there were effective screening instruments in place for ROTC 4-year scholarship
applicants and West Point applicants. Both had to
take the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or American
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College Testing (ACT) tests as part of the admissions
process. However, for non-scholarship ROTC applicants (which constituted the vast majority of ROTC
cadets during this era), there was no initial mental
aptitude standard worthy of the name (the committee dismissed the CEB as essentially worthless as a
screening device).11 The dearth of common standards
in the screening of pre-commissioning program aspirants, the committee declared, “underscores a series
of double or triple standards which shout for reform.”
The RETO group emphasized the need for a common
standard of officer accessions “unfettered by exception, waiver, and vague terminology.” In the opinion
of the study group, candidates for all three commissioning sources should be required to take either the
SAT or the ACT examination. In addition, OCS candidates should be required to have completed at least 2
years of college.12
The RETO study group recommended that the
Army use centralized assessment centers to screen
applicants to all of the Army’s commissioning programs. This was necessary, it asserted, for establishing comparative norms. The USMA and OCS could
use Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations
while special ROTC assessment centers would have to
be established to assess all candidates for the ROTC
program. The “major factor” that led to this recommendation was the “total lack of initial measurements
of [mental] aptitude, motivation, physical fitness and
leadership potential of individual[s] desiring to enter
the ROTC program.” Non-scholarship applicants to
the ROTC program, it was noted, had no “scholastic
requirements” for admission into the program whatsoever. The lack of initial assessment instruments led
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to a predictable flood of “unqualified” candidates
into ROTC, which inevitably produced high attrition
rates. It also led to a very heterogeneous officer corps.
“Upon commissioning,” the RETO report noted:
the only common bond these officers enjoy is their rank
as second lieutenants—and that is not enough. Funneled
through eligibility gates of various descriptions, and
developed through disparate programs of military
training, without common gauges of cadet performance,
the new officers arrive at their basic officer course as
unmeasured products of an uncommon system.13

Along a spectrum of screening procedures ranging from stringent to lax, the committee remarked,
one would place West Point, OCS, and ROTC, respectively. Under existing regulations, the USMA imposed
the most rigorous screening standards on its applicants. OCS was equally as precise, but the variety of
waiver devices and the frequency with which they
were dispensed lessened the value of the screening
accomplished to a level that was “something less
than desired.” The ROTC, except for its 4-year scholarship students (who constituted at the time about 2
percent of ROTC freshmen), imposed virtually no initial screening over its participants (the use of the CEB
notwithstanding).14
Attrition in pre-commissioning training programs
was a big issue for the RETO study group. It noted that
the first year attrition rate at the USMA was 24.9 percent and in ROTC, 54 percent. The OCS attrition rate
was 10 percent. Whatever the cause for the attrition,
the RETO group observed, “one thing [is] clear: the
cost-effectiveness of any program becomes increasingly suspect in the light of high attrition.” Program
cost would, it was asserted, continue to increase if
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only through the “normal inflationary spiral.” Consequently, other means had to be developed and tested
to reduce the dropout rate. This involved, inter alia,
creating instruments or procedures that would do a
better job of identifying applicants who had the ability and motivation to successfully complete officer
producing programs. The RETO study group was
aware of, but rather naive about, the effect that these
instruments would have on officer production. To
select candidates that were motivated for military service would necessarily lead to a dilution of standards
since extremely high mental aptitude was known to
have an inverse relationship with proclivity for military service. However, the RETO group wanted these
instruments created and introduced “without lowering standards,” a difficult goal to attain.15
The study group, as we have seen, insisted that
there should be common requirements applied to all
applicants, regardless of the pre-commissioning program to which they were applying. “Where uncommunality [sic] reigns,” it asseverated, “a decided
laxity appears.” However, once again the RETO group
demonstrated an awareness of, but naivety about, the
ramifications of their recommendation. That group
wanted to have common standards “without sacrificing the leavening effect the military community enjoys
through the annual transfusion of new officers representing all elements of the democracy it serves.”16
Common standards, the RETO group realized, made
minority recruiting problematic. Nevertheless, they
again attempted to square the circle by pursuing these
two divergent objectives simultaneously.
The changing character of the ROTC cadet corps
was yet another concern of defense leaders in the
1970s, although this concern was more acute among
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civilian officials than it was among senior military officers. In the last chapter it was noted how in the 1960s
and 1970s, ROTC units in the nation’s most prestigious
colleges and universities were replaced with ones
at less selective state-supported institutions. It was
also noted how the geographical center of the ROTC
program shifted to the South and West. Some of this
reflected an effort by the Johnson administration to
distribute funds more equitably across the nation’s
university community, and some reflected a desire by
the military to position ROTC programs where they
would be welcomed and supported and, hopefully,
become more productive. The U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was worried about
the trend away from the country’s most selective colleges and the cultural changes that were altering the
nature of the ROTC program but, given the fiscal realities of the late seventies, the intense pressure to meet
officer accessions objectives, and the relatively high
employment rate that prevailed at the time, could do
little to reverse these developments.17
In Figure 8-1, we depict a composite ranking of
schools with ROTC programs since 1972. We do this in
an attempt to better understand the intellectual ability
of individuals enrolled in ROTC programs over time.
While any college ranking or evaluation system has its
strengths and weaknesses, we chose Barron’s Profiles of
American Colleges as our measuring stick because of the
availability of the data for a large number of schools
and the publication’s historical availability (i.e., back
to the 1970s). We utilized four different time periods
based on ROTC and Baron’s data; these periods are
roughly decade intervals, though not exactly.
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Note: The figure above displays the stacked distribution of ROTC
schools by their Barron’s selectivity classification. ROTC data
was obtained from the annual “Army ROTC Enrollment Report.”
Selectivity data came from yearly Barron’s Profiles of American
Colleges.

Figure 8-1. Stacked Distribution of ROTC Schools
by Barron’s Selectivity Classification.
The Baron’s system ranks schools based on their
selectivity using high school class ranks, high school
grades, standardized test scores for admitted students,
and the institution’s admission rate. The system consists of five categories of schools, and we added a
category for schools not included in the ratings. We
provide a definition of each category and some example schools for each category to orient the reader to the
ratings.
Examples of schools (private and public) by category in decreasing selectivity include: most competitive (Harvard, Lehigh, University of Virginia);
very competitive (Boston University, University of
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California, Berkeley); competitive (Baylor, Ohio State);
less competitive (Saint Louis University, Buffalo
State); noncompetitive (Wilmington College, University of Arkansas at Little Rock); special (Albany College of Pharmacy, Allen College of Nursing); not listed
(New Mexico Military Institute, University of Guam).
Of note, Barron’s rates the USMA in the highest category, “Most Competitive.”18
The data reveal several trends. First, relative to the
early dates, there are now more ROTC programs at the
most competitive schools (blue section). The share of
schools in the very competitive and competitive categories has decreased slightly, reflecting the gain in the
highest (most competitive) tier. Grouping together the
schools in the bottom four categories (less competitive,
noncompetitive, special, and not listed), the fraction
of schools in these categories has remained relatively
constant at just over 70 percent, though it increased
to nearly 80 percent in 1984. This suggests that most
ROTC programs are at schools ranked relatively low
by Barron’s. Also of note, since 1995, the fraction of
schools not listed by Barron’s has increased, suggesting that ROTC programs are increasingly being
located at schools not even covered by the ranking
system.19
In Figure 8-2, we analyze the trends in ROTC
accessions quality by students as opposed to ROTC
program schools. The previous analysis weighted
ROTC programs equally while this analysis weights
each ROTC cadet equally.
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Note: The figure above displays the stacked distribution of ROTC
students by their Barron’s selectivity classification. ROTC data
was obtained from the annual “Army ROTC Enrollment Report.”
Selectivity data came from yearly Barron’s “Profiles of American
Colleges.”

Figure 8-2. Stacked Distribution of ROTC Students
by Barron’s Selectivity Classification.
This analysis reveals some more encouraging
trends. Overall, the fraction of students enrolled at
schools in the top three categories (most competitive,
very competitive, and competitive) increased by about
10 percentage points (from approximately 20 percent
to approximately 30 percent) since 1972. This suggests
that more ROTC cadets are enrolled at more-selective
universities. Correspondingly, the number of cadets
enrolled in the bottom four categories decreased from
80 percent to 70 percent. This is still a very large fraction though and suggests that the vast majority of
ROTC cadets are enrolled at schools rated less competitive or lower.
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Before concluding, we note that the preceding
analyses of ROTC programs (by school and by student) do not necessarily reflect the intellectual ability of ROTC cadets themselves. There is substantial
individual variation within any institution, and these
measures are institutional in nature. Nonetheless, the
analysis we provide offer some insight into the academic environments that ROTC cadets are exposed to,
and the environments that ROTC cadets selected into,
even if we do not know the academic performance of
the cadets themselves relative to other students. The
overall picture, while arguably slightly better than in
the 1970s, still suggests that these environments are
not as high as we might desire for the academic preparation of future Army leaders.20
THE EARLY COMMISSIONING PROGRAM (ECP)
The Army’s officer production problem became
more immediate and severe in 1976 when the Army’s
chief personnel officer, the DCSPER, determined that,
in order to meet mobilization requirements, ROTC
had to produce more than 10,000 officers a year by
1980. As it was, the Army was commissioning fewer
than 6,000 officers annually. To ramp up ROTC
output to the desired level, the Army took a number
of extraordinary measures. The most controversial
was the extension of the Early Commissioning Program (ECP). Previously, the ECP was available only
to graduates of military junior colleges (MJC). Beginning in 1978, however, it was extended throughout
the entire ROTC institutional base. Cadets could now
earn reserve commissions through the ROTC without completing a baccalaureate degree. By the early
1980s, the ECP accounted for roughly half of all ROTC
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commissions. Even more worrisome to Army personnel managers was the fact that there were no minimum academic standards in place to cull unqualified
ECP cadets from the ranks. Since graduation was no
longer linked to commissioning, students with a GPA
below 2.0 could now be commissioned, as hundreds
of them were. With the ECP offering an easy road to
a lieutenant’s bar, many officer aspirants reportedly
entered the ROTC program with no intention of finishing their degree.21
OFFICER ACCESSIONS IN THE REAGAN ERA
The advent of the Reagan administration signaled an upturn in the fortunes of the Armed Forces.
Recruiting, aided by a severe recession, improved as
Congress loosened its purse strings, raising military
pay, increasing retention incentives, and pouring more
funds into pre-commissioning programs. The ROTC
program saw its scholarship budget rise steeply. As
a result of these programs and others like them, the
quality of both enlisted and officer accessions rose.
Still, problems persisted on the officer side.22
Although the officer accessions picture brightened, the Army still maintained the much-maligned
ECP through the 1980s. It had to if it hoped to meet its
officer needs. The ECP, therefore, continued to play a
huge role in reserve officer production. The program
accounted for more than 60 percent of all ROTC graduates in some years. In 1984, the California National
Guard received 95 percent (74 out of 78) of its ROTC
lieutenants from the ECP. The Army Reserve had a
similar experience. RC commanders felt that a lieutenant without a degree was better than no lieutenant
at all.23
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Not all senior officers approved of the ECP. The
general perception was that RC was being shortchanged since they had to settle for a lower caliber
of officer. General William Richardson, the TRADOC
Commander from 1983 to 1986, clearly felt this way.
He told the Army’s chief personnel officer in June 1985
that the ECP was:
fundamentally wrong and contrary to our efforts to
upgrade quality. To allow thousands of officers, who
are commissioned without a college degree, to serve in
reserve units (TPU) [troop program units] lowers our
standards and, in effect, establishes a double standard for
the AC [active component] and the RC.24

The bleakest period for the ROTC program was in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Worries about the lack
of ROTC screening and culling mechanisms deepened
in this era as increasing numbers of ROTC graduates
began to fail their Army branch basic courses. In 1981,
General Starry, the TRADOC Commander, observed,
While we have always been concerned with ROTC
graduates who perform poorly at the [Officer Basic
Course] OBCs, it has been only in the past few years that
this problem has become critical. Whereas in the sixties
and early seventies the bottom 5 to 10 percent of ROTC
graduates were fully able to complete OBC and meet
minimum levels of proficiency, in recent years, this group
is often able to accomplish neither.25

While a disproportionate number of the lieutenants
who failed OBC came from historically black colleges and universities (HBCU), the problem was by
no means limited to those institutions. Many lieutenants from ROTC’s less selective, predominantly white
colleges also could not meet the intellectual demands
placed on them in their branch schools.26
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The commissioning source mix in the 1980s differed little from the previous decade. ROTC’s annual
contribution declined slightly (from 75 to 72 percent)
as did the USMA’s (from 17 to about 16 percent) while
OCS rose slightly (from 8 to 13 percent). The officer
accessions environment in the 1980s, however, was
much more propitious than it had been in the previous decade. A high unemployment rate, a resurgence
of patriotism, the heating up of the Cold War with the
Soviet Union, and the Reagan administration’s firm
support of the military services helped create this
environment. The Reagan administration doubled the
number of ROTC’s scholarships and greatly expanded
the ROTC’s institutional base. Simultaneously, West
Point became (according to the U.S. News & World
Report at least) one of America’s hottest undergraduate destinations and reportedly attracted thousands of
additional applicants.27
With high unemployment rates and more scholarships, the number of ROTC cadets enrolled in America’s more-selective schools increased. Less selective
schools also saw ROTC enrollment gains. Moreover,
because ROTC units now attracted more applicants,
instructors could be more discriminating in whom
they commissioned. The number of waivers granted
for medical, moral, and academic issues was cut back
and failures at OBC gradually ceased to be a major
problem.28
The Army took a number of steps to increase the
rigor of its officer applicant screening process. The
most momentous was the introduction of the ROTC
Quality Assurance System, which was designed to
raise minimum contracting and commissioning standards. The Quality Assurance System required a minimum GPA of 2.0 for commissioning, and it introduced,
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or at least attempted to, the Officer Selection Battery
(OSB) as a screening mechanism.29
RESERVE OFFICERS’ TRAINING CORPS (ROTC)
ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS
In 1986, the Army began to screen non-scholarship
ROTC cadets with the Pre-commissioning Assessment System (PAS). The PAS, another outgrowth of
the RETO study, was used on non-scholarship ROTC
cadets typically at the beginning of their junior or military science (MS) III year when they signed a contract with the Army agreeing to enter either the AC or
RC following their commissioning. Factors that were
taken into consideration by the PAS included: (1) the
Army Physical Fitness Test; (2) a structured interview
conducted by the professor of MS to assess motivation; (3) GPA; (4) participation in extracurricular activities; (5) ROTC writing assessments, presented in MS
courses; and (6) scores on the OSB Forms 3 and 4.30
These six factors were then evaluated in terms of the
“whole person package,” instead of “being quantified,
weighted, and combined to form a single qualifying
score.” There were certain minimum scores that candidates were supposed to meet, such as those established for GPA and the OSB. However, these scores
were not absolute cut-offs in the traditional sense. As
Diane Brown observed, if an applicant fell short in one
area, the Army would look for strengths in other areas
or for justifications for the observed shortcoming. In
fact, some of the screening measures, such as the OSB
for example, were used to identify individual shortcomings and shunt students into remedial programs
rather than eliminate weak performers, as they were
originally intended to do.31
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The Army Research Institute developed the OSB 3
and 4 referred to above. The battery was built from a
job analysis of Army lieutenants “conducted to identify performance dimensions.” Those dimensions were
initiative, decision-making, administration, communication, interpersonal manner, technical knowledge,
and combat performance. The battery was relatively
effective in predicting the performance of cadets in the
ROTC program and the success of ROTC graduates in
Officer Basic Courses.32 At the same time, the OSB was
a good illustration of how far the Army officer corps
had fallen since the interwar years when strict, criterion-referenced tests regulated entry into the profession.
The Army ROTC employed the whole person score
to select 4-year scholarship winners. The weighted factors that went into that score were: (1) the SAT or Act
score (25 percent); (2) high school class standing (25
percent); (3) participation in extracurricular activities
and “other factors that demonstrate leadership ability” (40 percent); and (4) the Physical Aptitude Examination (10 percent). Cut-off scores varied from year to
year, depending on the number of applicants and on
the Army’s requirements. However, there were minimum scores for the SAT and ACT that, if not attained,
would result in the rejection of a candidate. For the
SAT, for example, 4-year scholarship applicants had to
score at least 850 to be admitted into the program.33
The 3-year ROTC scholarship program (designed
for students in their last 3 years of college) combined
the whole person package (like the one used in the
PAS) with scores on the SAT or ACT to come to a decision on applicants. Again, applicants had to attain a
minimum score on the tests (850 for the SAT) to be
considered for a scholarship. The 2-year ROTC scholarship program (given to students in their last 2 years
of college) did not employ the SAT or ACT to select
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award winners. Their selection methodology required
that an applicant have at least a 2.0 GPA on a 4.0 scale.
If that minimum GPA was not met, the applicant was
not considered. If it was, the applicant was evaluated
using the whole person package.34
PERSISTENT PROBLEMS
Despite the measures taken to raise officer accession standards and the favorable budgetary conditions
that positively affected all the Army’s commissioning
sources, problems remained. A number of Army-sponsored studies written in the late 1970s and early
1980s—the RETO (1977), the Officer Personnel Management System Study (1984), Army Pamphlet 360-885
(1984), and the Professional Development of Officers Study
(PDOS) in (1985)—all sounded the alarm about officer
accessions standards, especially in regard to the ROTC
program. During the Reagan era, the most influential
of these was the PDOS, it noted that the “wide variance in standards . . . across and within [the Army’s]
commissioning programs” that earlier studies had
called attention to were still extant. The authors of the
PDOS, like the RETO study group before them, urged
the Army to “tighten commissioning standards” to
meet Army requirements and develop “common minimum standards” for commissioning that applied to
all officer producing sources.35
The PDOS compared the relative rigor of the officer
screening process in the three sources of commission
(SOC). The USMA and the OCS program had the most
stringent screening standards, the study observed.
On the other hand, the ROTC, except for its scholarship program, imposed “virtually no initial screening
requirements [on] its participants.”36
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The generally low officer accessions standards that
prevailed in the Army were reflected in the lack of
basic academic skills among lieutenants and captains.
The Army’s junior officers, according to the PDOS,
had a problem with reading, writing, and arithmetic.
The study urged the Army to conduct basic literacy
and numeracy testing in officer producing programs
and that reading, writing, and arithmetic be made a
part of pre-commissioning and commissioning standards. A special effort, the study continued, should be
made to assist MS I and MS II cadets with developing
these skills before it was time for them to contract into
the ROTC Advanced Course.37 In addition to screening out unqualified and unsuitable applicants, the
testing would help individuals by identifying areas in
which they needed remedial training and by guiding
their self-development efforts. It would also help the
branching process by identifying aptitudes for certain
branches and functional areas—such as computer science, languages, etc.38
The PDOS lamented the fact that between 20 and
30 percent of all company grade officers were unable
to read, write, and perform basic arithmetic calculations at the 12th grade level. The precise percentage
was not known because the Army had no uniform testing standard. Diagnostic testing at branch schools—in
the OBC and in the Officer Advanced Course (OAC)—
since June 1982 supported the conclusion that many
officers were deficient in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Of the 12 branch schools reporting, only 9 evaluated 1 or more of the basic educational skills at the
OBC level. In these 9 schools, 8 different sets of test
instruments were used. The established evaluation
standards differed in all but three schools. Evaluation
standards ranged from a low of the 11.0 grade to a
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high of the 14.0 grade level and, in one case, the standard was self-determined.39
THE CADET EVALUATION BATTERY (CEB)
The CEB was the screening test use by the ROTC in
the 1970s and early 1980s. It represented the culmination of a program, initiated in the late 1950s, designed
to improve “the selection and assignment of personnel in accord with their capabilities to meet differing
leadership requirements.” The Army Scientific Advisory Panel and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
guided and watched over its development. The CEB
was an abbreviated version of the Differential Officer
Battery (DOB), which was briefly described in Chapter
6. From 1972 until 1983, it was the principal screening
instrument for students coming into the Army ROTC
program.40
The CEB consisted of two principal sections: the
Cadet Evaluation Test (CET) and the Cadet Evaluation
Inventory. The former section provided “a measure
of the individual’s cognitive abilities in the areas of
combat leadership, technical-managerial leadership,
and career potential.”41 The latter section provided a
non-cognitive gauge of the candidate’s interests in the
same three areas in addition to a measure of his or her
career motivation. The subscales on this test battery
were evaluated (employing factor analysis) as a unit:
of the resulting factors, the following were included in the
CET because of their predictive validity, as demonstrated
by correlations with leadership performance measures at
an Officer Evaluation Center.
1. Practical skills. . . . practical knowledge of a ruralmechanical nature. Items from the following content
categories are prominent in this factor: nature sports,
farm facts, and mechanical information.
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2. Technology operations. . . . mechanical and physical
science knowledge. Dominant content categories are
mechanical information, physics, and chemistry.
3. Math and physical science. . . . knowledge in physics,
chemistry, and mathematics.
4. History, politics, and culture. . . . knowledge in
humanities and the social sciences. Major content
categories are art, literature, and politics.
5. Tactics. Unlike the others, this scale was composed of
residual content items and was not identified in the factor
analysis. It tests knowledge in military tactics.42

Further analysis of the DOB showed that:
combat cognitive and non-cognitive scales incorporated
into the CEB were predictive of combat leadership
performance, and that technical-managerial cognitive and
noncognitive CEB scales were predictive of leadership
performance in technical and managerial roles. The career
potential and career intent scales are used to predict
whether the cadet will pursue an Army officer career.43

As already alluded to, through a comparison
of CEB scores from 1971 and 1975, ARI researchers
noticed a deterioration of the cognitive abilities of
ROTC cadets.44 They attributed this deterioration principally to the:
change in composition of the ROTC MS II population
between 1971 and 1975. In 1971 the draft, by removing
the nonmilitary job options of many college students,
[shunted many students into the ROTC] . . . who might
not otherwise have considered it. The competition for the
limited number of ROTC spaces, may well have produced
a higher level of academic quality than in 1975, when the
draft was no longer a factor.45
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Michael Rumsey and Sue Mohr of the Army Research
Institute observed:
comparisons . . . on the noncognitive scales revealed a
trend markedly different from that found in comparisons
of the cognitive scales. On each non-cognitive scale except
career potential, scores indicated that the 1975 group
tended to have more of the interests found to correlate
with successful on-the-job performance [as a junior
officer] than the 1971 group. These findings are again
consistent with an explanation based on the changing
composition of the ROTC population between 1971 and
1975. A likely impact of the draft was to produce an
ROTC population with relatively heterogeneous interests
in 1971, which paralleled the interests of active military
officers to a somewhat limited degree. With the draft
eliminated by 1975, students with traditional military
interests were more prevalent in the ROTC population.
This explanation is consistent with the finding that the
1975 group demonstrated more motivation for a military
career than the 1971 group on the career intent scale.46

The lack of basic academic skills did not affect
completion rates at TRADOC schools. Although
more than 29 percent of the officers failed to meet the
desired literacy and numeracy standards, only about 2
percent failed to graduate from OBC. This percentage
was slightly less than the 3 percent failure rate at the
Infantry School, which did no diagnostic testing. The
low failure rate coupled with the low levels of reading, writing, and math skills among junior officers led
many to question the rigor of the TRADOC system
of officer education and training. The disappointing
results of the diagnostic testing of reading, writing,
and arithmetic, after all, did not appear to have any
correlation to the ability of the officer to complete the
OBC or OAC successfully.47
The extreme heterogeneity of mental standards
and testing for officers was alarming. For example,
only 8 of the 12 branch OACs (consisting primarily
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of captains) evaluated 1 or more of the basic education skills. In the eight schools that did assess at least
one basic education skill, six different test instruments
were used. Evaluation standards varied from the 11.0
grade level to the 15.5 grade level. The Ordnance and
Infantry Schools determined their own evaluation
standards while the Armor School chose the 50th percentile level as its evaluation standard.48
TRADOC deplored the lack of uniformity in diagnostic testing programs within the OBC and OAC
branch schools and in October 1984 established both a
common testing instrument—the OSB—and a uniform
standard. At the same time, it placed a requirement on
the branch schools to establish a remedial education
program for all who do not meet established literacy
and numeracy marks.49
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICER
SELECTION BATTERY (OSB)
The RETO study had found that commanders in
the field were concerned about the quality and trainability of lieutenants from ROTC. It denounced the
absence of a common gauge to measure the academic
performance and leadership ability of cadets entering the Army ROTC program. To remedy what it
perceived as a dire situation, the RETO study group
recommended the development of a standard written
test to measure the officer potential of ROTC applicants. The Army Research Institute, responding to
RETO concerns, developed and fielded the OSB. The
OSB was field tested in School Year 1981-82 and again
in School Year 1982-83. Data was gathered and evaluated by ARI and test scores reported to TRADOC
in the summer of 1983. The OSB was scheduled for
implementation in February 1984. However, before
that could happen, questions were raised about the
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OSB’s validity, the predictive value of mental testing,
and the OSB’s likely impact on minority recruiting. It
was consequently not used as a screening device in
ROTC, albeit it was employed for other purposes.50
Some found the Army’s handling and use of the OSB
anomalous. Developed to screen for entry into the
ROTC Advanced Course, the test was never used for
this end. This prompted some observers to ask, “If the
Army does nothing with test results, why test?”51
The Army experienced difficulty establishing valid
test standards with instruments that measured cognitive ability. As already noted, prior to February 1984,
ROTC used the CEB as a mental screening test for MS
III applicants who did not have SAT/ACT scores. It
was originally believed that a score of 80 on the CEB
equated to an 850 (out of a possible 1600) on the SAT;
however, it was eventually determined by researchers employed by the Army that a CEB score of 80 correlated to an SAT score of 650 (out of a possible 1600)
and, according to other sources, to an SAT score of
only 530. With this low bar, it is not surprising that
virtually all applicants taking the CEB were able to
score 80 or higher and qualified for entry into MS III/
contract status despite the fact that many did not have
an SAT/ACT score, or had a SAT score below 850. The
Army did better with the OSB. Testing determined
that an OSB score of 97 correlated to an 850 on the SAT
and the Army initially planned to use this score (i.e.,
97) as its pre-commissioning standard. The use of the
OSB as an intellectual screening test for all pre-commissioning programs, the PDOS study group plaintively commented, would have resulted in a uniform
mental qualification standard to regulate entry into
ROTC, OCS, and the USMA.52
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FLYNN EFFECT
The Flynn Effect, named after the American expatriate political
science professor at the University of Otago in New Zealand, is the
demonstrable trend of intelligence quotient (IQ) test score gains in
countries all over the world for the past few decades.53 Most surprisingly, these IQ test score gains are greatest on those IQ tests which
are the most heavily g-loaded and have coincided with measureable
declines in standardized test scores (such as the SAT). Such findings
call into serious question the validity of IQ tests as actual assessments of intelligence. Critics of IQ testing latched onto this as proof
of the invalidity of the concept of intelligence and of the invalidity
of intelligence testing. They reference improvements in education,
better test taking skills, the growing complexity of environments
over time, and improved nutrition as possible causal agents.54 None
of these explanations can be dismissed out of hand as there are lines
of data and evidence in support of the positions.
Nevertheless, other researchers do in fact question the validity
of the Flynn Effect (and not IQ testing). Jan te Nijenhuis and Henk
van der Flier, in a meta-analysis, provide evidence that the factors
which influence black/white group differences are quite different
from those which influence the Flynn Effect, thus casting doubt that
the Flynn Effect actually references a true increase in psychometric
g worldwide over the past few decades.55 Joseph Rodgers as well as
Thomas Teasdale and David Owen offer helpful critiques (helpful
in the sense of recommending research strategies and designs that
can help clarify the nature of the Flynn Effect as well as its causes.56
Rodgers reanalyzed some of Flynn’s original dataset and concludes
that the data “are as consistent with a changing IQ variance as with
a changing mean.”57 Teasdale and Owen, meanwhile, present evidence that IQ and standardized test scores are beginning to decline,
thus perhaps signaling an end to the Flynn Effect.58
While a fascinating topic for psychometrists and researchers
studying human intelligence, the Flynn Effect does present a concern for the U.S. Army. To the degree that tests might not actually
measure what we believe they measure (i.e., be invalid), they lose
their ability to tell us why someone might or might not serve well in
a particular MOS or branch. It is possible that an invalid test might
correlate strongly with a desired outcome, and hence be predictively
useful, but that is a different matter from being able to explain why
there is such a relationship in the first place. Additionally, without
this kind of understanding, it becomes almost impossible to make
informed adjustments to the test in the future or to offer coherent
explanations for why certain people were or were not selected for
various positions. The Flynn Effect, although if great theoretical interest, necessitates a practical resolution.
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Worries about the lack of mental screening mechanisms arose, in part, from what Army leaders perceived as a performance gap between the capabilities
of the Army’s systems and the capabilities of its Soldiers. Technological advances, in other words, had
outrun the Army’s human talent. This gap had to be
closed if the United States was to sustain a high level
of military readiness. The Army’s decision not to use
the OSB, or some similar test, as an entry-screening
device left ROTC without a standard mental qualification test. Because the SAT/ACT was not part of the
admissions process at many colleges and universities, the use of these tests could not be applied equitably and uniformly throughout the entire ROTC
institutional base.59 The Army began the development
of another cognitive test—the Achievement Test Program—that was designed to measure reading ability, English expression and mathematical skills and
be used as a screening device for admission into the
ROTC Advanced Course. This initiative, however,
was never implemented. It floundered for the same
reasons that had led to the rejection of the OSB as a
vetting tool.60
While the OSB was never used as a screening
device, it was employed to identify cadets in need of
additional training in basic academic skills. Although
failure rates at branch Officer Basic Courses declined
after 1980, the loss of even a few officers at that point
represented a waste of time, money, and energy.
Moreover, the Army remained troubled about the disproportionately large number of OBC failures among
students commissioned through certain ROTC programs. Since many of the students came from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, it seemed likely
that that their latent academic abilities had not been
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fully developed. Accordingly, TRADOC’s ROTC chief
asked the Army Research Institute to come up with a
program to train certain academic skills in the ROTC
program. The program selected was named Instrumental Enrichment—later to become the Enhanced
Skills Training Program. A pilot test of this program
was conducted in 12 ROTC units during the 1982-83
academic year.61 The Enhanced Skills Training Program was later expanded throughout the ROTC program. The ROTC assigned cadets to this program who
had been identified as having problems with basic
literacy or numeracy skills as demonstrated by a substandard performance on the OSB.
OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL (OCS)
Since the Korean War, the evolution of testing in
OCS had followed a path similar to that followed in
the ROTC and at the USMA in that non-cognitive
instruments assumed an increasing salience over
time. One such non-cognitive instrument was the Officer Leadership Qualification Inventory (OLI), which
was adopted by the Army in 1956. This instrument, a
self-description questionnaire, borrowed items from
several other questionnaires and surveys that were
adjudged to have proven their predictive reliability in
the past. The OLI proved reliable in forecasting attrition rates in OCS and leadership performance as an
officer. Additional study eventually resulted in the
development of a new pre-commissioning vetting
instrument, the CEB, which was first used in 1975.
(It had the same name but was different from the
screening test used in the ROTC.) The Army learned
that OCS applicants with “longer enlistment service
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performed better than expected on many measures
such as Combat Leadership and Career Intent.”62
When the RETO group published its report in
1978, OCS admissions standards were as follows: (1)
candidates had to have completed 2 years of college or
have received a 2 year college equivalency evaluation
by the Department of the Army; (2) they had to score
at least 110 on the GT test; women had to score at least
115; (3) they had to score at least 115 on the Officer
Candidate Test (OCT); and (4) they had to attain “a
minimum composite score of 200 on the OCT and the
Officer Qualification Inventory (OQI).”63
In 1979, the CEB’s validity was confirmed. At the
same time, the test was officially authorized for use in
OCS and renamed the OSB. (Although both had the
same name and both were developed by ARI, the OSB
for OCS [OSB 1 and 2] was not the same one adopted
by the ROTC [OSB 3 and 4] several years later.) The
OCS program transitioned to the OSB in the early
1980s.64
The elements used in the OCS selection process
included the Army Physical Fitness Test (on which
applicants had to attain a passing score), college GPA
(if applicable), letters of recommendation from former
teachers, professors, or supervisors, college major (if
applicable), and an interview by a board (usually at
the battalion level). The aptitude measures used in the
OCS selection process were the OSB 1 and 2 and the
GT composite from the ASVAB, on which applicants
had to attain a score of 110 or above. As in the PAS in
ROTC, these various elements were not weighted but
all were “reviewed in a whole person evaluation.”65
The version of the OSB used in OCS was made of
seven subtests, three of which were cognitive and four
of which were non-cognitive. The following formed
the cognitive portion of the battery:
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•
•
•

Combat Leadership (military tactics, practical
skills in areas such as outdoor activities and
mechanical applications);
Technical-Managerial Leadership (history, politics, culture, math, physical science); and,
Career Potential (technical knowledge related
to military requirements).

The following formed the non-cognitive portion:
• Combat Leadership (combat leader qualities,
job interests, sports interest, outdoor interests);
• Technical-Managerial Leadership (interest in
math and science, urban versus rural background, decisive leader qualities);
• Career Potential (Clerical-admin interest versus
white collar interest, combat interest); and,
• Career Intent (intention of making the Army a
career).
Only the Technical-Managerial Leadership from the
cognitive subtest was employed as an entry screen.66
The first step in the selection process was to ascertain which candidates attained passing scores on the
GT test (110) and the Technical-Managerial Leadership (Cognitive) subtest of the OSB. Candidates failing that hurdle were eliminated. The applications of
candidates who passed the tests were sent to a selection board, which would rate each applicant. These
ratings would be expressed in the form of a numerical value and the highest rated individuals would be
selected. The number of individuals selected would
vary according to the Army’s needs at the time.67
This OCS selection process was abbreviated in the
late 1980s when the OCS-version of the OSB was eliminated. After its elimination, no other selection tool
was developed to replace it. From then on, the OCS
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operated without a dedicated screening instrument.68
As we shall see, the OSB for the ROTC would follow
suit in the mid-1990s.
After the early 1980s, researchers dedicated little
effort to the selection of candidates into OCS. This
contrasted sharply with the substantial work done on
OCS in the 4 decades or so before that year. According to Michael Rumsey, the Army placed “the greatest
emphasis on OCS selection research . . . between 1941
. . . and 1957.” Rumsey notes how, over the course of
this period, the emphasis went from measuring the
“cognitively oriented aspects of officer candidates,
such as general cognitive aptitude, data interpretation,
arithmetic reasoning, and reading comprehension” to
assessments that employed “alternative approaches
(e.g., biographic self-reports and structured interviews) to predict leadership performance” as a junior
officer as well as career motivation.69
Thus, the development of testing in the OCS program generally mirrored that done in the ROTC.
The rigor of cognitive testing was diluted while
more emphasis was placed on non-cognitive testing in an attempt to promote better performance as
junior officers and better retention in the Army after
commissioning.
WEST POINT
Between the advent of the AVF in 1973 and the end
of the Cold War in the early 1990s, West Point continued its qualitative decline relative to America’s most
competitive schools. By the mid-1980s, West Point
stood between Harvard and Penn State on the qualitative index of competitive colleges (see Figure 8-3). This
was admittedly still a respectable position but it represented a decided step down from the halcyon days of
the Academy prior to World War II.
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In Figure 8-3, we provide more recent average SAT
scores for students at West Point and a list of comparison schools (Harvard, Ohio State, and Lehigh).
These civilian schools represent public and private
peer or near-peer institutions for West Point. As the
data shows, since the 1980s, the average scores at West
Point have increased at approximately the same rate
as those at Harvard and Lehigh (with a small dip in
Lehigh’s scores during the early 1990s). However,
West Point’s relative scores have not increased at the
same rate as Ohio State’s. In fact, the average scores of
the USMA and Ohio State have nearly converged as of
the mid-2010s.

Note: The figure above displays the average SAT by school by
year. USMA data from 1995-2014 was obtained from internal
USMA database and displays median SAT scores (or estimated
SAT scores using ACT scores). Harvard data for 2001-14 is
estimated as the midpoint of the 25th and 75th percentiles using
Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS). Harvard
data from 1987-90 and 1992-2000 and USMA data for 1982 and
1984-85 are linear estimates from surrounding years. All other
data is provided by respective college archivists. Data for Lehigh
prior to 1984 was unavailable.

Figure 8-3. Average Total SAT Scores by School.
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West Point made several changes to its admissions
testing program just as the Army converted to an AVF
in the early 1970s—changes that generally reflected a
deteriorating admissions standard. In 1972, the USMA
began accepting ACT program test scores in lieu of
College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) examination.70 In 1973, an even more momentous adjustment was made to the admissions process—namely,
the elimination of the use of achievement tests. On
January 18, 1973, the Academy’s Academic Board
approved the Admissions Committee’s proposal that
West Point candidates no longer be required to take
the College Board Achievement Tests (a requirement
that had been in place since 1954). From then on, candidates for admission would only be required to take
the College Board SAT or the ACT to determine their
academic qualification.71
The Academy’s official explanation for its decision
to eliminate the achievement tests as an admissions
requirement was that these tests had only limited usefulness in predicting success as a cadet, that they were
too expensive, and that they added too much complexity to and unnecessarily slowed down the admissions
process.72 These considerations certainly played a part
in the decision but minority recruitment was undoubtedly also a factor. West Point in the era of the AVF was
very concerned with boosting minority (and especially
African American) admissions. African Americans as
a group did not attain high scores on these tests. Thus,
eliminating the achievement tests as an admissions
screen would facilitate the acceptance of minority candidates into the Academy.73
The selection process at West Point was regulated
by the whole candidate score (WCS). This score was
calculated from the following factors: (1) academic
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aptitude—60 percent; (2) leadership potential74—30
percent; and (3) physical aptitude75—10 percent. The
evolution of the WCS was obscure since, as Brown
observed, documentation about its development, to
include the importance attached to each component,
was lacking. The WCS underwent a major revision
in 1973, coincident with the adoption of the AVF,
although the idea of the whole man score, as we have
seen, dated back to 1958.76
The academic aptitude portion of the WCS is the
portion of the process most pertinent to this study. The
score on this component was calculated by combining
a candidate’s SAT score with his high school rank or
by combining a candidate’s ACT score with his high
school rank. In the former case, it was called a CEER
score while in the latter, it was called an ACEER score.
If a candidate took both exams, the test that gave the
highest score was the one used.77 West Point had no
firm cut-off score for the SAT or the ACT; the Academy may have specified a minimum score, but it did
not strictly enforce it. Standards for these standardized tests varied according to the number and quality
of applicants.78
The files of the candidates who had been determined to be qualified (provided that they received a
nomination, of course) were sent to the admissions
committee for a final decision. The committee at this
time was comprised of a number of junior and senior
officers who were on the staff or faculty of the USMA.
The admissions decision itself, although constrained
by the number of openings in the entering class, was
largely subjective. Committee members evaluated the
files of candidates and selected the ones that they felt
were most qualified.79
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THE PURSUIT OF QUALITY
During the 1970s and 1980s, as West Point struggled to attract the nation’s most academically talented
high school students, it steadily increased the money
it spent on advertising while its recruiting and marketing efforts became “increasingly extensive and
complex.”80 It could no longer rely on its sterling reputation and fame to attract candidates into its ranks as
it once did. Now, it had to compete with institutions
that had more to offer, in a material and prestige sense
at least. The Academy continued to lag behind the
nation’s most selective civilian institutions and consequently felt a need to be more aggressive in attempting
to get its share of intellectual talent. More commercial
agencies and firms were contracted to produce publications advertising West Point, run marketing efforts,
and conduct research into the best ways to entice the
nation’s best and brightest into the Academy.81
West Point was particularly aggressive in pursuing
minority candidates. Two of the most ambitious and
widely known of the Academy’s minority recruiting
initiatives were the Cadet Summer Enrichment Program and Project Outreach. Under the latter program,
minority officers traveled to all parts of the country
to promote greater appreciation of the “opportunities provided for minority members at USMA.”82 The
Summer Enrichment Program, a joint venture of West
Point and the National Urban League, also put cadets
in touch with African-American youth in America’s
inner cities in an attempt to inform them about and
induce them to apply to the USMA.83
During the 2 decades separating the end of the
Vietnam War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the
Army continued to emphasize retention at West Point
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and, once commissioned, retention in the Army in
its candidate admissions process. It was pushed into
doing so by a cost-conscious Congress and Board of
Visitors, which generally reflected Congressional concerns and opinion. Indeed, many members of congress were on that board. Accordingly, major thrusts
of the Academy’s research efforts centered on identifying the causes of cadet attrition (which stood at 33
percent in the mid-1980s), measuring the career motivation of cadets and applicants, and developing more
accurate instruments to predict leadership ability and,
in this way, improve the performance of graduates
after entering the Army. It adopted the Strong Vocational Interest Blank as a tool to identify applicants
who were very likely or very unlikely to graduate.
The Strong Vocational Interest Blank had proved its
utility at the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy,
and the Coast Guard Academy, and West Point was
certain it could help it achieve its admissions goals.
The Academy also developed a retention index as an
admissions criterion using the Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory. The purpose of this effort was to identify cadets with high career motivation, that is to say,
students likely to stay in the Army for a career.84
To organize its admissions efforts with a view
toward maximizing retention at the Academy and in
the Army, the Academy developed a tri-partite admissions scheme. That scheme, which operated within the
parameters of the WCS, consisted of three categories—
scholars, leaders, and athletes. Scholars were selected
principally on the basis of their SAT scores and their
high school GPAs; leaders, for their activities in high
school and in the community; and athletes for their
prowess in sports. Leaders and athletes had a higher
likelihood of staying the course at the Academy and
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remaining in the Army for a career than scholars, who
had more opportunities at other civilian institutions
while cadets and more opportunities in the job market
once in the Army.85
West Point’s efforts to boost cadet retention at the
Academy and graduate retention in the Army apparently resulted in a drop-off in intellectual standards.
Lieutenant General Willard Scott noted in his 1981
annual report that he wanted to ensure that “candidates selected for admission gave evidence of superior academic potentialities.” He did this to ensure
that West Point produced officers with cognitive
abilities that would permit them to succeed in graduate school. At the time, the Army was emphasizing
graduate education for officers. The military profession and the world were becoming increasingly complex and officers allegedly needed a greater degree of
intellectual preparation to operate successfully in this
environment.86
However, there was some doubt that the Academy
was fostering high levels of intellect and developing
“superior academic potentialities” in cadets. Officials
noted that the attention given to academics by many
cadets was “insufficient to achieve the desired degree
of excellence.” Cadets reportedly relied on the “supportive academic environment,” with its unlimited
additional instruction and its lenient grading standards to get them through the Academy and did not
“devote the individual attention that academics warrant.”87 Academy officials also believed that West
Point had set its standards for performance on standardized tests too low. They stressed the importance of
meeting admissions goals in the scholar category and
of reducing the large number of high-risk candidates
being admitted—both of which could be addressed by
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raising minimum scores on the SAT and ACT.88 They
explored a proposal to adopt some form of averaging when candidates submitted multiple SAT scores
instead of using the applicant’s highest score on the
SAT or ACT in their evaluation of cadet candidacies.
They also considered establishing firm cutoff scores on
both of those standardized tests.89 West Point actually
did raise the cutoff or minimum qualifying score on
the verbal portion of the ACT. It raised that score from
19 to 20 in 1984. An ACT score of 20 corresponded to
a SAT score of 480. It did not alter the minimum math
score, however. That mark remained at 23 for the ACT
and 510 for the SAT.90
USMA officials believed that their quest to create a
more intellectually capable Corps of Cadets was limited by two principal factors. First, there were troubling demographic trends that were reducing the
number candidates available. Since the late 1970s,
the college-age cohort had been shrinking and would
continue to do so, demographers projected, until the
late 1990s.91 Second, West Point was facing competition from other colleges, which was reducing the pool
of candidates available. The USMA’s strongest competition came from the other service academies. The
Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine
Academies attracted the same basic type of candidate as West Point but were generally more attractive to high school applicants than the USMA.92 West
Point, Academy officials concluded, had to secure
more resources to support “an energetic admission’s
effort,” an effort that was seen as being increasingly
crucial in a very competitive admissions environment
and in the face of a demographically declining pool of
applicants.93
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Although West Point showed some concern with
intelligence standards in era of the AVF, that concern
was overshadowed by other concerns that proved
to be far more powerful and salient. Retention at the
Academy, retention in the Army, minority recruitment, the recruitment of women, and graduate performance in the Army (as reflected in such metrics as
promotion rates) were all issues that had much more
immediacy than standardized test scores. Attrition at
West Point, attrition in the Army, and poor performance as a cadet or an officer all resulted in a waste
of tax dollars. Failure to make minority and women
representation goals also had negative consequences.
The Congress and the nation expected the USMA to
be representative of the people it served. The problem
was that pursuing all of these aims simultaneously
placed mental admissions standards and the pursuit
of academic excellence on the back burner since there
was an inverse relationship between very high standardized test scores, on the one hand, and retention
in the Army and minority and female recruiting, on
the other. The leadership potential of cadets seemed to
be of more import in determining success as a junior
officer than intellectual ability. That is why, perhaps,
the Academy spent greater effort attempting to create
“improved measures of leadership potential” than it
did trying to raise the SAT average of the Corps of
Cadets. The Academy was intent on selecting “the
most appropriate candidates for the officer corps,” not
necessarily the most intelligent applicants.94
There is some evidence to suggest that the USMA
enjoyed at least a measure of success in attracting students with abundant leadership ability as well as academic prowess into its Corps of Cadets. One indication
of this was the relative success enjoyed by West Point
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in the competition for Rhodes Scholarships. In Figure
8-4, we depict data on the number of Rhodes Scholarship winners at West Point relative to the same group
of peer or near-peer institutions. The data show that
since 1980, West Point has outpaced Ohio State and
Lehigh in this competition, but has fallen behind Harvard. This suggests that the most gifted scholar-leaders (approximated by these scholarships) at West
Point are doing well relative to some very competitive
institutions but falling behind the nation’s most elite
universities like Harvard.

Note: The figure above displays the cumulative number of Rhodes
Scholarships from 1980-2015 awarded to students at Harvard,
Ohio State, and USMA. Lehigh is excluded from this graph
because no Lehigh student has won the scholarship since 1980.

Figure 8-4. Cumulative Count of Rhodes
Scholarship Winners by School Since 1980.95
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CONCLUSION
All three of the Army’s main commissioning sources experienced a similar evolution in the
post-Vietnam era, at least as far as testing was concerned. West Point, ROTC, and OCS all witnessed a
dilution of mental standards and an increased emphasis on non-cognitive measures of career motivation
and success. ROTC adopted a less rigorous test of
mental ability in 1972, and then essentially abandoned
cognitive testing for screening purposes in the 1980s.
The OCS program adopted a less rigorous test in 1979,
and then abandoned that test in the late 1980s, leaving
a GT score of 110 (which was waiverable by the way)
as its only mental screen. West Point eliminated the
College Board math and English achievement tests as
an admissions requirement in 1973. At the same time,
all three sources increased the emphasis they placed
on retention in the Army and performance as a junior
officer in their selection methods. They introduced
non-cognitive interest inventories and biographical
surveys to accomplish this end.
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CHAPTER 9:
OFFICER TESTING IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA
OFFICER ACCESSIONS IN THE 1990s
The Army initially heralded the post-Cold War
demobilization as a boon to officer accessions. Army
leaders assumed that a smaller force would lead to a
higher quality of lieutenant. This rise in selectivity,
however, did not occur, save for a short-lived uptick
immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
By the mid-1990s, in fact, the Army was struggling to
produce enough officers to meet its needs through its
collegiate-based commissioning programs. Not once
did the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC),
the Army’s largest source of officers, make its officer
accessions mission between 1993 and 2003.1 In such an
environment, the Army could not afford to be too concerned with quality—and it was not.
Three principal factors combined to produce this
situation. First, the economy improved and the unemployment rate decreased. That rate fell by 4 percent—
from 7.8 to 3.8 percent—between June 1992 and April
2000. Anytime the unemployment rate dips below
6 percent, the services have recruiting problems.2
Second, in an effort to realize a peace dividend, the
Congress cut defense spending along with the ROTC
scholarship budget. This negatively affected the ability of Cadet Command and, to a lesser extent, the
other commissioning sources, to attract high-quality
talent into their ranks. Third, the Army reduced officer accessions too much—to a point, in fact, where the
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Army’s officer needs were not being met. This was due
to both economic considerations and equity issues.3
As the drawdown began, Army leaders remembered what happened after the Vietnam War when
many combat experienced officers were summarily released from the Army by a reduction in force
(RIF)—to accommodate Department of Defense
demobilization goals. To some, the Army’s heartless
actions represented a betrayal of trust. In the early
1990s, Congress feared a reprise of the demobilization
imbroglio after Vietnam. It became concerned that
the men and women who had just defeated Saddam
Hussein and his army would be cast aside and left to
fend for themselves in a labor market in which many
of them were unprepared to compete. Wanting to prevent another betrayal of trust for the nation’s service
members, Congress inserted into the fiscal year (FY)
1991 National Defense Authorization Act a provision
directing the Army to reduce officer strength by lowering new accessions, not by cutting experienced officers.4 This not only hurt officer production in the short
run but also clouded the long-term officer recruiting
outlook by sending the message that the Army wasn’t
hiring anymore.5
Changes in Cadet Command’s scholarship management system exacerbated the ROTC’s production
problems, especially in a qualitative sense. Before
1998, 4-year scholarship applicants were selected by
a centralized board, which met at Cadet Command
Headquarters in Fort Monroe, Virginia. Under this
system, winners could use their scholarships to attend
the school of their choice. In 1998, Cadet Command
converted to the Campus Based Scholarship Program.
This new scheme required candidates to apply directly
to individual ROTC units. This change was intended
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to cut expenses by holding the number of scholarship
positions at each school constant and thus better controlling costs. It also gave Professors of Military Science (MS) more control over scholarship management
at their institution.6
An unintended consequence of the new Campus
Based Scholarship Program was a severe constriction
of the candidate’s options. A student winning a scholarship at Ohio State but who was accepted at Vanderbilt without an ROTC scholarship faced a dilemma.
Compelling a student to choose between an unfunded
education at their school of choice, versus an ROTC
scholarship at the second or third choice substantially
reduced the allure of ROTC scholarships. Students
who compared Army scholarships with the scholarships of the other services, which continued to use a
centralized selection system, found the former wanting. The Army ROTC consequently lost out on attracting many top students into the program.7
With its officer accessions capabilities thus constrained in its two collegiate-based commissioning
sources, the Army turned to Officer Candidate School
(OCS) to make up the officer deficits. The shift toward
OCS began in 1998 as a response to the difficult officer accessions environment that prevailed at the
end of the century. The Army’s reliance on the OCS
grew thereafter. The OCS share in officer accessions
increased from 9 percent in 1997 to nearly 40 percent
by 2008. Several factors accelerated this development.8
The two most important, perhaps, were (1) the troop
strength increases resulting from the global war on
terrorism and (2) the Army’s adoption of modularity,
an organizational scheme designed to reduce stress on
the operational force.9
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At the beginning of the OCS expansion in 1998, the
Army relied primarily on the OCS in-service program,
which obtains its candidates from the enlisted ranks.
When OCS in-service reached its maximum commissioning capacity mid-way through the 1st decade of
the 21st century, the Army increased its use of the
OCS Enlisted Option program, which brings college
educated civilians into the officer corps. After 2006,
OCS Enlisted Option accounted for about 60 percent
of all officers produced through OCS.10
OFFICER ACCESSIONS IN A NEW CENTURY
The officer accessions situation improved significantly after the turn of the century. The ROTC finally
made its mission in 2003, the first time it had done
so in over a decade. A number of measures worked
together to improve the officer accessions picture. For
one thing, a series of military pay raises brightened
ROTC’s recruiting prospects. In the late 1990s, defense
analysts and congressional leaders had warned about
the deleterious effects that the civilian-military pay
gap was having on recruiting, retention, and the quality of the force. Congress enacted legislation to reduce
or eliminate this gap. Even more importantly, the
nation’s unemployment rate shot up sharply in 2001.
That rate peaked in 2003. Moreover, as already noted,
a high unemployment rate provides a great boost to
recruiting. Additionally, after the events of September
11, 2001, the national mood was more supportive of
the military’s accessions efforts. The bombing of the
Twin Towers set off a wave of patriotic enthusiasm
that increased the propensity to serve.11
Internally, the Army took a number of measures to raise officer production. For example, Cadet
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Command adopted recruiting as its top priority.
Recruiting soon overshadowed all other aspects of the
ROTC program. ROTC cadre were made to understand that making mission, not training for Advanced
Camp, was their principal focus. The Department of
the Army helped the ROTC recruiting campaign by
increasing the number and value of incentives available to Cadet Command. The value of the ROTC
monthly stipend, for example, more than doubled
between 1997 and 2002.12 In addition, the command
benefited from a generous injection of scholarship dollars. Between 1998 and 2002, the ROTC scholarship
budget increased by 45 percent (from $64.7 million to
$94.3 million).13
The Army’s lowering of accessions standards and
the erosion of quality markers also helped raise officer
production. During this period, the number of waivers
issued by the commissioning sources shot up sharply
while scores on standardized tests like the SAT (formerly known as the Scholastic Aptitude Test) and the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)
declined. At the U.S. Military Academy (USMA),
the slide away from elite status continued. With the
re-norming of the SAT in 1995, SAT scores at institutions such as Ohio State shot up sharply. The average score at the USMA, on the other hand, remained
almost flat. This was tantamount to a decline in test
scores. The de facto decline in scores allowed schools
like Ohio State, which in the 1980s was substantially
below the USMA in terms of the selectivity of undergraduate admissions, to rise up to West Point’s level
of undergraduate selectivity.
In Figure 9-1, we elaborate on West Point’s continuing fall from elite status by providing data on the
intellectual ability of the lower quartile of students at
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West Point and select institutions since 2001 (based on
data availability from the Integrated Postsecondary
Education System [IPEDS]). We explore these trends
to identify if the trends in the average measures discussed above (see Figure 8-3 in Chapter 8) are hiding
changes in the variance of the data. The data show
that since 2001, the 25th percentile score at West Point
declined slightly and then increased to initial levels
in absolute terms. In addition, it has fallen relative to
Lehigh and Ohio State, both of which increased their
25th percentile scores over time. The changes are small
but suggest that even if West Point cadets are keeping pace on average, they are also falling behind in the
lower quartile of the distribution.

Note: The figure above displays the 25th percentile of total SAT
scores by school and by year. All data was obtained through
IPEDS.

Figure 9-1. 25th Percentile of Total SAT Score
by School.
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In Figure 9-2, we provide another set of data on
the intellectual ability of students at West Point and
other institutions, this time using the upper quartile of
students. The data show that since 2001, the 75th percentile score at West Point has been relatively stable in
absolute terms. However, it has fallen relative to Ohio
State. When we combine these SAT score analyzes
(mean, 25th, and 75th percentiles), the data suggests
that since 2001, the distribution of West Point’s SAT
scores has been relatively stable relative to Harvard
and Lehigh. It has declined slightly relative to Ohio
State.

Note: The figure above displays the 75th percentile of total SAT
scores by school and by year. All data was obtained through
IPEDS.

Figure 9-2. 75th Percentile of Total SAT Score
by School.
West Point’s move toward lower admissions
selectivity occurred while a new leader development
model for cadets was being introduced. The new
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program was labeled the “developmental” model and
was often contrasted with the previous system, which
was dubbed the “attrition” model.14 The word attrition has a very bad connotation in the U.S. Army. It
is often used to describe the U.S. strategy in Vietnam,
which allegedly relied on massive firepower while
discounting more subtle methods of counter-insurgency. Attrition was considered an unimaginative and
intellectually bankrupt strategy.15 The developmental
model, which replaced the attrition model, focused
on keeping cadets at West Point rather than separating the weak or unsuited. It sounded enlightened and
progressive. With the developmental model, not only
did West Point eliminate some of the harassment of
plebe year, it made an effort to keep students at the
Academy who were struggling in the academic and
physical arenas. This entailed more instruction and
mentoring as well as a greater emphasis on retention.
This inevitably led, according to some observers, to a
lowering of standards.
It is noteworthy that the attrition rate at West Point
has fallen drastically since 1900. That rate in 1900 was
50 percent, with the great majority of eliminations
due to academic failure. The washout rate stood at
between 30 and 35 percent in the 1960s and 1970s, with
the reasons for elimination more or less evenly split
between academic failure, on the one hand, and medical, physical, and motivational reasons, on the other.
In the 21st century, with the “developmental model”
in the ascendance, the attrition rate averages about 20
percent, with the majority of separations being due to
non-academic factors. This short historical sketch of
attrition rates at West Point suggests that the Academy is not nearly as academically rigorous as it once
was.
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Major General John T. D. “Rusty” Casey, the
commander of Cadet Command from 2000 to 2003,
imported a version of West Point’s “developmental”
model into the ROTC. This meant that Cadet Command would no longer focus on weeding out weak
performers; instead, it would concentrate on recruiting the right cadets into the program and developing
them to their full potential. Those right cadets that
Casey alluded to were the so-called scholars, athletes,
leaders—that is, students who possessed the intelligence, physical stamina, and leadership ability to meet
the demands of what the Army referred to as the Contemporary Operation Environment. As at West Point,
it all sounded rational and progressive. As it turned
out, however, the scholar, athlete, leader concept
proved to be more important as an ideal than as a reality. While the quantity of officer production increased
under Cadet Command’s version of the development
model, the quality of production trended in the opposite direction. The number of waivers for medical and
physical reasons shot up sharply while test scores,
especially the test scores of cadets on the lower edge of
the quality distribution, sank.16
In addition to granting more waivers for medical, physical, and legal reasons, Cadet Command
under Casey lowered testing standards to raise officer output. This can be illustrated by considering the
results attained from the ASVAB in the early 2000s. Of
all the ROTC cadets who took that test during those
years, and there were roughly about 1,500 contracted
cadets who fell into this category at any one time,
between 20 and 30 percent scored lower than 110 (the
minimum qualification score for OCS). The percentage
peaked in 2005 when slightly over 30 percent of the
ROTC cadets who took the ASVAB fell below the OCS
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minimum score. To be fair to the ROTC, it must be
mentioned that West Point, too, allowed prior-service
cadets and others who took the ASVAB to enter their
hallowed ranks with scores that fell below 110. The
worst year for the Academy in this regard was 2006,
when about 25 percent of its ASVAB test takers fell
below the minimum OCS mark. Indeed, Cadet Command and West Point both at this time accepted officer aspirants who scored in the Category IV range on
the ASVAB—which in enlisted recruiting is the lowest
allowable qualifying score.17
In OCS, likewise, many waivers were granted for
low ASVAB scores. Approximately 2 to 3 percent of
its OCS candidates during the most intense period of
the Iraq insurgency were classified as Category IVs
(the lowest category of recruit eligible for enlistment).
In terms of the overall percentage of candidates needing test waivers to enter OCS, the peak year was 2001
when about 8 percent received them. By 2006, that percentage in OCS fell down to the 3 to 4 percent range,
although, in absolute terms, the number of waivers
was higher than it had been earlier in the decade. The
Department of the Army became so concerned with
the dropping quality of officer aspirants that it even
considered converting the USMA from a 4-year to a
3-year institution. The last time that occurred had been
during World War II. Nothing came from this proposal to abbreviate the curriculum at the Academy,
but it did illustrate how serious senior Army leaders
perceived the officer accessions problem to be.18
In Figure 9-3, we depict the average general technical (GT) scores from the ASVAB by the source of
commission (SOC). The GT score reflects a combination of an individual’s score on three subcomponents of the ASVAB: word knowledge, paragraph
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comprehension, and arithmetic reasoning. GT scores
are commonly used as a measure of intellectual aptitude. The data reveal that average scores for OCS and
West Point cadets have increased slightly over time,
and at approximately the same rates. Average scores
for the ROTC program have remained relatively constant over time and are lower than those of OCS and
the USMA. By way of comparison, a score of 120 on
the GT roughly corresponds to a score of 1030 on the
SAT. It is important to note that by definition these
average scores reflect only the ability of the test-takers.
Since the fraction of individuals in each SOC who take
the test varies, the test-taking rates are an important
complementary source of data. We provide more data
on the test-taking rates by SOC below.

Note: The figure above displays the mean GT score by the SOC
and by year. All data used in this graph comes from the Officer
Master File and includes Active Duty commissions only.

Figure 9-3. Average GT Score by SOC.
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In Figure 9-4, we depict the percentage of each SOC
with a GT score by year. As expected, OCS has the
largest fraction of its officers with GT scores, though
that fraction declined by about 30 percentage points
between 1995 and 2015. Given that the typical reason
for having a GT score is prior service as an enlisted
service-member, these individuals will, on average,
have lower GT scores than officers who are non-prior
service enlistees. The fraction of ROTC officers with
GT scores has increased slightly over time (from about
8 percent to about 10 percent). The fraction of USMA
officers with GT scores has decreased during this time
(about 7 percent to about 2 percent). Combined with
the average GT scores analysis provided above, these
data suggest that from 1995 to 2015, the estimated
average GT scores for individuals in OCS and the
USMA have increased, while the average scores for
people in ROTC have decreased.

Note: The figure above displays the percent of each SOC with
a GT score by year. All data used in this graph comes from the
Officer Master File and includes Active Duty commissions only.

Figure 9-4. Percent of SOC with GT Score.
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A policy change that lowered mental standards
for students in the ROTC program was made in 2006
when the Army reduced the minimum grade point
average (GPA) requirement for scholarship cadets
from 2.5 to 2.0. The 2.5 GPA requirement for scholarship recipients had been in place for decades. After
2005, scholarship cadets could keep their scholarships and be commissioned if they maintained a 2.0
average.19 The lowering of the GPA requirement was
more harmful than it appeared on the surface because
of grade inflation, a phenomenon that has been afflicting the nation’s collegiate community for years. While
a 2.0 GPA was a sign of academic competence in an
earlier era, this was arguably no longer the case by
the beginning of the 21st century. It was now commonplace throughout the nation’s college community
to find A grades being given to over 50 percent of a
class “with grades below B verging on extinction.”20
All types of schools have suffered from this malady
although inflation has been more pronounced in private than in public colleges.21 Grade inflation has been
the source of much hand-wringing because observers
like David Bassinger tell us:
Students not only possess on average no greater capacity
than they did in the past, they actually demonstrate less
mastery of basic educational skills—less ability to read,
write, think, and calculate—than did their counterparts a
generation ago.22

Significantly, the 2.5 GPA mark was never reestablished. At the time of this writing, the minimum
GPA requirement for scholarship cadets remains a 2.0.
Reducing the minimum GPA to the 2.0 level resulted
in Cadet Command commissioning 1,553 more officers between 2006 and 2015 (155+ per year) than it
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otherwise would have. See Table 9-1. The 1,553 figure
is not a large number but neither is it insignificant,
since it represents a little over 3 percent of total ROTC
production over a 10-year time frame.23
Graduating
Class

Scholarship Cadets
with GPA between
2.0 and 2.49

Total
Commissions

Percent of
Commissions

2006

141

4050

3%

2007

127

4088

3%

2008

148

4300

3%

2009

163

4592

4%

2010

199

4994

4%

2011

219

5451

4%

2012

201

5880

3%

2013

151

5600

3%

2014

115

5536

2%

2015

89

5581

2%

Total

1,553

50,072

3.10%

Table 9-1. Scholarship Cadets with GPAs
between 2.0 and 2.5.24
After 2007, the officer accessions environment
improved significantly. A high unemployment rate
helped matters. Between April 2007 and October 2009,
that rate rose from 4.5 percent to 10 percent. It began
to drop in 2011 but stayed above the 6 percent mark
until the fall of 2014.25 The gradual withdrawal of the
United States from Iraq and Afghanistan also helped
officer recruiting. In 2011, the last American troops left
Iraq, and then-President Barrack Obama outlined his
plan for reducing the nation’s commitment in Afghanistan. By 2015, the U.S. presence in the latter nation
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was a fraction (about 8 percent) of what it had been 3
years previously.26
Officer recruiting gradually became more difficult after 2012 as the unemployment rate sank, the
defense budget declined, the Army’s end strength fell,
the impressive body of incentives that had bolstered
officer recruiting after 2004 dissipated, and the supply
of officer candidates that had built up in the extended
officer accessions pipeline eroded. By 2016, the Army
was definitely feeling the pinch.27
WEST POINT
In the post-Cold War era, the USMA has followed the general trajectory that it had been on since
the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973
in the realm of candidate testing. Over this period, it
accentuated non-cognitive factors while subtly deemphasizing cognitive ones. The whole person score
remained its principal selection instrument, and
within that whole person score, the SAT remained its
primary intellectual vetting tool. In an attempt to raise
the retention level of its graduates once in the Army,
West Point adjusted the whole person score to place
more weight on non-cognitive factors. In this adjustment, the weight accorded measures of mental ability
or achievement (such as SAT scores and high school
GPA) dropped from 60 to 55 percent while the weight
attached to physical measures rose from 10 to 15 percent. It was a relatively small but very significant
change.
Despite its increasing focus on non-cognitive measures in its admissions policies, West Point remained
the SOC with the highest SAT average. In Figure 9-5,
we depict the average total SAT scores over time by
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SOC; unfortunately, data for OCS was unavailable. As
with GT scores, SAT scores provide one measure of
academic ability. The data reveals that while the average score of cadets at the USMA has remained higher
than the average ROTC SAT score through the postCold War era, the gap between the two SOCs has narrowed. In 1995, West Point had a 200-point advantage
over ROTC; by 2015, that advantage had decreased to
120. Figure 9-5 also reveals that the average scores for
ROTC and West Point cadets have increased slightly
over time. As with the GT scores, these average scores
reflect only the ability of the test-takers. We provide
more data on the SAT-taking rates by SOC below.
We must keep in mind, however, (1) that (as will be
shown presently) the ROTC line depicted on the chart
represents only a portion of the ROTC production
base; a substantial percentage of ROTC cadets (about
40 percent) do not have SAT scores in their records;
and (2) the SAT is a norm-based test that has been
gradually declining in rigor over the last 2 decades. It
is difficult to tell how meaningful the slight uptick in
scores referred to above really is.
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Note: The figure above displays the mean SAT score by the SOC
by year. All data used in this graph comes from the Officer Master
File and includes Active Duty commissions only. SAT data was
not available for OCS.

Figure 9-5. Average Total SAT Score by SOC.
In the post-Cold War era, West Point continued its
pursuit of new research initiatives to add and refine
non-cognitive, self-report measures. This research
eventually led to the adoption of the BioABLE instrument. This instrument concentrated on items that
were “historical, external, objective, first-person, and
primarily verifiable, at least in principle.”28 Researchers found that it was fairly effective in forecasting performance ratings.29
In the mid-1990s, the USMA and the Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) worked together on a project exploring
how a number of individual measurements gathered
at West Point correlated with demonstrated leadership
ability. The name of the project was the Baseline Officer Longitudinal Data Set (BOLDS). Like the Officer
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Prediction Project, the BOLDS effort covered an extensive collection of individual attributes. Analysis of the
BOLDS data revealed that standardized test scores, a
social judgment measure, and a measure of hardiness
were all useful predictors of cadet performance.30
RESERVE OFFICERS’ TRAINING CORPS (ROTC)
The ROTC entered the post-Cold War period still
using the Officer Selection Battery (OSB), albeit not as
a screen for admission into the Advanced Course.31
Analysts from ARI had discovered that OSB scores
were positively correlated with the faculty ratings and
grades of ROTC graduates in the Officer Basic Course
(OBC). These findings led TRADOC to incorporate the
OSB into the Pre-commissioning Assessment System
in 1986. Despite the correlation of OSB test scores and
performance in OBC, the OSB was discontinued in
1996. Nothing replaced it. The battery represented, as
Michael Rumsey notes, “the last major effort undertaken to develop an academically-oriented ROTC
selection measure.”32
Interestingly enough, Michael Rumsey states that
the OSB was discontinued “[w]hen the administration of the SAT or the ACT [American College Testing] to all applicants was determined to be a feasible
approach.”33 This contention has since been refuted
by Lenny Wong and Stephen Gerras of the U.S. Army
War College (USAWC), who point out that approximately 40 percent of ROTC graduates do not have
SAT or ACT scores in their records.34 Nevertheless, the
idea that the Army uses the SAT/ACT to screen all of
its officer applicants remains strong.
To provide additional insight into this matter, we
depict the percentage of ROTC and USMA cadets
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commissioned each year from 1995 to 2015 with a SAT
score. See Figure 9-6. For West Point, SAT scores are
available for virtually all officers (save 1999, which
might be a data problem). The Army, therefore, has
a clear picture of the academic abilities of USMA
cadets. For ROTC the picture is less encouraging. The
fraction of officers with scores is much lower overall.
Moreover, that fraction has declined steadily over the
period under consideration, falling from about 77 percent in 1995 to approximately 59 percent in 2015. This
suggests that the Army lacks any standardized measure of academic or intellectual ability on a large fraction of the officers in its largest commissioning source.
While many people assume that officers from ROTC
have completed the SAT and have been vetted or
screened prior to commissioning, this is only a partial
truth at best. This also suggests something about the
academic rigor of the institutions that ROTC cadets
are attending, since, for a large minority of cadets
(nearly 40 percent), their school does not require a
SAT score. Missing score data in Army records might
explain some of this, but the lower overall percentages of test-takers and the downward trend remain
concerning.
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Note: The figure above displays the percent of each SOC with a
SAT score by year. For cadets at USMA who took the ACT, we
use the estimated SAT data provided by USMA. All data used in
this graph comes from the Officer Master File and includes Active
Duty commissions only. SAT data was not available for OCS.

Figure 9-6. Percent of SOC with SAT Score.
The consequences of eliminating the OSB were
highlighted after the outbreak of the second Gulf war.
When young men and women failed to attain the minimum qualifying score of 110 on the GT test and were
consequently rejected for admission into the National
Guard OCS program, they sometimes turned to the
ROTC, where a standardized test was not part of the
selection procedure. They were subsequently able to
enroll in ROTC and earn their commissions, thus circumventing the ASVAB screening requirement of
National Guard OCS.35
Since the final demise of the OSB in 1996, research
into ROTC officer selection has focused on non-cognitive factors. The focus has been upon the development
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of construct-based measures of motivation and interests. These construct-based measures have drawn
upon instruments used by the Army in other venues.
The Rational Biodata Inventory and the Test of Adaptable Personality are two of these instruments. The
tools derived from research associated with these
instruments have proven effective as predictors of
attrition and performance in 4-year ROTC scholarship
recipients and are now used in the ROTC selection
process.36
RECENT ATTEMPTS TO USE COGNITIVE TESTING AS AN ROTC SCREENING INSTRUMENT
A recent commander of Cadet Command, Major
General Peggy Combs, attempted to reintroduce
cognitive testing in the ROTC candidate selection
process. Combs found support for this move in the
Army Human Dimension Strategy, which accentuates
“precision talent management” and “comprehensive
assessments of personal aptitude and potential.”37 She
initiated a search for a standardized test to serve as a
screening device for the Advanced Course soon after
she assumed command of the ROTC in the spring of
2014. It seemed irregular to her that OCS and West
Point required universal mental testing and ROTC did
not. In the ROTC world, standardized tests are seen as
serving multiple purposes—for building self-awareness, for identifying talent, for talent management, for
assessing the efficacy of the ROTC curriculum, and,
more problematically, for screening entry into the
Advanced Course. This last purpose—as a screening
device for the ROTC Advanced Course—has been,
and remains the most controversial application.38
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Combs and members of her staff initially proposed
that only cadets who scored above a certain minimum on the SAT should be allowed entry into the
Advanced Course. If the Army really wanted mentally
agile, critical thinkers as officers, they reasoned, then
candidates should be required to evidence a certain
level of intelligence or academic attainment. However,
many rejected the SAT as a screening tool because it
was generally regarded as undemocratic, an impediment to minority recruiting, and of marginal value as
a measure of military aptitude or career commitment.
Before 2015, the aversion to the SAT had been so widespread that Cadet Command did not even collect SAT
data on all cadets—only on certain types of scholarship
cadets (who had to submit a SAT score as part of the
scholarship application process). That only changed
in 2015, when Combs directed that SAT scores be systematically collected and archived.39 Cadet Command
eventually rejected the SAT as a screening instrument
because it was unable to come up with a score everyone could agree on.
Cadet Command next turned its attention to the
ASVAB. All OCS candidates have to take this test.
Combs wanted to use the ASVAB as the baseline
accessions test in ROTC to establish consistency within
the ROTC cohort. In any given year, from 35 to 40 percent of ROTC class has prior military service and has
taken the ASVAB. Cadet Command, however, did not
require a test of this type for progression cadets—i.e.,
those cadets who enter the program as college freshmen and take 4 consecutive years of ROTC.40
The ASVAB option, however, proved to be unworkable. Authorities in the Department of Defense told
Cadet Command that ROTC units could not administer the test because of the danger of compromise. To
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make the ASVAB practicable as a screening instrument, all ROTC cadets would have been required to
take the test at a Military Entrance Processing Station
site, a requirement that could not reasonably be met.
In addition, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) did not believe
the ROTC needed a test. That office thought that the
type and quality of lieutenant then being produced
was just fine and asked Cadet Command, “What’s
broken?”41
At the time of this writing, Cadet Command still
does not have an entrance test for the ROTC program,
at least for many of its cadets. The Air Force Officer
Qualification Test (AFOQT) is currently administered
during ROTC summer training, but is used as a leader
development instrument, not as a screening instrument. It is employed to promote self-awareness in
cadets and help them identify their strong and weak
points.42 While there is an awareness of the desirability
of mental screening for officers, it remains a very controversial proposition.43
OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL (OCS)
As in ROTC and at West Point, post-Cold War
selection research in OCS has centered on non-cognitive factors in an effort to ensure that the candidates
have the motivation to pursue a career in the Army.
The biodata approach that had proven useful in the
ROTC program was also employed in OCS. Such an
approach had been found to be a fairly accurate predictor of career retention as well as performance in
pre-commissioning training.44 In the latter stages of the
Iraq War, the Army became interested in determining
whether biodata measurements might be helpful in
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allowing it to go “beyond [its] existing selection tools”
and create a “predictor composite” for choosing OCS
candidates.45 It took this tack because, inter alia, biodata measurements have a less detrimental effect on
retention than do certain other types of selection measures based on mental ability.
Recognizing the lack of recent research into the
OCS selection process and the potential value additional assessment methods could have on helping OCS
meet its mission, the ARI initiated a research program
in 2008 called Measures for Selecting Soldiers for the
Officer Candidate School (referred to as SelectOCS).
The primary goal of SelectOCS was to identify a test
battery likely to select applicants who had strong leadership potential and possessed a high propensity to
remain in the service after commissioning.46 The project began with the development of the Officer Background and Experiences Form, a battery of measures
designed to assess aspects of applicant personality,
values, and judgment. In accordance with its purpose,
the form contained mostly non-cognitive domains.47
Insights into the development of the SelectOCS
can be found in an ARI report published in 2014 about
OCS selection methods. In this report, ARI researchers underlined the importance of the Officer Background and Experiences Form’s ability to measure
certain non-cognitive aspects of a candidate not measured by the ASVAB. While the ASVAB can predict
performance, they point out that has been shown to be
unrelated to turnover. This statement is true enough
but rather misleading.48 The relationship between
retention and mental ability is not linear but curvilinear. Candidates at both the top and bottom ends
of the mental ability spectrum tend to have lower
retention rates—the top end because they have better
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opportunities in the civilian labor market and the
bottom end because their performance is weak and
they are not retained in the Army (thus indicating
an inverted U relationship). This reinforces what the
Army has known for decades—namely, that individuals with superior intelligence tend to leave the Army
at high rates. Asserting that ASVAB scores are unrelated to turnover is thus rather disingenuous.
Still, it is true that measures of cognitive ability like
the ASVAB have proven to be less predictive of the
non-technical aspects of an officer’s performance—
aspects such as commitment, leadership, and personal
discipline—than they are of technical proficiency. That
is why the Army has chosen to rely primarily on “on
qualitative and descriptive materials such as interviews, documentation of educational requirements,
recommendations from superiors, and essays” for OCS
candidate selection. Army researchers have found
these non-cognitive instruments to be well suited to
assess whether individuals applying to OCS have the
character to be effective leaders. On the other hand,
there has been little standardization in how the Army
administers and scores these instruments. In identifying candidates for OCS, a lot depends on the subjective judgments of the selection board. Some boards are
relatively lenient while others are quite severe.49
Developing screening instruments for OCS has
become a more intricate process than it had been
formerly because, in the post-Cold War era, there
emerged two wide avenues for gaining entry into
the OCS program. One avenue was known as the
in-service option, and the other was known as the
enlistment option. Before the year 2000, most OCS
candidates were former enlisted Soldiers (typically
non-commissioned officers [NCOs]) and came into
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OCS through the in-service program. Accordingly,
most research concentrated on this element of the OCS
population. More recently, as a result of the Army’s
junior officer retention problems and a depleted NCO
leadership base, the Army has relied more heavily on
enlistment-option candidates, which targets graduates
of civilian colleges and universities; it has shifted its
research focus to reflect this new emphasis. The Army
refers to these candidates as enlistment option because
they are technically enlisted Soldiers for a short period
of time before entering OCS.50
Between 1998 and 2008, OCS expanded significantly. The program reached a post-Vietnam high
point in the years 2006 to 2008, when it produced
between 35 percent and 40 percent of new Army officer accessions; historically, only 10 to 15 percent of
the Army’s annual cohort of new officers came from
OCS.51 The Army achieved the expansion of OCS
through a greater reliance on the enlistment option. By
2009, this option accounted for about half of all OCS
commissions.52
After 2012, when combat operations had ended for
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and were drawing down
for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the Army
began reducing the size of its force and the number
of officers it accessed annually. The trend in a greatly
reduced OCS program was for the Army to favor
enlistment option candidates over in-service candidates. This was due in part to new selection requirements established in October 2010 that (a) required
all candidates to have a 4-year degree from an accredited college prior to entering OCS and (b) suspended
waivers for time-in-service, age, medical, and moral
reasons.53
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The application experience of an in-service candidate varies significantly from that of an enlistment-option candidate. For example, Human Resources
Command manages the in-service program while
U.S. Army Recruiting Command manages enlistment-option candidates. The latter type of applicant
must submit an application packet that contains college transcripts, letters of reference, and several personal information forms. Next, they must be screened
by a three-member board convened by a Recruiting
Battalion Commander. The board rates each candidate
in areas such as demeanor, oral communications, and
appearance. If the board renders a favorable decision,
the candidate is shipped to basic training; after graduation, the candidate reports to OCS.54
During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the academic attainment standards were higher for the
enlistment-option candidates than they were for the
in-service applicants. In-service applicants only had
to have 90 undergraduate credit hours to be eligible
for a commission; enlistment-option candidates had to
have a bachelor’s degree. The assumption was a large
portion of in-service applicants received credits from
post or online programs, while enlistment-option candidates were more likely to receive degrees from traditional 4-year colleges.55
Two ARI researchers, Teresa Russell and Trueman
Tremble, found that “in-service and enlistment-option
candidates differ[ed] in many ways.”56 As might be
expected, most in-service candidates had prior military service, and many had seen service overseas,
while most enlistment-option candidates had not
served in the military and had not deployed overseas.
In the sample used by ARI to develop selection instruments, in-service applicants were, on average, 33
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years old, and a solid majority had at least one child.
On the other hand, enlistment-option candidates were
younger (the median age was 27) and most did not
have children. Enlistment-service applicants were
more likely to be white, had higher levels of civilian
education, and attained higher marks on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) than their in-service
colleagues.57
There were also significant differences, Russel
and Tremble note, between in-service and enlistment
option candidates in terms of performance in OCS and
career motivation. In terms of performance, differences were notable on the final Army Physical Fitness
Test score, leadership performance, and the total OCS
score. These differences were large and significant,
with in-service candidates scoring higher than enlistment-option candidates on all measures. In-service
applicants were far more likely to indicate that they
intended to stay in the Army for a career. 58
On the other hand, the two types of candidates
were similar in some areas. They were “similar in
terms of their temperament, identity, affectivity,
values, leadership judgment and reasons for applying to OCS.” Their academic performance at OCS and
their retention rates in the OCS program were likewise
very similar.59
CONCLUSION
Officer testing in all three of the Army principal
commissioning programs has followed a similar trajectory during the post-Cold War period. In the screening
programs of the three principal SOCs, cognitive measures continued to be eclipsed by non-cognitive measures of aptitude and performance. The latter tended
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to be better predictors of retention in pre-commissioning programs and in the Army than the former. Very
high cognitive scores on standardized tests, in fact,
were found to have a negative correlation with career
commitment. Certainly, budgetary pressures (attrition
is costly) and military effectiveness issues (readiness
is negatively impacted by high officer turnover) combined to push defense and congressional leaders to
demand economy and efficiency in pre-commissioning training, and this meant placing a premium on
non-cognitive measures while deemphasizing cognitive ones. The Army, the Defense Department, and the
nation, as it seemed to the many observers, could not
afford to do otherwise.
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CHAPTER 10:
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
WHY HAS OFFICER TESTING BECOME LESS
RIGOROUS?
The progressive decline of rigor in officer testing
is not derived from a single cause, as some observers
have suggested, but has resulted from the confluence
of a number of policy decisions and long-term structural trends. It is our intent in this chapter to list and
briefly discuss these factors. Unfortunately, the restrictions of time and space mean that only the weightiest
of these factors can be discussed here. This means our
analysis is confined mainly to the strategic level, and
then only to the most salient factors. We believe that
these factors, or at least most of them, are irreversible
but some of their negative effects can be mitigated
through policy.
GROWTH OF THE OFFICER CORPS RELATIVE
TO THE U.S. POPULATION
Probably the most obvious and easily demonstrable of these factors is the size of the office corps relative to the size of the population. Over the last century
or so, the growth in officers has outpaced the growth
in people. This development has made the competition for each officer slot less intense, entry into the
officer corps correspondingly easier, and the task of
officer recruiting more complicated.
Between 1900 and 2016, the population of the
United States increased threefold, while the size of the
officer corps increased almost twenty-fivefold. Officer
strength reached its peak during World War II when
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the size of the Army and the Armed Forces reached
record levels. At that time, the Armed Forces exceeded
12 million men while the Army alone numbered over
8 million. To be sure, the Army shrank drastically in
size after the war. However, even when the demobilization was complete in 1947, the Army remained a
huge force by historic peacetime standards. In fact, the
Army that emerged from the post-World War II drawdown period was more than seven times larger than
the interwar Army had been. The Army gradually
contracted in the decades after the Korean War but
never again approached interwar manpower levels.
The upshot of all this is that since the turn of the last
century, the officer to population ratio has risen dramatically—by more than eightfold.1 With such a trend
line, a dilution of testing and accessions standards was
inevitable. See Figure 2-1 in Chapter 2.
DECLINING PRESTIGE AND ATTRACTIVENESS
OF A MILITARY CAREER
Since the beginning of the 20th century and particularly since the end of World War II, the prestige
and attractiveness of a military career has gradually
but steadily declined. This development is closely
connected with, among other things, the nation’s shift
from an Agricultural Age to an Industrial Age to an
Information Age economy. The status and attractiveness of an officer’s career changed as the economy,
the organization used to control and regulate industry, and the personnel practices of business enterprises
evolved over time. The general trend has been for the
officer corps of the military services to lose their relevance as engines of industrial and economic innovation and with that loss of relevance their attractiveness
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as a career choice for the nation’s best and the brightest young people.
In the early 19th century, when the nation stood
on the cusp between an Agricultural Age and Industrial Age economy, the officer corps was on the cutting
edge of technology and industrial organization. From
1820 until the Civil War, West Point—the Army’s most
prolific source of officers—was the leading engineering and technical school in the nation. Its graduates
built the transportation systems (roads, railroads, and
canals) and infrastructure that facilitated industrial
growth and westward expansion, wrote the engineering texts for the nation’s technical schools, and headed
engineering departments in many of the nation’s most
prestigious colleges. In this early stage of industrialization, military development generally led civilian
development in both the technological and organizational arenas. The government assigned Army officers to the railway companies to plan and oversee the
westward progress of rail lines. A number of Army
officers left the service and became the presidents of
railroads. Because it was a leading source of technological and industrial innovation, the officer corps
attracted men of relatively high social standing and
intellectual accomplishment. While it did not draw the
financial elite of the nation into its ranks in large numbers (Henry A. Du Pont being one of the most notable exceptions), it did have sufficient social appeal to
induce sons of presidents, secretaries of state, senators,
and representatives to join its ranks. At one point in
the 1840s, four sons of former presidents were matriculating at West Point.2
In the 9 decades between the end of the Civil War
and the beginning of World War II, the prestige of the
officer corps remained high. The Army’s officer corps
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continued to be relevant to economic and industrial
development. Although it was no longer on the cutting edge of engineering and technological progress,
there was a substantial cognitive overlap between the
duties of a field grade officer and those of a captain
of industry. The predominant industrial model still
followed the military management model. In terms of
the scale and scope of their responsibilities, the hierarchical structure of their organizations, their personnel management practices, their competitive ethos,
the goal-driven nature of their enterprises, and the
manner in which they controlled and managed their
budget, their realms were very similar.3
Industry, in fact, continued to borrow its organization and staffing model from the military. Indeed,
the nerve center of a large civilian firm closely resembled the organization of a division or corps headquarters. The Army’s officer education and development
system was adept at producing the kind of well-educated generalist that both industry and the military
highly valued. There was, in short, a great deal of
what psychologists call near-transferability between
their domains.

336

Domain Transfer and g
Virtually everyone agrees that the main function of education
is not merely the development of knowledge within the student but
the transfer of that knowledge by the student for use outside the
classroom.4 After all, if English-speaking students learning Spanish
could never speak or understand a single Spanish word when not in
the classroom, the propriety of foreign language education would
be called into question. The details of how best to accomplish this
transfer are the concern of teachers and researchers, but the fact of its
status as the major goal of all education and training is undisputed.
Knowledge does, indeed, transfer.5 Transfer has been a topic of
psychological research efforts since the dawn of the science through
to the present (e.g., C. Spearman, Fowler Brooks, George Ferguson,
Joseph Campione, Ann Brown, Susanne M. Jaeggi, Martin Buschkuehl, Priti Shah, and John Jonides). These researchers do not necessarily agree on the strength of the effect of general intelligence (or,
g) on transfer, but they are agreed that it does influence it.6
Mary Gick and Keith Holyoak, in some of the most cited research in cognitive psychology, examined whether and how students would transfer the logic learned from one situation to another analogous situation. A scenario was first presented which dealt
with a general wishing to attack and capture a fortress from which
many roads radiated. The details of the scenario led to the reasonable conclusion that only by dividing up his army along the many
roads could he capture the fortress. Students were then presented a
problem dealing with how best to use radiation to destroy a tumor.
Although the details of the two situations differed, the skeletal structure was identical; to wit, reduce the size of the attack force (soldiers
or photons) and position them along many paths simultaneously.7
Some students quickly and efficiently see the relations between
different situations or phenomena and are likely to transfer what
they have learned in one domain into the other; Spearman referred
to this as the education of relations and correlates.8 So what influences transfer? Erika Dahlin, Anna Stigsdotter Neely, Anne Larsson,
Lars Bäckman, and Lars Nyberg’s findings indicate that, “transfer
can occur if the criterion and transfer tasks engage specific overlapping processing components and brain regions.”9 This is where g
has its influence. Generally speaking, high g individuals require less
specific overlap in processing components and, by virtue of their
greater neuronal density, can more efficiently process and transfer
information.10
Educators continue to strive to improve student transfer efforts.
A general finding related to such efforts is that, for the majority of
students (who would necessarily be described as possessing average levels of g), transfer occurs in limited fashion, between near
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domains, and often requires overt cues.11 For high g individuals,
transfer is easier, more efficient, occurs between more distal domains, and frequently occurs spontaneously.12
Applying what is learned in the classroom to the field is transfer.
Army officers are educated in America’s colleges and universities
with the understanding that they will take what they have learned
at college and apply it to their jobs. This certainly occurs—think foreign language majors—but efforts at assisting transfer to dissimilar
domains, in spontaneous fashion, and while juggling competing demands, places a great premium on g. To the degree the Army does
not test for g, it cannot know whether it has this element in hand or
to what degree.

The continued economic and industrial relevance
of the military profession was reflected in the social
composition of the Army’s officer corps. To be sure,
sons of presidents no longer attended the U.S. Military
Academy (USMA). Nevertheless, the officer corps still
appealed to the children of well-heeled professionals
and managers through the interwar period. The pay
and benefits given officers permitted them to lead
an upper middle-class lifestyle, while the social perquisites afforded them a respected place in genteel
society.
Things began to change after World War II as the
Industrial Age gradually gave way to the Information Age. The secondary sector (manufacturing)—the
driver of economic growth in the Industrial Age—lost
prominence while the tertiary (service), quaternary
(knowledge-based, information management), and
quinary (top-level decision-making) sectors gained
prominence.
Responding to these economic shifts, the business model slowly changed. That model drifted away
from the rigid, top-down, hierarchical model pioneered by the military and toward a more flat, open,
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and egalitarian collegial model that was more adept
at responding to the competition and changes in the
environment. No longer was the cognitive operational
overlap between the military and business domains as
substantial as it once was.
Over the long transition period between the Industrial and Information Ages, (which according to some
observers began in 1947 and is still ongoing today), the
military gradually lost ground to civilian industry as
an engine of innovation, technological advancement,
and industrial organization. By the 21st century, the
change was nearly complete, with the military now
looking to borrow from civilian business ideas on how
to shape not only its technology and organization, but
the way it managed its personnel. Agile leaders, talent
management, total quality management, and other
management paradigms that the Army has adopted
over the last 3 or 4 decades were imports from the
business world. Moreover, some modern corporations began to look for leaders who were vastly different from those who had led the business world a
half century before. Depth of talent in an individual
now trumped breadth of talent on the new corporate
list of leadership attributes. Thus, generalists lost relevance while managers possessing a depth of knowledge gained it.
It is emblematic of this trend, perhaps, that when
the Department of Defense began to shape a strategy and build a force to combat emerging threats in
the cyber realm, it turned to the civilian world and
not to its internal resources to do so.13 It was clear
that the military no longer had the talent or motivation to undertake such a complex task.14 The military’s
hierarchical organization for management seemed
increasingly dysfunctional. Its outdated personnel
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management policies were, it was alleged, driving the
most talented officers out of the Army. Its multi-layered command structure was an albatross around its
neck, preventing it from responding to threats and
developments with the necessary rapidity. The adaptability pressure increased along with the need for the
quick acquisition of information.15 There were many
calls for the Army to become more like civilian businesses and adopt a more flat, open, and democratic
management structure. With his Force of the Future
initiative, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter was a leading advocate of such change. To date, the Army has
been unable and unwilling, for a variety of reasons, to
embrace this transition wholeheartedly and extend it
to encompass its core functions.
These changes in the business model were accompanied by an erosion of officer compensation. The
officer corps grew in size as the attractiveness of an
officer’s compensation package declined. A colonel
in 1954 received substantially the same compensation
as a captain in the 1930s. The officer corps also lost
some of its financial and social perquisites. Medical
and dental care, post exchange and commissary privileges, and insurance benefits were all downgraded or
eliminated. Moreover, a new spirit of egalitarianism
infused the officer corps—helped along by the Doolittle Board and similar study groups—and the privileges and prestige formerly accorded officers declined.
Morris Janowitz characterized this decline as an inevitable consequence of modern society.16
In the post-World War II era, the socio-economic
profile of the officer corps changed dramatically.
For example, the changing socio-economic profile of
entering West Point cadets. In the post-World War II
era, the number of cadets hailing from working class
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families grew larger while the number of cadets from
the professional and managerial classes decreased.
The religious affiliation of cadets also changed
dramatically, which was a reflection of the larger
socio-economic changes mentioned previously. Once
a bastion of mainline Protestantism—especially Episcopalianism—the Academy was now increasingly
filled with students from Catholic or low-prestige
Protestant denominational backgrounds.17
Also, consider the declining academic level of the
officer corps. It was not until the 1960s that the officer corps once again had a clear majority of officers
with baccalaureate degrees. Moreover, by the time
the officer corps attained this mark, the baccalaureate
degree had been considerably devalued. A bachelor’s
degree in the age of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)
was roughly equivalent to a high school diploma in
the interwar period.
We are not arguing that the social, religious, and
demographic changes discussed above are negative
or that the social status quo should have been preserved. We are highlighting the dramatic changes
that shook the officer corps in the wake of World War
II—changes that negatively affected the attractiveness
and prestige of the military profession, and nudged
the Army toward both widening the field from which
it recruited officers and making its officer screening
mechanisms less stringent.
EXPANSION OF COLLEGE FINANCIAL AID AND
FUNDING
The tremendous growth in college scholarships
and other assistance packages also worked against
officer recruiting and commissioning standards. The

341

amount of financial aid available to students exploded
after World War II and has generally been on the rise
ever since. This explosion of financial aid was fueled
by critical pieces of legislation, such as the a very generous Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944—known
as the GI bill—for veterans, the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the Higher Education Act of 1965,
and the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of
1978, to name just a few.18 Student financial aid not
only expanded but also became more variegated in the
decades after World War II. Federal financial grants,
federal work-study funds, federally backed loans,
state grants, institutional assistance, and financial
aid from corporations, foundations and other private
organizations all became integral parts of the financial
assistance landscape.
The growth of student financial aid resulted in a
fundamental change in the admissions process at most
of the nation’s leading civilian universities. Before
World War II, these institutions had screened their
annual intake of students largely by the metrics of
wealth. With the increased availability of financial aid,
they now screened primarily by cognitive ability.19
This growth of student aid was generally bad news for
the service academies and other officer commissioning
programs. The Army’s once generous financial incentives were now far less attractive than before the war.
Inevitably, this erased an important advantage for
West Point and the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
(ROTC) in their quest to attract the nation’s brightest
undergraduates.
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“UNBALANCED” GROWTH IN COLLEGE
ATTENDANCE
Between 1910 and 2010, the number of young
people enrolled in college shot up by more than 1000
percent.20 The percentage of this population enrolled
in college increased as well. In 1910, 5 percent of that
population was enrolled in college; by 2015, nearly 70
percent was. The rise in college attendance has been
particularly dramatic since 1980. In the 3 decades
between 1980 and 2010, the number of young people
enrolled in college rose by 50 percent. This post-1980
expansion has been enabled by students who fell on
the left side of the collegiate intelligence distribution—i.e., they were generally less intelligent than the
average student entering college in 1980 and before.
This implies that the average college graduate in 1980
was more intelligent that the average college graduate
of 2016.
Some government and business organizations have
recognized this decline in the intellectual attainment
level of bachelor’s degree holders and compensated
for it by requiring a master’s degree as a condition of
employment. The military, however, has not made this
adjustment. It has dealt with this decline by ignoring it
and by lowering or ignoring standards. Although the
pool of potential officer candidates has grown over the
last 4 decades, it has not grown in a way that would
promote a more intellectually capable officer corps.21
As Matthew Cancian points out, the drop in intelligence levels shows up not only in the middle of the
distribution, but also at the top. Cancian notes how in
the Marine Corps not only the average General Classification Test (GCT) score of officers has declined,
but also the number of officers who are achieving the
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highest scores. In 1980, 14 Marine officer candidates
attained a score above 155 on the GCT—a test with a
maximum score of 160. By 2005, there were only two
officer candidates who had a score above 155. In 2014,
the number was zero.22 The general technical (GT)
scores of Officer Candidate School (OCS) candidates
in the Army have seen a similar decline.23
GROWTH OF MILITARY COMPETITION
The growth of the Navy and the Air Force after
World War II presented recruiting challenges to the
Army and its officer accessioning programs. Between
1935 and 1955, the size of the Navy grew almost sevenfold, while the Marine Corps experienced a twelvefold expansion.
The Air Force represented a new element of competition after World War II. In the interwar period, Air
Corps personnel strength had been included under the
Army personnel account. After the war, the Air Force
became an independent organization whose officer
needs nearly equaled those of the Army. In 1955, its
end strength was 87 percent that of its parent service.
At the same time that competition was intensifying,
the Army itself was getting larger. Between 1935 and
1955, the Army grew by a factor of eight. Considered
as one entity, the defense establishment increased
nearly twelvefold between 1935 and 1955. With the
growth of competition, accessions and testing standards were inevitably affected.
Even more damaging to the Army was the fact
that its two largest military competitors were more
attractive service options for young people and consequently drew off the best talent—leaving the Army
with less to choose from. Evidence of this can be seen
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in the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores
necessary for induction, since services that are the
least attractive have the most lenient accessions standards. The Army has the least restrictive entrance
requirements, requiring a 31 on the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), with waivers possible down to 26, depending on recruiting
needs. The Air Force has the most restrictive entrance
requirements. It requires a 36 on the ASVAB if candidates have a high school diploma and a 65 if they have
a general educational development (GED) certificate.
Waivers are possible down to 31 if recruits have special skills like speaking a foreign language. The Navy
falls in the middle. It requires a score of 31 with a high
school diploma and a score of 50 with a GED.24 The
Army, it is important to note, does not have a different standard for GED holders. This is because it generally does not have the option of being as selective and
discriminating as the Navy and Air Force in its entry
requirements.
It is difficult if not impossible to find comparative data about officer accessions. The SAT (formerly
known as the Scholastic Aptitude Test and the Scholastic Assessment Test) is a requirement for only a
fraction of the cadets in the Army ROTC program so
any comparison with the ROTC programs of the other
services would be suspect. However, the SAT scores
of incoming classes at the services academies, while
not definitive, are informative and very suggestive.
The Naval Academy has the highest SAT standard.
The average SAT score of entering freshmen is 1341.
The Air Force Academy comes next with an average
entering freshman score of 1314. West Point is last; its
average score is 1283.
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Again, it is our contention that ASVAB and SAT
scores reflect the relative attractiveness of the services
and the most attractive services get the most talented
work force. Attractiveness is a function of many factors—image, lifestyle, work environment, compensation, training, and skill acquisition being among the
most important. The Air Force is perceived as high
tech, modern, progressive, egalitarian, clean, civilized,
and relaxed. Skills acquired in the Air Force tend to be
easily transferable to civilian life, and the lifestyle and
work environment in that service are generally pleasant. Deployment and field duty have less of a negative connotation in the Air Force than they do in the
ground forces. It is the service that most closely parallels civilian life.
The Navy is also perceived as high tech and
modern. Skills acquired in the Navy are also easily
transferable to civilian life. The lifestyle and work
environment are clean and relatively pleasant. Service in the Navy is generally not gritty or dirty, but
does often involve long cruises and periods away
from home. Conditions on ships are clean, but often
cramped. The Navy is not quite as relaxed as the Air
Force. It is more bound by tradition and discipline is
harsher. It also tends to be more hierarchical and aristocratic. Still, it is usually seen by prospective officer
aspirants as a better career alternative than the Army.
The Army and Marine Corps are not perceived as
being as modern and high tech as the Navy and Air
Force. Soldiers and Marines are perceived as “grunts”
and less cerebral than airmen and sailors. They deploy
frequently and spend long stretches in the field. The
lifestyle and work environments are often seen as
harsh and physically demanding. Both the Marine
Corps and the Army are seen as bound by tradition
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and regulated by harsh discipline. The Marine Corps
has the advantage of being perceived as elite by large
segments of the youth population. All this must be
considered in the context of the general decline in military propensity among youth over the last half-century or so. Competition from the other services thus
detracts significantly from the Army’s ability to
impose strict testing and high accessions standards.
INCREASING EMPHASIS ON NON-COGNITIVE
FACTORS AND RETENTION
The Army began to place increasing emphasis on retention as a factor in officer selection beginning immediately after World War II. This inevitably
entailed greater stress on non-cognitive factors in officer testing instruments. By the late 1950s, non-cognitive factors counted for almost as much as mental
ability for entrance into officer producing programs.
Later, these factors largely displaced measures of
intellectual attainment.25
Officer procurement was a larger concern for the
Army after World War II than it had been in the interwar era. A far greater annual supply of newly minted
officers was needed to lead the force. Unfortunately,
the officer recruiting environment in the post-war era
was far less favorable than it had been in the 1930s.
Unemployment was low, the economy was booming,
Army compensation was eroding, and the Army lifestyle was deteriorating. A cost conscious Congress
severely cut commissary and post-exchange benefits,
eliminated life insurance for officers, and reduced
medical and dental benefits. Officers no longer lived
an upper middle-class existence. Consequently, the
Army struggled with officer recruiting and retention.
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In the post-war period, the service lost many of its
best and brightest junior officers after the expiration
of their initial service obligation. Images of undergraduates at the nation’s leading private universities
flocking into ROTC programs in the 1950s are, at best,
overblown.26 True, conscription (or more accurately
selective service) ensured that the Army would always
have enough second lieutenants and tended to channel students into ROTC to escape the draft.27 However,
it did not ensure that the Army would have enough
captains or senior first lieutenants to meet its needs.
That was because lieutenants, especially the best and
brightest ones, tended to leave the service as soon as
their military service obligation expired, which in most
cases was after 2 years. Indeed, the Army suffered
from a huge junior officer deficit in the 1950s—a deficit that only grew worse in the early 1960s when the
Army and its officer corps expanded to meet the needs
of Kennedy’s so-called Flexible Response strategy and
the Berlin Crisis. The raising of the minimum service
obligation of West Point graduates from 4 years to 5
years in the early 1960s is a testament to the concern of
Congress about junior officer retention problems.
During this era, West Point became concerned
about not only the retention of cadets through the
Academy experience, but of its graduates in the Army
after graduation. As a result, West Point adjusted its
admissions policies and standards to boost retention. It began in 1947 when the USMA introduced a
personality survey to assess a candidate’s potential
to navigate through West Point successfully and the
likelihood of his remaining in service for a career. This
new tact was also evident in West Point’s adoption of
the “whole man score” in 1958.28 The whole man score
was devised to select not necessarily the smartest or
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most intellectually talented candidates, but those who
were, in the words of one of the Army’s social scientists, “best motivated for attendance at the Academy
and for a subsequent Army career [emphasis added].”
The score was a composite of various academic measures, measures of physical proficiency, and evaluations of leadership potential.29 It differed from earlier
admissions procedures in the weight accorded non-academic factors in the selection process.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was becoming apparent, and would become even more apparent in later decades, that abundant intelligence and
retention in the Army were not positively correlated.
Consequently, rigorous, criterion-referenced tests of
academic aptitude and attainment, which in decades
past had regulated entrance into the USMA, were
abandoned in favor of norm-referenced achievement
and aptitude tests and psychometric survey instruments that identified candidates most motivated
toward staying in the Army. This process, which began
in the years after World War II and gained momentum
in the decade thereafter, accelerated West Point’s slide
out of the ranks of elite undergraduate institutions.
The same trend was evident in the ROTC program, which became the Army’s largest commissioning source for active duty accessions after World War
II. However, the slide from away from rigor to retention was much more radical and dramatic in ROTC
than at West Point. The ROTC Qualifying (RQ) Test
gave way to the Cadet Evaluation Battery (CEB) in
the early 1970s, which in turn gave way to the OSB in
the early 1980s. Entrance testing in ROTC as a general
requirement was abolished completely in 1996. Officer screening was further diluted after 2003 under the
strain put on the officer corps and officer accessions
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by the war on terror. The disregard for measurements
of academic ability and intellectual attainment by the
Army is reflected by the fact that Cadet Command
did not start keeping records of SAT scores on a systematic basis until 2015, when certain Army leaders,
like the Cadet Command commander, Major General
Peggy Combs, and some observers, such as Lenny
Wong, Stephen Gerras, and Matthew Cancian, began
to question mental standards in military commissioning programs.
Complacency or wishful thinking (or perhaps
both) on the part of the Army was partly responsible
for this retreat from cognitive tests for officers. The
Army assumed after World War II that acceptance into
college and the attainment of a baccalaureate degree
would be sufficient to ensure the requisite degree of
intellectual attainment in the officer corps. As the baccalaureate degree lost much of its value over the years,
the Army did not adjust its assumptions or methods to
take this into account. Indeed, it actually increased its
reliance on the bachelor’s degree as a screening device.
It continued to consider, and in fact still does today,
the baccalaureate degree as a credential certifying the
necessary level of intellectual attainment and mental
aptitude. Only recently has this begun to change.
Moreover, the requirement for officers from ROTC
and the USMA to have a bachelor’s degree led the
social scientists who developed the non-cognitive tests
for officers to assume that most officers took the SAT
or the American College Testing (ACT) exam. This, to
our dismay, is simply not true. In fact, between 40 and
60 percent of the Army officers on active duty in recent
years have no evidence in their records that they took
such a standardized test. In any case, even if they did,
this score was not used to screen their entry into their
commissioning program.30
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s as the Army was
transitioning to an AVF and coming to grips with its
officer accessions challenge, a fundamental change in
the Army’s accessions philosophy occurred—a change
that still impacts officer accessions today.
Since, generally speaking, abundant intelligence
was negatively correlated with remaining in the
Army, it had to be sacrificed to increase career commitment and raise retention rates in the officer corps.
This realization began to inform all officer accessions
policies. To paraphrase one observer, the Army gave
up on “motivating the educated” (they simply would
not stay in the Army past their initial service obligation in anything near the numbers required) and
embraced the concept of “educating the motivated.” It
might not have described the situation accurately, but
it did get the point across clearly. Motivation replaced
intelligence as the most important consideration in
officer selection.
Various private and government-affiliated research
entities led, or at least provided justification for, this
“race to the bottom.” Numerous studies on officer
motivation and career success typically led to prescriptions that involved substituting less rigorous tests
of mental ability for more rigorous ones. They also
involved adding factors measuring various non-cognitive qualities into the mix, and in the process made
intellect less important in the selection process. West
Point’s whole man score is an excellent example.
At West Point, the race to the bottom began immediately after the war when inventories attempting to
measure personality and background became more
prominent parts of the admissions process and the
rigor in admissions tests was reduced. Officer selection tests turned from tests of academic attainment
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to tests of “tactics” and “practical skills” because,
Army researchers found, they were good predictors of
“combat leadership performance.”
Many studies focused on the short term and immediate—who would be retained in the ROTC program
or at the Academy, who could succeed in jobs required
of lieutenants. Instead of asking cadets to trace the history of the Greco-Persians Wars (as West Point applicants had to do in the 1930s), they were assessed on
how competently they inspected a vehicle and how
well they directed the evacuation of an office in the
event of an emergency. The social scientists who studied these matters attempted to apply the techniques
they used on the enlisted force, where jobs and career
paths were well defined, to the officer corps, where
jobs were more open-ended and ill-defined. To be
sure, several analytical organizations did attempt to
come up with job descriptions so the Army could—as
it did for the enlisted ranks—link specific positions
and career specialties to specific skills, attributes, and
knowledge.31 Nevertheless, officer positions resisted
specific classification and categorization; they presented more performance measurement problems and
involved more complexity than enlisted positions and
were simply too nebulous and broadly configured to
be precisely defined.32
In addition, past efforts to construct officer job
descriptions largely ignored the fact that the Army
was selecting colonels and generals at the same time it
was selecting lieutenants. There is, after all, no lateral
entry for line officers.33 Some observers have called for
the Army to use broad measures of intellectual ability in selecting tomorrow’s strategic thinkers.34 Only in
this way, they argue, can the Army produce the type
of mentally agile, adaptable, and innovative leaders
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we are told are necessary to deal with the myriad
challenges of the 21st century. To date, the Army has
not been able to overcome these challenges and has
exerted limited effort to focus on quality over quantity. As a result, it has never established meaningful
intelligence standards for lieutenants or any other officer rank.35 To the extent that it has incorporated more
testing, it has generally prioritized standardization
over rigor.
ACHIEVING DIVERSITY GOALS
The Army’s attempt to achieve diversity goals
has also contributed to the dilution of its intellectual
screening procedures. This is true for two principal
reasons. First, a smaller proportion of the nation’s
African-Americans and Hispanics than whites attend
and graduate from college. Thus, the base from which
the Army can draw is relatively small for certain
minorities. Second, the nation’s most selective colleges and the commissioning programs of the other
services are generally more attractive to minority
applicants than are the Army’s commissioning programs. Consequently, West Point and the Army
ROTC are compelled to accept many minority applicants who are not accepted by highly competitive colleges or by the service academies or ROTC programs
of the other services. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines are pursuing many of the same candidates
and, in this competition, the Army usually loses out.
Thus, the Army has had to lower its accessions standards to achieve what it considers to be a desirable
demographic distribution in its pre-commissioning
programs.
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SUMMARY
This book has suggested that, contrary to popular
opinion and scholarly assertion, the rigor of the Army’s
intellectual selection instruments has deteriorated
over the course of the last century. In all three of the
Army’s principal commissioning sources—the USMA,
ROTC, and OCS program—the trend has been toward
declining standards and declining (relative) scores.
The size of the Army, changing economic paradigms,
declining prestige of an Army career, expansion of
college aid, “unbalanced” college growth, competition
from the other services, increasing emphasis placed on
officer retention, and diversity considerations all help
explain this trend.
This trend of deteriorating mental standards,
strangely enough, has generally escaped the notice of
social scientists and historians, who in their studies
depict the history of officer testing as one of uninterrupted progress. Even the fact that the Army’s largest
commissioning program (ROTC) has operated without a nominal intellectual screening instrument since
1996—and in a practical sense since the early 1980s—
is not widely recognized. To be sure, screening tests
have become more standardized and broad-based
since World War II; they now include psychometric
measures that were not a part of the officer selection
process before World War II. However, they also have
become less intellectually rigorous because of the factors we have just discussed.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We offer a few preliminary recommendations that
we feel would restore a degree of rigor and selectivity
to the officer screening process. Given what the Army
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expects of its officers, we believe this is an urgent
matter. At the very least, we hope our recommendations will focus attention on this issue and stimulate
further discussion about improving officer selection.
First and most importantly, we believe that there
should be required testing for officer candidates in all
commissioning sources. We echo the calls of observers
such as David Lyle, Lenny Wong, Michael Colarusso,
Matthew Cancian, Tim Kane, David Barno, and Nora
Benashel, who have already made similar recommendations in scientific journals, professional military
journals, and public media outlets. Moreover, as urged
by Lyle and Colarusso, we believe that the scores
achieved on these tests should be recorded in personnel files and used by the Army for officer assignments and career management decisions.36 The tests
employed could be the ASVAB, the Air Force Officer Qualification Test (AFOQT), the SAT, or the ACT
and could even vary by source of commission (e.g.,
the ASVAB for OCS, the SAT for the USMA and the
AFOQT for ROTC). The important thing is that some
test should be adopted and some standard enforced.
In addition, there should be explicit accession standards attached to these tests, both in terms of a minimum and an average. The Army should establish
minimum scores for program entry (an ASVAB score
of 110 and an SAT score of 900 seem reasonable, but
these numbers could be fine-tuned with input from
the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences (ARI) and other stakeholders). Equally
important, there should be standards for each source
of commission related to the distribution of scores.
So perhaps West Point should be required to access
cadets with an average SAT score of 1200 and ROTC
with an average of 1050. Alternatively, the Army could
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establish quality categories (e.g., Category I through
IV) using standardized test scores for its officer recruits
in the same way that it does in its enlisted recruiting
efforts. Either method would ensure not only a minimum intellectual ability level, but also a higher level
of aggregate intellect in the officer corps. In this way,
the Army’s officer corps would improve its collective
cognitive capability over time and its readiness to
respond to America’s strategic challenges.37
The Army might also consider gearing these
standards to appropriate comparison institutions to
account for the changing demographics and abilities
of the distribution of American students pursuing
higher education. An appropriate initial guess might
be to tie the average for West Point to the nation’s toptier public flagship institutions (e.g., the University of
California, Berkeley; the University of California, Los
Angeles; the University of Michigan; and the University of Virginia). In the mid-1980s, West Point’s superintendent, Lieutenant General Dave Palmer, liked to
show a graph that depicted West Point’s degree of
selectivity as falling between Harvard and Penn State.
Perhaps that would be a worthy standard to readopt.
True, Penn State is more selective now than it was in
the mid-1980s on a relative basis, but given the huge
size of the entering class at Penn State and other flagship state institutions, it is a standard that should be
within the USMA’s reach. Similar benchmarks could
be adopted for ROTC programs.
In support of improved officer accession standards, we note that the Army could do more to identify and access officers from its large and diverse pool
of enlisted Soldiers. By coupling reviews of current
military performance with administrative data on
standardized test scores (both the ASVAB and the
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SAT/ACT), the sources of commission (SOC) could
significantly improve recruiting and selection processes. Existing research demonstrates the potential to
recruit a large number of intellectually capable (e.g.,
SAT scores above 1200) candidates to become officers,
many of whom also support SOC diversity goals.38
The Army could conduct an annual review of its most
capable enlisted personnel and work with them to
secure admission to West Point or to an appropriate
university with an ROTC scholarship.
What the Army does not need is more studies suggesting that high mental ability has not been found to
be positively correlated with retention in the Army.
This has been stated by numerous studies in a variety
of ways. The Army’s interests could be better served
by focusing on what programs or incentives could
keep highly intelligent people in the officer corps. To
meet the challenges of the future, the Army needs to
retain people with many outside employment options,
not those with limited outside employment options.
It is necessary to emphasize that testing must continue throughout an officer’s career, and be part of the
broader officer assessment system. A system of institutionally mandated and comprehensive testing of
mental ability and achievement is an integral part of
the Army’s Talent Management plan—a plan elaborated in Lyle and Colarusso’s book, Senior Officer Talent
Management. In that book, Lyle and Colarusso call for
collecting and keeping standardized test results such
as the Test of Adult Basic Education, the Defense Language Aptitude Battery, the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) and the SAT.39 Recent efforts at West
Point in support of the Talent-Based Branching system
demonstrate the feasibility of such testing and data
collection.
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In the near term, the Army must maximize the
capabilities of its current stock of human capital. This
means that even though mental testing standards and
the intellectual capability of the force have declined,
the Army has an obligation to develop and employ its
force to the best of its ability. Accordingly, it should
do everything in its power to train and educate officers to maximize their domain expertise—namely,
their expertise within their particular career fields
and assigned jobs. In order to do this, the Army must
increase the rigor of its professional military education
programs (from pre-commissioning training through
the War College), make students accountable for their
academic performance, and grade accordingly.40 A 100
percent graduation rate at a professional military education school is not necessarily a good thing. The Army
may never get the critical thinkers it says it wants, but
it must ensure that it does its part to develop leaders
highly skilled in operational and enterprise military
functions. For the time being, this is all that can reasonably be accomplished.
This will also require, at a minimum, extended
tenure, more effective matching of officer talents and
positions, and, probably most importantly, a deliberate commitment to rigorous, formal assessment programs throughout an officer’s career. For more details
on policies the Army should develop in support of
this workforce optimization, see Colarusso and Lyle’s
Senior Officer Talent Management: Fostering Institutional
Adaptability.
Finally, we acknowledge that if current compensation remains fixed and the Army raises its accession
and promotions standards relative to cognitive testing, there would likely be shortfalls in officer production and staffing. Conversely, if current compensation
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remains fixed and the Army wants to staff the force,
it will need to maintain its low mental standards.
However, there is no reason that compensation must
remain fixed. The solution requires a balance between
all three elements: manning requirements, cognitive
standards, and compensation. Given our calls for
higher expectations in terms of cognitive ability, a corresponding increase in compensation also seems in
order. Highly capable individuals have options, and
inducing them to join and stay in the Army as officers requires appropriate compensation. An AVF is
an effective but expensive system; such a force staffed
with more cognitively capable leaders will naturally
require additional investment.
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Figure A-1. Excerpt from the Official Register
of the Officers and Cadets of the United States
Military Academy, 1910.1
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Figure A-1. Excerpt from the Official Register
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Figure A-1. Excerpt from the Official Register
of the Officers and Cadets of the United States
Military Academy, 1910. (cont.)
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Figure B-1. Reproduction of the Pamphlet
Questions Used in the Competitive Examination
Held in May, 1914.1
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Figure C-1. Army Group Examination Alpha:
Test 2.1
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Figure C-2. Army Group Examination Alpha:
Test 3.2
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Figure C-2. Army Group Examination Alpha:
Test 3. (cont.)
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Figure C-3. Army Group Examination Alpha:
Test 4.3
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Figure C-4. Army Group Examination Alpha:
Test 5.4
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Figure C-5. Army Group Examination Alpha:
Test 6.5
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Figure C-6. Army Group Examination Alpha:
Test 7.6
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Figure C-7. Army Group Examination Alpha:
Test 8.7
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1. Clarence S. Yoakum and Robert M. Yerkes, comp. and
eds., Army Mental Tests, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920, pp. 262-263, available from https://archive.org/details/
armymentaltests00yoak, accessed September 29, 2017.
2. Ibid., pp. 264-265.
3. Ibid., pp. 266-267.
4. Ibid., pp. 268-269.
5. Ibid., pp. 270-271.
6. Ibid., pp. 272-273.
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Figure D-1. Army Group Examination Beta:
Test 1.1
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Figure D-2. Army Group Examination Beta:
Test 2.2
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Figure D-3. Army Group Examination Beta:
Test 3.3
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Figure D-4. Army Group Examination Beta:
Test 4.4
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Figure D-5. Army Group Examination Beta:
Test 5.5
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Figure D-6. Army Group Examination Beta:
Test 6.6
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Figure D-7. Army Group Examination Beta:
Test 7.7
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Figure D-8. Army Group Examination Beta:
Test 8.8
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accessed September 29, 2017.
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